The policy defined medical expense as "all reasonable and necessary expenses for medical . . . services . . . incurred. . . ." Id. Accordingly, to answer the coverage question, we focused on the meaning of the term "incurred," as defined by this Court in Virginia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hodges, 238 Va. 692, 385 S.E.2d 612 (1989). In Hodges, we said that "[a]n expense can only be `incurred' . . . when one has paid it or become legally obligated to pay it."

The Court of Appeals observed that "[t]o 'incur' means '[t]o suffer or bring on oneself (a liability or expense),'" id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 885 (10th ed. 2014)), and that this Court has held that a medical expense "can only be 'incurred' when one has paid it or become legally obligated to pay it," id. (quoting Virginia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. v. Hodges, 238 Va. 692, 696 (1989); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Bowers, 255 Va. 581, 585 (1998)). The Court of Appeals found this definition of "incurred" to be inapplicable because it arose in cases involving automobile insurance, and "[t]his, of course, is not an auto insurance case." Id.

There are three potentially "interested" jurisdictions: the District of Columbia, where the Whitneys reside and where the automobile accident took place; Maryland, where GEICO is incorporated and has its principal place of business; and Virginia, where the Fetisoffs are domiciled. The law in each of these jurisdictions is the same with respect to the interpretation of insurance contracts — in all three, the plain meaning of the policy language controls, and any ambiguities are resolved in favor of the insured. See Meade v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 477 A.2d 726, 728 (D.C. 1984); Howell v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 305 Md. 435, 505 A.2d 109, 113 (1986); Virginia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hodges, 238 Va. 692, 385 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1989). Thus, there is no "true conflict" and we apply the law of the District of Columbia by default.

When “the terms are unambiguous, the court need not apply any other rules of construction.” Id. at 722 (citing Va. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hodges, 385 S.E.2d 612, 614 (Va. 1989)). But “ambiguous terms in a policy are construed against the insurer, who wrote the policy and presumably could have written it more clearly.”

" State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Walton, 244 Va. 498, 502, 423 S.E.2d 188, 191 (1992) (citation omitted). Courts must "construe the contract as a whole, and no word or clause is to be treated as meaningless if any reasonable meaning consistent with the other parts of the contract can be given to it." Hutter v. Heilmann, 252 Va. 227, 231, 475 S.E.2d 267, 270 (1996) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Johnson v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., 716 F.3d 813, 820 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that courts must analyze ERISA plans like contracts and as a whole to determine a provision's meaning in context of entire agreement). If the terms are unambiguous, the court need not apply any other rules of construction. Va. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hodges, 238 Va. 692, 696, 385 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1989). Accordingly, when construing an insurance policy under Virginia law, words are given their ordinary and reasonable meaning in light of the contract as a whole.

(Mot. in Limine 7-9.) Citing McAmis v. Wallace, Defendant urges that Virginia law only permits a Plaintiff to recover expenses actually incurred, and thus precludes damages for written-off expenses. (Mot. in Limine 7-9 (citing 980 F. Supp. 181, 184 (W.D. Va. 1997) (quoting Va. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hodges, 385 S.E.2d 612, 614 (Va. 1989))).) Defendant further argues that the statute of limitations to collect debts on these write-offs has passed in the jurisdictions where Plaintiff received medical care, making it impossible for Plaintiff to be held liable for the debt at a later date. (Mot. in Limine 7-9 (citing D.C. Code § 12-301(7); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101).

Lockheed Info. Mgmt. Systems v. Maximus, Inc., 259 Va. 92, 108, 524 S.E.2d 420, 429 (2000). In considering these issues, we apply the well established rule that when the language in an insurance policy is clear and unambiguous, courts do not employ rules of construction; rather, they give the language its plain and ordinary meaning and enforce the policy as written. Osborne v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 251 Va. 53, 56, 465 S.E.2d 835, 837 (1996); see also Virginia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hodges, 238 Va. 692, 696, 385 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1989); United Services Auto. Assoc. v. Webb, 235 Va. 655, 657, 369 S.E.2d 196, 198 (1988); Atlas Underwriters, Ltd. v. Meredith-Burda, Inc., 231 Va. 255, 259, 343 S.E.2d 65, 68 (1986). We are of opinion that the language in Insuring Clause 1 of the policy is clear and unambiguous.

An insurance policy is a contract; therefore, we give the words used in this policy their ordinary and usual meaning when they are susceptible of such construction. Graphic Arts Mut. Ins. Co. v. C.W. Warthen Co., 240 Va. 457, 459, 397 S.E.2d 876, 877 (1990). If the policy language is unambiguous, we do not resort to rules of construction. Virginia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hodges, 238 Va. 692, 696, 385 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1989). We simply apply the terms of the policy as written. United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Webb, 235 Va. 655, 657, 369 S.E.2d 196, 198 (1988).