Opinion
No. 3D21-1823
12-01-2021
Francisca VALDES, Appellant, v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, etc., Appellee.
Marrero, Chamizo, Marcer Law, LP, and Julio C. Marrero, for appellant. Lapin & Leichtling, LLP, and Jan Timothy Williams, Coral Gables, for appellee.
Marrero, Chamizo, Marcer Law, LP, and Julio C. Marrero, for appellant.
Lapin & Leichtling, LLP, and Jan Timothy Williams, Coral Gables, for appellee.
Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and LOGUE and BOKOR, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Finding no preliminary basis for reversal, we summarily affirm the order on appeal. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.315(a). The initial brief references possible violations of the federal CARES Act and various state executive orders on foreclosure. None of the claims relate to conduct at the foreclosure sale. See Venezia v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 306 So. 3d 1096, 1097 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) ("[T]he law is well established that an objection to a foreclosure sale must be directed toward conduct that occurred at, or was directly related to, the foreclosure sale.") (citing IndyMac Fed. Bank FSB v. Hagan, 104 So. 3d 1232, 1236 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012). Accordingly, the trial court correctly denied the motion.
More troubling than the baseless grounds for appeal, however, is the fact that Valdes cites to cases purportedly for support of its position that, instead, appear to support the opposite result without any explanation. The record in the trial court and before us reflects that the original foreclosure sale was set in 2018. Such sale was cancelled and reset multiple times because of two unsuccessful bankruptcy petitions and a failed attempt at removal to federal court. However, with no apparent irony, Valdes objects to the reset foreclosure sale while citing to a case that explains that the CARES Act "does not, by its terms, prohibit a servicer from moving to reset an already scheduled foreclosure sale." Landau v. RoundPoint Mortg. Serv. Corp., 925 F.3d 1365, 1370 (11th Cir. 2019). Valdes provides no support or argument as to how the CARES Act or the various executive orders referenced (pertinent portions of which having either gone into effect after the initial sale date or expired prior to the date on which the sale finally occurred) apply to her sale, which was reset from an initial sale date in 2018. Additionally, it appears that Valdes may have abandoned her objection to the sale and waived the basis for this appeal by not showing up to the August 10, 2021, hearing on the objection and by representing to opposing counsel the evening before the hearing that "upon review of Plaintiff's July 7, 2021 Response...our office will be filing tonight a Notice of Withdrawal of the relief sought mooting the hearing tomorrow."
The remand order explains not only the insufficiency of the removal in the instant case, but also lists other examples of Valdes's counsel's "patently frivolous" removals in other cases.
Because we summarily affirm the order on appeal, the motion to dismiss is denied as moot. We retain jurisdiction for resolution of the pending order to show cause, and for purposes of determining entitlement to and, if appropriate, amount and scope of sanctions. Pursuant to section 57.105(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.410, Valdes’ counsel, Julio C. Marrero, Esq., shall show cause in writing within 10 days why this Court should not impose sanctions, including but not limited to an award of appellate fees and costs against both appellant and attorney Julio C. Marrero, Esq., for the filing of a frivolous appeal and for misrepresenting or failing to address the Court with full candor regarding: the status of the reset sale dates, Valdes's counsel's failure to appear at the hearing on the objection to sale before the trial court, and the representation that the objection would be withdrawn the day before the trial court's hearing thereon.