Defendant appeals, claiming that Supreme Court improperly included certain joint brokerage accounts in the distribution of marital property, that plaintiff's distributive award should be reduced to account for her willful dissipation of marital assets after the commencement of the action, and that the measure and duration of spousal maintenance is inappropriate. Finding none of defendant's claims to be meritorious, we affirm. Initially, it is well settled that the statutory factors enumerated in Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(5)(d) should be considered in a court's equitable distribution of marital property (see, Butler v. Butler, 256 A.D.2d 1041, 1042, lv denied 93 N.Y.2d 805; Avramis v. Avramis, 245 A.D.2d 585, 586; Vail-Beserini v. Beserini, 237 A.D.2d 658, 660), although they do not have to be specifically cited when the factual findings of the court otherwise adequately articulate that the relevant statutory factors were considered (see, Fraley v. Fraley, 235 A.D.2d 997, 997-998; Sperling v. Sperling, 165 A.D.2d 338, 343-44). Although not specific as to each factor, Supreme Court's findings of fact reveal that the court was well aware of the statutory factors and the legislative purposes behind the statute.
The plaintiff lived with the defendant rent-free for more than 20 years. He also maintained two offices, one at the defendant's residence and the other at the rental property, and did not pay rent on either of those offices. Even if we were to accept the plaintiffs claims as to his contributions, the scope of those contributions could not be attributed to more than "the give and take of the [parties'] relationship" ( Sylvester v Sbarra, 268 AD2d 424, 424; see Terrille v Terrille, 171 AD2d 906; Vail-Beserini v Beserini, 237 AD2d 658). The jury awarded the defendant $10,000 on her counterclaim for reimbursement of the rental income the plaintiff had collected but had failed to give her. Since we have concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to a constructive trust that would result in his joint ownership of the rental property, the Supreme Court's reduction of the jury's award from $10,000 to $5,000 was not warranted.
Defendant asserts two reasons why plaintiff should not be credited with any of the payments used to pay the mortgage debt on the marital residence. First, relying on this Court's decision in Vail-Beserini v Beserini ( 237 A.D.2d 658), he argues that no credit is due plaintiff because no part of the mortgage debt was incurred for improvements or renovations resulting in an increase in the value of the marital residence. To the extent that Vail-Beserini may be read as supporting that view, it should not be followed.
Likewise, it was defendant's burden to prove his contention that his monthly disability payments are compensation for personal injury and, in light of his failure to present evidence on that issue, Supreme Court properly distributed those payments between the parties (see, Alwell v. Alwell, 277 A.D.2d 789, 790; Parrish v. Parrish, 213 A.D.2d 928, 928-929). The record also clearly supports Supreme Court's finding that the three life insurance policies owned by the parties — two by plaintiff and one by defendant, all insuring defendant's life — were marital property inasmuch as all premiums were paid with marital assets during the marriage and subject to waiver of the payment of premiums since 1994 because of defendant's disability (see, Dougherty v. Dougherty, 256 A.D.2d 714, 715-716; Vail-Beserini v. Beserini, 237 A.D.2d 658, 660). We reject defendant's invitation to revisit our prior decision in which we held that the final order of divorce obtained by plaintiff in Vermont did not bar this action for equitable distribution under the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata.
We reject plaintiff's contention that the court erred in distributing the cash value of the parties' life insurance policies. We also reject the contentions of the parties that the court erred in distributing 30% of plaintiff's medical practice to defendant ( see, Vail-Beserini v. Beserini, 237 A.D.2d 658, 659-660). "[T]he court has great flexibility and discretion to fashion an equitable award" ( Lester v. Lester, 237 A.D.2d 872, 874), and we conclude that the court did not abuse that discretion.
A plaintiff seeking to impose a constructive trust upon property must show, inter alia, a transfer in reliance on an express or implied promise, and unjust enrichment ( see, Terrille v. Terrille, 171 A.D.2d 906, 907). "The transfer concept extends to instances where funds, time and effort were contributed in reliance on a promise to share in the result" ( Terrille v. Terrille, supra at 908). Here, the majority of the plaintiff's expenditures, for items such as newspapers, telephone service, cable television, and oil, were for expenses which were not over and above that which could be attributed to the give and take of the relationship ( see, Vail-Beserini v. Beserini, 237 A.D.2d 658, 660). Hence, no expenditure of funds was made in reliance on the defendant's alleged promise that the house would be jointly owned. In any event, the defendant, who paid all mortgage and real-estate taxes, was not unjustly enriched.
Plaintiff appeals, claiming that Supreme Court's distribution was not equitable and that temporary maintenance was improperly terminated. It is axiomatic that the factors enumerated in Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (5) (d) should be considered in the court's equitable distribution of marital property ( see, Avramis v. Avramis, 245 A.D.2d 585; Vail-Beserini v. Beserini, 237 A.D.2d 658). However, the statutory factors do not have to be specifically cited where it is evident that the relevant factors were taken into consideration by the court and the reasons for its decision are articulated ( see, Fraley v. Fraley, 235 A.D.2d 997; Chasin v. Chasin, 182 A.D.2d 862; Sperling v. Sperling, 165 A.D.2d 338).
At trial defendant established that plaintiff owned two life insurance policies with cash values of $1,599.98 and $2,729.51, respectively. As plaintiff offered no evidence that these policies constituted separate property ( see, Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [1] [d] [1]), defendant is entitled to a 50% distributive award of these assets, totaling $2,164.75 ( see, Vail-Beserini v. Beserini, 237 A.D.2d 658, 660; Annis v. Annis, 189 A.D.2d 846; Miller v. Miller, 150 A.D.2d 652; cf, Turner v. Turner, 145 A.D.2d 752), and Supreme Court erred in failing to make such award. Moreover, given the current custodial arrangement between the parties and the lack of any child support obligation on plaintiff's part, in addition to sharing equally in the unreimbursed medical expenses of their two dependent children, the parties should also share equally in the annual health insurance premiums for the children until the youngest daughter has attained the age of 21 ( cf, Juneau v. Juneau, 206 A.D.2d 647, 649; Costanza v. Costanza, 199 A.D.2d 988, 991; Chasm v. Chasm, 182 A.D.2d 862, 863 [each case holding that it was improper to require a parent to pay health insurance premiums in addition to child support]).
Defendant continued her involvement in the practice until December 1994 when plaintiff terminated her services. Inasmuch as plaintiff's practice was established during the course of the parties' marriage ( see, Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [1] [c]; Miness v. Miness, 229 A.D.2d 520, 521) and defendant directly contributed to its appreciation in value ( see, Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5] [d] [6]; Vail-Beserini v. Beserini, 237 A.D.2d 658, 660; see also, Sarafian v. Sarafian, 140 A.D.2d 801, 805), we conclude that the practice is a marital asset to which defendant is entitled to an equitable share. We further find that the 25% distributive award was not an abuse of discretion given the nature and extent of her contributions.
Further, Supreme Court credited the testimony of defendant that he did not cause the delay in obtaining the certificates of occupancy for all of the units. Defendant testified that the delay was the result of unanticipated conditions beyond his control, such as the replacement of an electrical transformer and the necessary additional work required by the replacement, asbestos removal for which defendant was not responsible, and the inability of plaintiffs to secure a conflict of interest waiver from the Department of Housing and Urban Development. "Determinations of the trial court regarding credibility and the weight of evidence are to be afforded great weight on review" ( Vail-Beserini v Beserini, 237 A.D.2d 658, 661). The contention of plaintiffs that the court erred in granting defendant judgment on his counterclaim for the balance due him, less certain offsets, is without merit.