Opinion
E070915
10-25-2018
V.A. et al., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY, Respondent; SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Real Party in Interest.
Friedman & Cazares, Monica Cazares, and Andrew Haas for Petitioner, V.A. Law Offices of Arthur J. LaCilento and Arthur J. LaCilento for Petitioner, C.A. No appearance for Respondent. Michelle Blakemore, County Counsel, Pamela J. Walls, Special Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. J275299) OPINION ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petitions for extraordinary writ. Annemarie G. Pace, Judge. Petitions denied. Friedman & Cazares, Monica Cazares, and Andrew Haas for Petitioner, V.A. Law Offices of Arthur J. LaCilento and Arthur J. LaCilento for Petitioner, C.A. No appearance for Respondent. Michelle Blakemore, County Counsel, Pamela J. Walls, Special Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
Petitioners V.A. (Mother) and C.A. (Father) each filed a petition for extraordinary writ pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, challenging an order of the juvenile court denying them reunification services and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 as to their one-year-old daughter A.A. Both parents contend there was insufficient evidence to support the denial of reunification services under the bypass provisions. We find no error, and so deny both writ petitions.
All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Detention—March 2018
On the evening of March 5, 2018, Mother and Father brought seven-month-old A.A. to the emergency room at Montclair Medical Center. A.A. presented with a skull fracture, bruising to the face, and a swollen forehead. A.A. received a head CT and then was transferred to Kaiser Permanente in Fontana to see a specialist.
Mother told the responding social worker that A.A. had fallen out of her arms while she was holding A.A., with one hand under A.A.'s head and the other under A.A.'s bottom. Mother stated A.A. was pushing back and kicking toward Mother's stomach; A.A slid out of Mother's arms and fell, "twisting" and hitting the left side of her face on the top of a walker/jumper and then hitting the right side of her head on the linoleum-covered cement floor of the converted garage. Mother tried to soothe the crying A.A., but 10 minutes later she and Father decided to take A.A. to the emergency room because A.A. was dozing off and staring off to the side. Father was not in the room when A.A. fell, but walked into the room to see Mother picking up A.A. from the floor.
The parents disclosed that they lived with the maternal grandfather and his wife, along with two maternal aunts. Mother cared for A.A. during the day while Father worked, and Father cared for A.A. in the evenings when Mother worked.
The social worker saw A.A. and noted she had bruising on her left upper cheek and around the left eye. A.A. was responsive and appeared developmentally on track when the social worker spoke to her. A.A. was big for her age and was taking medication for hypothyroidism. The on-call neurologist told the social worker that the head CT showed a small displaced fracture to the occipital bone, which he characterized as "just a crack." The neurologist said the fracture could have been caused by the fall as reported by Mother. The nurse caring for A.A. told the social worker that A.A. was doing well and seemed neurologically appropriate, and that Mother and Father were at A.A.'s bedside and acted appropriately. On March 7, 2018, the Kaiser social worker told the responding social worker that the skeletal exam showed no rib, spinal, or displaced fractures, and that that A.A. was ready for discharge. A.A. was discharged from the hospital on March 8.
On March 13, 2018, A.A. was seen at the Children's Assessment Center (CAC) by Dr. Young. A.A. was developmentally appropriate for her age, had begun sitting unassisted two weeks prior, supported her weight on her legs, reached for objects, babbled, was starting to imitate some sounds, and was starting to crawl. The head CT view taken on March 5 showed two skull fractures of the right occipital bone, one of which appeared to be a complex skull fracture, and possibly a third skull fracture. A.A. had a small area of bleeding or hemorrhaging of the brain tissue, along with an indication of bleeding from a prior injury. A.A. had swelling on the left side of her scalp in addition to an injury on the right side, which "is concerning as an area of additional impact." Mother stated she had not previously been aware of the swelling on the left side of the scalp. A.A. also had bruising to her pubic region, which Mother explained as being caused by A.A. hitting herself with a toy. Mother said the bruises on A.A.'s back were caused by the car seat. Dr. Young stated the numerous injuries were not explained by a single fall and directed that A.A. be admitted to Loma Linda University Medical Center (LLUMC) for further evaluation, including additional head CT's.
On March 16, 2018, the social worker and a police detective scheduled a meeting with the parents at the police station to discuss the results of the CAC exam and possibly conduct a polygraph test. The parents did not show up to the meeting and did not answer or return telephone calls. Their attorney called and stated he was advising the parents not to speak with police or social workers.
That same day, the social worker obtained a detention warrant for A.A. and served it on the parents at the hospital. Father came out of the patient room alone and said Mother was holding A.A. as she slept and the social worker could talk to him alone. The social worker stated she must speak with both parents. Mother stated she had received the social worker's calls and messages, but Father interrupted and stated their phones were broken. Father told the social worker to speak with his attorney regarding the matter.
At the detention hearing held on March 21, 2018, the court detained A.A. and ordered hospital visits with A.A. for both parents.
Jurisdiction and Disposition—April-July 2018
In the jurisdiction and disposition report filed April 6, 2018, CFS recommended no reunification services for either parent, pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5). The family's prognosis for reunification was listed as "poor" because A.A. had sustained numerous serious injuries (skull fractures, swelling to the forehead, and bruises to the face and groin) that could not be accounted for by the single fall described by Mother. The social worker concluded the serious nature and extent of A.A.'s injuries called into question Mother's protective capacity.
The original police report from the Montclair Police Department concluded that the allegations of physical abuse are "unfounded," based on interviews with the parents and hospital staff.
Mother was 18 years old and graduated from high school in 2017. She and Father had been together for about two years. The parents were engaged to be married, but had not yet set a date. Father was 22 years old. Mother had recently begun working at a fast food restaurant, and father worked at a warehouse. Mother indicated A.A. was always with her or with Father. The maternal step-grandmother occasionally watched A.A. for an hour while Mother ran errands. Mother stated she had no concerns when Father or the maternal step-grandmother cared for A.A. A.A. was the first child for both parents. Father was arrested in 2016 for battery with serious bodily injury.
The social worker supervised one of the visits and described it as going "well." A.A. went to her parents willingly and they interacted with A.A. appropriately and lovingly. A.A. appeared to be bonded to both parents.
The jurisdiction and disposition hearing was continued to May 2, 2018, for the trial setting conference. Mother was already engaging in parenting classes and Father had enrolled in parenting classes. Both parents were requesting additional services.
At the further hearing on May 2, 2018, CFS notified the parties that it was adding section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6), as an additional basis for denying reunification services. Both parents asked for more visits than the current once a week for two hours, and to attend medical and Inland Regional Center appointments. The court ordered that the parents be allowed to attend appointments and authorized CFS to liberalize visits. The court set the jurisdiction hearing for July 11 and the disposition hearing for July 18, with a pretrial settlement conference for June 20.
CFS filed an additional information to the court, or "CFS 6.7" (6.7), on June 19, 2018. In the 6.7, CFS continued its recommendation for no reunification services. A.A. was doing well in her foster placement, but concerns arose about her overall development. The caregiver and service providers reported that A.A. was not doing some things that children of similar age could do, such as sit up unassisted. A.A. was referred to several specialists, including a neurologist. Both parents were undergoing individual counseling; both parents were cooperative in counseling, but Father appeared more guarded at first. A supplemental police report indicated the police now believed A.A.'s injuries were a result of child abuse, after speaking with Dr. Young. The parents' visits with A.A. continued to go well.
We note that when A.A. was evaluated at CAC on March 13, she was sitting unassisted and was described as developmentally appropriate.
Numerous documents were attached to the 6.7. Dr. Young provided an addendum to her initial consult of March 13, 2018, dated June 29, 2018. Dr. Young stated that a head scan conducted at LLUMC on March 15 indicated multiple skull fractures. Dr. Young described the three fractures as "a right complex, branching occipital fracture near the lambdoid suture," "another fracture of the right occipital bone extending to the base of the skull," and a "posterior left parietal bone fracture which crosses the lambdoid suture and extends into the left occipital bone." Dr. Young concluded that these multiple fractures would be "consistent with multiple blunt impacts to the head and not a single fall as described by mother." Attached to the 6.7 are copies of the head CT scans taken on March 15 showing the described fractures, as well as photographs of A.A.'s injuries that were taken during the CAC evaluation on March 13. Also attached is the radiologist report of the head CT scans taken on March 15, which documents the multiple skull fractures described by Dr. Young, along with indications of a current brain hemorrhage and a prior brain hemorrhage.
The jurisdiction hearing was held on July 11, 2018. The court accepted into evidence the social workers' reports and attached medical and police reports, including the addendum CAC report, the photographs of A.A.'s injuries, and her CT scans. None of the parties called any witnesses. After hearing argument from the parties, the court found true each of the allegations in the section 300 juvenile dependency petition: under subdivision (a), serious physical harm, in that A.A. suffered numerous nonaccidental injuries while in the care of each parent; and similar allegations under subdivision (b), failure to protect, and subdivision (e), severe physical abuse of a child under age five. The court specified that it was making each of the findings by clear and convincing evidence.
The disposition hearing was held on July 17, 2018. The court ordered the confidential psychological evaluations for Mother and Father be attached to the 6.7, filed on June 19. The court heard testimony from the two psychologists who prepared the reports, and from the social worker. Dr. Brodie testified that he conducted a psychological exam of Father on May 18, and was provided with all social worker, medical, CAC, and police reports up to that date. Father displayed no cognitive impairment, mental illness, or pathology. Dr. Brodie testified that it was his opinion that Father would benefit from reunification services and that the services would likely prevent reabuse.
Dr. Roberts testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation of Mother to determine whether she could benefit from reunification services and whether the services would possibly prevent reabuse or neglect of the child. Dr. Roberts testified that Mother's personality traits, intellectual ability, eagerness, and ability to complete services indicated she would benefit from reunification services and was at extremely low risk for reabusing the child.
The social worker, Ms. Figueroa, testified that she investigated and wrote the jurisdiction and disposition report, as well as the 6.7 report. She testified that A.A. was bonded to Mother, reached out to her during visits, and did not display any fear of Mother. Mother was cooperative with the social worker, motivated to participate in services, visited with A.A. consistently and appropriately, and attended A.A.'s medical appointments. Ms. Figueroa testified similarly about Father. Mother had no criminal history, was employed, and maintained stable housing. Ms. Figueroa had been a social services practitioner since 1999 and had been involved in many cases involving serious physical abuse. In her experience, it was not uncommon for seriously abused infants to show affection to their parents. Both parents presented as likable, concerned for A.A., and eager to do what CFS asked of them. However, the social worker stood behind the recommendation of no reunification services because "[w]ithout a clear understanding of how this child was so seriously and severely injured, I do have strong questions about whether the child can safely remain or return to their care, given the serious nature of the injuries." Ms. Figueroa stated that in order for the parents to benefit from reunification services, CFS needs "some honesty as to what led and contributed to this child being seriously injured and receiving three skull fractures. And I have not received that with any of the interviews with the family, or the therapists that worked with the family, or in the psychological evaluations that were provided for these parents."
After hearing argument from the parties, the court indicating this was a "harder case than most" because the parents did not have some of the factors normally seen in dependency cases, such as drug abuse, domestic violence, and prior CFS and criminal histories. The court noted that the parents had been cooperative and eagerly participated in services; it described the parents as "more deserving than some parents that we have to give services to." However, the court then stated it was dealing with a very young child with the described serious injuries, most notably three skull fractures. The court commented that "primarily what is driving this" is that the child's injuries indicated she had been abused on more than one occasion and that the parents had no explanation for that. The court then found that both section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5) and (b)(6) applied and denied reunification services to both parents.
Mother and Father timely filed their writ petitions under California Rules of Court, rule 8.452(a).
DISCUSSION
1. Jurisdiction Findings under Section 300 , Subdivision (e)
The parents challenge the court's jurisdictional finding by clear and convincing evidence that they severely abused A.A. under section 300, subdivision (e) (subdivision (e)).
" 'On appeal from an order making jurisdictional findings, we must uphold the court's findings unless, after reviewing the entire record and resolving all conflicts in favor of the respondent and drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment, we determine there is no substantial evidence to support the findings. [Citation.] Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value. [Citation.]' " (In re Christopher C. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 73, 84.) "We do not reweigh the evidence, nor do we consider matters of credibility." (In re E.H. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 659, 669 (E.H.).)
A child can come under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under subdivision (e), where: "The child is under the age of five years and has suffered severe physical abuse by a parent, or any person known by the parent, if the parent knew or reasonably should have known that the person was physically abusing the child. For the purposes of this subdivision, 'severe physical abuse' means . . . more than one act of physical abuse, each of which causes bleeding, deep bruising, significant external or internal swelling, bone fracture . . . ."
Here, the medical evidence demonstrates that A.A. suffered severe physical abuse, as defined in the statute. Further, the record demonstrates severe physical abuse even by the more stringent "clear and convincing evidence" standard that section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5), requires to use section 300, subdivision (e), as a basis to deny reunification services. A.A had three separate skull fractures, indications of current and prior bleeding in her brain, soft tissue swelling and hematoma on the left side of her head, "significant bruising" around her left eye, and bruising just above the pubic area and back. More specifically, Dr. Young, the child abuse specialist from LLUMC, stated unequivocally in her consult addendum dated June 29, 2018, that A.A.'s injuries are "consistent with multiple blunt impacts to the head and not a single fall as described by mother." Further, the record shows that the injuries may have affected A.A.'s development. Three months after A.A. was admitted to the hospital, the caregiver and service providers began to report that A.A. "is not doing some things like sitting up unassisted like children of similar age," whereas the CAC evaluation on March 13 indicated she was sitting up unassisted, starting to crawl, and was developmentally appropriate.
Father argues the evidence does not demonstrate that he physically caused A.A.'s injuries or that they occurred while A.A. was in his care and custody, because both parents state Father was not in the immediate vicinity when Mother dropped A.A. Such evidence is not necessary for a true finding under subdivision (e). Rather, the statute states that the evidence only need demonstrate that Father, or someone known to him, abused A.A and that he knew or reasonably should have known that a person known to him was abusing her. In E.H., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th 659, the court held under subdivision (e), that because the child under age five suffered severe physical abuse and was never out of the custody of either the mother or father, the parents either inflicted the injuries themselves or reasonably should have known who inflicted the child's injuries. (E.H., at p. 669-670.) The child welfare agency in that case correctly employed a " 'res ipsa loquitur' " type of argument, using the facts to support the jurisdictional finding under subdivision (e). The appellate court agreed. (See E.H., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 669.) Here, A.A. is a child under age five who suffered severe physical abuse; the parents worked opposite shifts so one of them could always be with A.A., except for a few occasions where the step-grandmother watched A.A. while Mother ran an errand. Therefore, under the reasoning of E.H., it is reasonable to infer that either Mother or Father inflicted A.A.'s injuries, or each of them knew or reasonably should have known who did.
Mother argues the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence that she knew or should have known that A.A. had sustained previous injuries. This argument assumes the court believed that all of A.A.'s visible injuries occurred as Mother said they did, accidentally and on a single occasion. However, our review of the jurisdictional hearing shows that the court simply did not find Mother's or Father's explanation for the injuries to be credible. As the trier of fact, the trial court had authority to determine questions of credibility. (In re Cole Y. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1452.) The court had good reason to doubt the parents' credibility: the history provided by the parents is just not supported by the unchallenged and abundant medical evidence. The evidence shows that A.A. had three separate skull fractures, two separate brain hemorrhages—one new and one old—bruising to the vaginal area, back, and left eye area, and soft tissue swelling on the scalp. The court had before it the opinion of Dr. Young, the child abuse specialist, that the three skull fractures were consistent with multiple blunt impacts to the head, rather than the single fall described by Mother and reinforced by Father. A finding of severe physical abuse under subdivision (e) can be supported by circumstantial evidence. (E.H., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 670.) Here, the evidence supporting the finding is that A.A. was severely injured on more than one occasion, had multiple bruises to her back, vaginal area, and left eye, that she had three skull fractures, two separate brain hemorrhages and a swollen scalp, and that her parents were the only persons who regularly cared for her. Yet neither parent could account for all of A.A.'s many injuries. This is clear and convincing evidence, both direct and circumstantial, that each of the parents either abused A.A. themselves or knew that someone, presumably the other parent, was abusing her. For these reasons, we affirm the court's finding of jurisdiction under subdivision (e), by clear and convincing evidence.
2. Denial of Service under Section 361 .5, subdivision (b)(5)
Both parents argue the juvenile court erred when it denied them reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5) (subdivision (b)(5)). We disagree, based on the court's true finding, by clear and convincing evidence, under section 300, subdivision (e).
"We affirm an order denying reunification services if the order is supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.]" (In re Harmony B. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 831, 839.) "On review of the sufficiency of the evidence, we presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order. [Citations.]" (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) Section 361.5, subdivision (a), generally mandates that reunification services are to be provided whenever a child is removed from the parent's custody. However, subdivision (b) of section 361.5 sets forth the circumstances under which reunification services may be bypassed. "Once it is determined one of the situations outlined in subdivision (b) applies, the general rule favoring reunification is replaced by a legislative assumption that offering services would be an unwise use of governmental resources." (In re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 478.)
Subdivision (b)(5) provides: "(b) Reunification services need not be provided to a parent or guardian described in this subdivision when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, any of the following: [¶] (5) That the child was brought within the jurisdiction of the court under subdivision (e) of Section 300 because of the conduct of that parent or guardian."
As explained ante, we affirm the court's jurisdictional ruling that A.A. comes within its jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (e). The court made the finding by clear and convincing evidence, as required to use the bypass provisions set forth in section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5). As is also explained ante, we affirm that substantial evidence supports the court's finding under section 300, subdivision (e), by clear and convincing evidence, rather than just the preponderance of the evidence required for jurisdiction. Therefore, "reunification services need not be provided" to either parent.
As both parents point out, section 361.5, subdivision (c)(3), provides in addition "the court shall not order reunification in any situation described in paragraph (5) of subdivision (b) unless it finds that, based on competent testimony, those services are likely to prevent reabuse or continued neglect of the child or that failure to try reunification will be detrimental to the child because the child is closely and positively attached to that parent. . . ." Our affirmance of the true finding under section 300, subdivision (e), is enough by itself to defeat Mother's and Father's challenges to the disposition. This is because, once the court makes the section 300, subdivision (e) finding by clear and convincing evidence, "reunification services need not be provided." (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(5).) Section 361.5, subdivision (c)(3), is an additional hurdle for the parents to overcome at disposition and an additional restriction on the court, should the court be inclined to consider granting reunification services despite the bypass provisions of subdivision (b)(5). (See In re A.M. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1076.) It is also a ground for the child protective agency to challenge in this court the granting of reunification services. (See In re Z.G.(2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 705; In re G.L. (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1153.) Section 361.5, subdivision (c)(3), is not a ground for challenging in this court the denial of reunification services under subdivision (b)(5). This is because, even if we were to find that the court abused its discretion in failing to find under section 361.5, subdivision (c)(3), either that reunification services are likely to prevent reabuse or detriment because the child is closely and positively attached to the parents, the plain language of subdivision (b)(5) still provides that "reunification services need not be provided." The court did not err when it denied the parents reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5).
3. Denial of Services under Section 361 .5, subdivision (b)(6)
"[O]nly one valid ground is necessary to support a juvenile court's decision to bypass a parent for reunification services, . . ." (In re Madison S. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 308, 324.) Nevertheless, we explain post how the petitioners fail to establish error regarding section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) (subdivision (b)(6)).
Subdivision (b)(6) provides: "(b) Reunification services need not be provided to a parent or guardian described in this subdivision when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, any of the following: [¶] (6)(A) That the child has been adjudicated a dependent pursuant to any subdivision of Section 300 as a result of severe sexual abuse or the infliction of severe physical harm to the child . . . by a parent or guardian . . . and the court makes a factual finding that it would not benefit the child to pursue reunification services with the offending parent or guardian."
Mother briefly asserts the evidence before the juvenile court did not support a finding by clear and convincing evidence that A.A.'s injuries came within the meaning of "severe physical harm" as defined in section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6). She also disputes that there was clear and convincing evidence that she "was complicit, participated in, acted in omission or by consent to the deliberate abuse" of A.A. We conclude that the medical evidence (the head CTs, the radiology report, and Dr. Young's reports), as described ante in our discussion of section 300, subdivision (e), establishes by clear and convincing evidence the "severe physical harm" to A. A. in the form of multiple skull fractures that were inconsistent with a single accidental fall. That the harm was inflicted by the parents is, again, supported by the evidence that the parents were the only two people who spent any significant time caring for A.A. and that A.A. was injured on more than one occasion in a manner inconsistent with Mother's account of a single fall.
The court also made the required finding under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6)(A), that it would not benefit A.A. to pursue reunification services for either parent. As the juvenile court explained: "I have a seven and a half month old child who has three skull fractures, bruising to the pubis, and what Dr. Young calls a significant bruise on the left eye. This combination of injuries didn't happen from one fall. It's not a case where it's just one incident of neglect. And that is primarily what is driving this. In addition to the fact, obviously, that we have no explanation from the two caretakers of this seven and a half month old child at the time."
Subdivision (i) of section 361.5 lists the following relevant factors to consider when determining under subdivision (b)(6) whether reunification services would benefit a child. First and second are the specific act or omission comprising the severe physical harm inflicted on the child and the circumstances under which the harm was inflicted. While we do not know the specific acts or circumstances, other than the improbable (according to Dr. Young and the juvenile court) story of the single accidental fall, we do know the results—again, three separate skull fractures, two distinct cerebral hemorrhages, swelling of the scalp and bruising to the left eye, lower back, and pubic area, as well as what appears to be a decline in A.A.'s previously age appropriate development. The court considered in its decision the circumstance that the injuries took place while A.A. was in the parents' care and that "the injuries . . . speak for themselves." Factors three, four and six, the severity of the child's emotional trauma, parental history of abusing other children, and the child's desires for reunification, are not relevant because A.A. was so young and was the parents' first child. Factor number five is "[t]he likelihood that the child may be safely returned to the care of the offending parent or guardian within 12 months with no continuing supervision." The court stated that it considered this factor to be "significant," and we agree. This is because, although the psychologist for each parent stated that the parent had participated willingly and extensively in services, and would benefit from additional services, the social worker was skeptical about their ability to have A.A. safely within their care, unsupervised by CFS, within 12 months. The factors here include A.A.'s young age and vulnerability. More important, neither parent had admitted responsibility or described truthfully how A.A. had obtained her many injuries from multiple instances of abuse, and thus they were unable to address the causes of the abuse as part of their services. It is difficult to see how the parents can effectively treat the causes of the abuse without acknowledging that the abuse had happened, as well as the parent's part in committing or condoning the abuse. (See In re A.M. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1077 ["[T]here are no services that will prevent reabuse by a parent who refuses to acknowledge the abuse in the first place."]) Thus, we find substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parents inflicted severe physical harm on A.A. and that it would not benefit A.A. to provide the parents with reunification services.
Finally, section 361.5, subdivision (c)(2), provides: "The court shall not order reunification for a parent or guardian described in paragraph . . . (6) . . . of subdivision (b) unless the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the child." It is the parent's burden to "affirmatively show that reunification would be in the best interest" of the child. (In re Ethan N. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 55, 66.) As with section 361.5, subdivision (c)(3), discussed ante, this is a prerequisite for granting reunification services, not a basis for overturning the court's decision to deny services.
To conclude, the parents have not established that the juvenile court erred when it denied them reunification services.
DISPOSITION
The petitions are denied.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ
P. J. We concur: McKINSTER
J. MILLER
J.