Valencia v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

Full title: ANA L. VALENCIA, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

Court: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Date published: Jul 12, 2012

Case No.: 1:11 -cv-01970 - JLT (E.D. Cal. Jul. 12, 2012)

Opinion

Case No.: 1:11 -cv-01970 - JLT

07-12-2012

ANA L. VALENCIA, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

Jennifer L. Thurston

ORDER GRANTING SECOND EXTENSION OF

TIME

(Doc. 16)

The parties have stipulated by counsel to extend the period of time for Plaintiff to file an opening brief. (Doc. 16). Notably, the Scheduling Order allows an extension of thirty days by stipulation. (Doc. 7-1 at 4). "With the exception of the single thirty day extension, requests to modify [the] order must be made by written motion and will be granted only for good cause." Id.

On June 26, 2012, the Court granted the stipulated extension of time, and ordered Plaintiff was "granted an extension of time until July 10, 2012, to file an opening brief." (Doc. 15). On July 12, 2012, Plaintiff's counsel filed a stipulation for second extension of time (Doc. 16), which the Court interprets the parties' stipulation as a motion to modify the scheduling order. Therefore, Plaintiff is required to demonstrate good cause in seeking a second extension.

A scheduling order "is not a frivolous piece of paper, idly entered, which can be cavalierly disregarded without peril." Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 1992). The deadlines are considered "firm, real and are to be taken seriously by parties and their counsel." Shore v. Brown, 74 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 1260, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94828 at *7 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2009). Plaintiff's counsel asserts he "has several briefs due this week and he needs to prepare for oral argument at the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on July 12, 2012." (Doc. 16 at 2). Notably, the request for an extension of time was untimely, and made after the deadline had expired. Counsel's pending case load and argument before the Ninth Circuit were matters that should have been considered at the time the first extension was requested. Nonetheless, because Defendant has consented to an extension of time, the request is GRANTED.

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED: Plaintiff is granted an extension of time until July 24, 2012, to file an opening brief. IT IS SO ORDERED.

Jennifer L. Thurston

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE