Opinion
INDEX NO. 190025/2017
01-09-2019
IN RE: NEW YORK CITY ASBESTOS LITIGATION JENNY SHULMAN and BRONISLAV KRUTOVICH, Plaintiff, v. BRENNTAG NORTH AMERICA, INC., et al, Defendants.
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 833 PRESENT: MANUEL J. MENDEZ Justice MOTION DATE 12-19-2018 MOTION SEQ. NO. 010 MOTION CAL. NO. __________
Upon a reading of the foregoing cited papers it is Ordered that defendants Imerys Talc America, Inc. ( hereinafter individually "Imerys") and Cyprus Amax Minerals, Co.'s ( hereinafter individually "CAMC") motion pursuant to CPLR §3212 for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint and all cross-claims asserted against them, and dismissing the punitive damages claims is granted to the extent of dismissing plaintiff's claims for exposure to asbestos as against defendants Imerys Talc America, Inc., and Cyprus Amax Mineral Co., for the period 1977-1979. The remainder of the relief sought is denied.
Plaintiff, Jenny Shulman, was diagnosed with mesothelioma in February 2016. Plaintiff alleges she was exposed to asbestos in a variety of ways including from the use of Johnson & Johnson's Baby Powder from approximately 1980 through 2011. Plaintiff asserts claims against Imerys and CAMC (hereinafter referred to jointly as "defendants") alleging that they supplied raw talc to Johnson & Johnson that was used to make Johnson & Johnson Baby Powder (JJBP). Plaintiff commenced this action to recover for her injuries from the asbestos exposure.
Charles Mathieu, Inc. ("Charles Mathieu") was a supplier of talc used to manufacturer Johnson & Johnson Baby Powder during the years 1977 - 1979 part of the period during which Ms. Shulman alleges exposure to the product. Charles Mathieu was owned and operated by Donald Ferry and Peter Bixby from the 1930s. Charles Mathieu had three main business lines by the 1970s, including importing talc from Italy, mining and exploring U.S. talc, and processing talc at facilities in Alabama and New Jersey. Charles Mathieu and Cyprus Mines Corporation ("Cyprus Mines") were competitors in the 1970s.
Cyprus Georesearch, Inc., a wholly owned-subsidiary of Cyprus Mines, purchased part of Charles Mathieu's assets and none of its liabilities in August 1979. The initial contemplated stock acquisition was for $2.4 million. Cyprus Georesearch, Inc. offered an extra $1 million for all liabilities to remain with Charles Mathieu. Cyprus Mines agreed to pay $3.5 million in cash and up to $1.5 million in commissions on sales of Italian talc over the next twenty (20) years. Charles Mathieu retained its talc importation business and Cyprus Mines became one of its customers. Cyrpus Mines began selling Italian talc imported by Charles Mathieu, who received a 4% commission on all sales . Charles Mathieu eventually changed its name to Charles Mathieu & Co., but remained the same company. The parties agreed to an Amendment in April 21, 1983 to reflect the name change to Charles Mathieu & Co., and continued commission sales.
Cyprus Mines sold its talc business on June 5, 1992. Prior to the sale, it created Cyprus Talc Corporation and transferred its entire talc business to that entity . Rio Tinto purchased all outstanding stock from Cyprus Talc Corporation. Rio Tinto subsequently changed the name of Cyprus Talc Corporation to Luzenac America, Inc.. Defendant Imerys America purchased all outstanding stock of Luzenac America, Inc. and changed the name of the company to Imerys Talc America, Inc. (Downey Affidavit #1and #2).
Defendant CMAC was created by the merger of Amax Inc. and Cyprus Minerals Company in 1993 (Downey Affidavit #1 and #2).
The defendants now move for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR §3212 to dismiss plaintiffs' Complaint and all cross-claims against them. The defendants have met their prima facie burden by establishing that they are not liable as the putative successor to Charles Mathieu, who was a supplier of the talc used to manufacture Johnson & Johnson Baby Powder during the years of 1977-1979, part of the period during which Ms. Shulman alleges she was exposed to the product.
Plaintiff in opposition to this motion "does not dispute defendants' assertion that they are not responsible for any exposures to asbestos from the use of Johnson & Johnson Baby Powder prior to 1980."
The defendants are granted summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims against them for exposure to asbestos during the period of 1977-1979.
The defendants argue that they are also entitled to summary judgment for the remaining years of Ms. Shulman's alleged exposure - 1980 through 2011 . They claim that there is no proof that the talc sold to Johnson & Johnson was contaminated with asbestos and at best any contamination would be a "sporadic occurrence" that was insufficient for plaintiff to establish causation against them. The defendants also move to dismiss plaintiff's claims for punitive damages because plaintiffs have not cited any intentional criminal actions by defendants, and this is insufficient for the imposition of punitive damages.
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the proponent must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, through admissible evidence, eliminating all material issues of fact (Klein v City of New York, 81 NY2d 833, 652 NYS2d 723 [1996]). Bare conclusory assertions and failure to make a showing and to provide admissible evidence requires denial of the motion regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers (Winegrad v. New York University Medical Center, 64 N.Y. 2d 851, 476 N.E. 2d 642, 487 N.Y.S. 2d 316 [1985] and Pullman v. Silverman, 28 N.Y. 3d 1060, 66 N.E. 3d 663, 43 N.Y.S. 3d 793 [2016]). It is only after the burden of proof is met that the burden switches to the nonmoving party to rebut that prima facie showing, by producing contrary evidence in admissible form, sufficient to require a trial of material factual issues (Amatulli v Delhi Constr. Corp., 77 NY2d 525, 569 NYS2d 337 [1999]). In determining the motion, the court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party by giving the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence (SSBS Realty Corp. v Public Service Mut. Ins. Co., 253 AD2d 583, 677 NYS2d 136 [1st Dept. 1998]).
The defendants, in support of this motion provide the expert affidavit of Dr. Matthew S. Sanchez, that was e-filed by defendant Johnson & Johnson in support of their motion for summary judgment (NYSCEF Docket No. 577). The defendants did not have Dr. Sanchez prepare a report for this action.
Dr. Sanchez has a doctorate in geology and specializes in asbestos analysis. He describes asbestos as a regulated group of six naturally occurring, highly fibrous, silicate minerals that when crystallized can become one of two families of asbestos containing minerals: serpentine and amphibole. Dr. Sanchez claims that while talc may contain either of the two asbestos containing minerals, that does not mean there is asbestos contamination, and that analysis is needed to make a determination. He does not state the frequency of testing needed to make a determination and whether the asbestos containing samples would be identified consistently throughout a given location.
Dr. Sanchez is of the opinion that Johnson & Johnson Baby Powder did not contain asbestos. He bases his opinion on his testing of Johnson & Johnson Baby Powder, his testing of Talc from the Italian, Vermont and Guanxi mines from where the Talc supplied to Johnson & Johnson was extracted, a review of Johnson & Johnson internal records which required that only asbestos free talc be used in Johnson & Johnson Baby Powder and a review of historical testing done over decades by Johnson & Johnson, its suppliers, independent third parties and government entities.
In toxic tort cases, an expert opinion must set forth (1) a plaintiff's exposure to a toxin, (2) that the toxin is capable of causing the particular injuries plaintiff suffered, and (3) that the plaintiff was exposed to sufficient levels of the toxin to cause such injuries. Specific causation can be established by an expert's comparison of the exposure levels found in the subjects of other studies. The expert is required to provide specific details of the comparison and show how the plaintiff's exposure level related to those of the other subjects (Parker v. Mobil Oil Corp., 7 N.Y. 3d 434, 857 N.E. 2d 1114, 824 N.Y.S. 2d 584 [2016]).
Plaintiff in opposition to the motion provides the affidavit and expert report of Dr. William E. Longo, Ph.D. a Doctor of Philosophy in Materials Science. The report was e-filed in opposition to Johnson & Johnson's motion for summary judgment . Dr. Longo performed studies on samples of Johnson & Johnson Baby Powder, that allegedly included the moving defendants' talc, covering the same periods relevant to Ms. Shulman's period of exposure. Dr. Longo's analysis of samples, using the Transmission Electron Microscope (TEM), found 20 of 35 samples contained detectable amounts of asbestos.
Based on his own testing, as well as his review of historic testing of the talc ore and Johnson & Johnson finished talc products, Dr. Longo is of the opinion to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that individuals that used Johnson & Johnson Talc products in a manner similar to the plaintiff over an extended period were more likely to have been exposed to significant airborne levels of asbestos. It is also his opinion that ambient or background air does not contain measurable amounts of airborne anthophyllite or tremolite type fibers, unless there is an identifiable source for those fibers. Therefore any exposure to either tremolite amphibole asbestos or anthophyllite asbestos found in Johnson & Johnson's products would be substantially above background. Additionally, he is of the opinion that Ms. Shulman's exposure to Johnson & Johnson's baby powder for some 20 years caused her to be exposed to fibrous amphibole asbestos well above background or ambient levels. Dr. Longo is of the opinion that Ms. Shulman's exposure to Johnson & Johnson's Baby Powder for 31 years equates conservatively to 11,315 individual exposures.
Furthermore, he is of the opinion that since during the majority of Ms. Shulman's use of Johnson's Baby powder, she was exposed to talc sourced exclusively from Vermont, and since all(100%) of his laboratory's analysis of Johnson's Baby Powder products from Vermont source vintages contemporaneous with Ms. Shulman's use have been shown to contain significant quantities of amphibole asbestos, based on his testing and his review of historic testing of talc ore and Johnson & Johnson finished talc products, Ms. Shulman was exposed to amphibole asbestos substantially above background levels ( see Exhibit 105).
Plaintiffs submits the affidavit of Dr. Jacqueline Moline, M.D., Board Certified Occupational Medicine and Internal Medicine Physician. In her affidavit Dr. Moline describes the manner, frequency and intensity of Ms. Shulman's exposure, as well as the methodology she used to reach her conclusions. She is of the opinion that Ms. Shulman's exposures to dust from asbestos contaminated talc were above background level and were a substantial factor in causing her mesothelioma ( see Exhibit 1)
Plaintiffs also submit the affidavit of Dr. Steven Compton, Phd., the executive director and senior research scientist at MVA Scientific Consultants, specializing in the identification, measurement and analysis materials, determining the constituent ingredients in materials, and characterizing those materials and ingredients, including asbestos and talc. Dr. Compton analyzed 13 samples collected by defendant's expert, Alan Segrave, of Bureau Veritas of Kennesaw, Georgia. The samples were collected by Mr. Segrave from Imerys' mining facility in Italy. Dr. Compton detected amphibole fibers in 11 of the samples analyzed. Dr. Compton goes on to state the approximate range of fibers per gram contained in the samples and, after quantifying their mass, the range of fibers by weight. Dr. Compton prepared a report of his findings for the Italian Talc which were annexed to his affidavit (see Exhibit 60).
Dr. Compton also analyzed 15 samples of talc taken from the Vermont mines which had been owned by Johnson & Johnson and were later owned by Imerys. These samples were provided to Dr. Compton by Dr. Sanchez, who had previously analyzed them. Dr. Compton detected amphibole fibers in 11 of the 15 samples analyzed. His affidavit and report state the approximate range of fibers per gram contained in the samples and, after quantifying their mass, the range of fibers by weight. ( see Exhibit 60).
Based on his analysis and findings Dr. Compton is of the opinion, to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, that because the Italian samples are reported to be representative of present and historic talc produced from this homogenous talc horizon, and because the samples collected from Vermont represent both the talc mined and the surrounding mining property, consumer talc powder products containing talc produced from these regions in Italy and Vermont would likewise contain asbestos. It is further his opinion that aerosolization of talc from these regions or any friable powder consumer products containing talc from these regions as a constituent ingredient, including Johnson's Baby Powder, would likewise result in elevated concentrations of airborne asbestos fibers. ( see Exhibit 60).
Summary judgment is a drastic remedy that should not be granted where conflicting affidavits cannot be resolved. The Court's function on a motion for summary judgment is issue finding, not issue determination. It should not be granted when there is any doubt (Insurance Co. of New York v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 47 A.D. 3d 469, 850 N.Y.S. 2d 56 [1st Dept., 2008] citing to Millerton Agway Cooperative v.Briarcliff Farms, Inc., 17 N.Y. 2d 57, 268 N.Y.S. 2d 18, 215 N.E. 2d 341[1966] and Brunetti v. Musallam, 11 A.D. 3d 280, 783 N.Y.S. 2d 347 [1st Dept., 2004]). Conflicting testimony raises credibilty issues, that cannot be resolved on papers. They should be determined by a jury instead, and are a basis to deny summary judgment (Prevost v. One City Block LLC, 155 A.D. 3d 531, 65 N.Y.S. 3d 172 [1st Dept. 2017] and Messina v. New York City Transit Authority, 84 A.D. 3d 439, 922 N.Y.S. 2d 70 [1st Dept. 2011]).
There are credibility issues on the conflicting expert testimony provided by the moving defendants and the plaintiff. There remain issues of fact as to whether the defendants' talc had asbestos and whether plaintiff's mesothelioma was caused through the use of Johnson & Johnson Baby Powder during the period of 1980 - 2011.
The purpose of punitive damages is to punish the defendant for wanton, reckless or malicious acts and discourage them and other companies from acting that way in the future (Ross v. Louise Wise Servs., Inc., 8 N.Y. 3d 478, 868 N.E. 2d 189, 836 N.Y.S. 2d 590[2007]; In re 91st. Street Crane Collapse Litigation, 154 A.D.3d 139, 62 N.Y.S.3d 11 [1st. Dept. 2017]). To the extent plaintiffs argue, and submit documentation in opposing the motion, that the defendants knew that exposure to asbestos and asbestos-containing talc causes cancer, that it knew its talc contained asbestos, that it actively concealed from the FDA its knowledge that testing had shown the presence of asbestos in its talc, that it lied to the Federal Government and to its customers about asbestos in its talc, that it protected its workers but not the consumers and, that instead of warning placed corporate profits and reputation above the health and safety of the decedent by failing to place any warnings about asbestos on their product, and their continued insistence that there is no asbestos in talc, plaintiff have raised an issue of fact on the issue of punitive damages. Whether the trier of fact gets to decide the issue of punitive damages is to be determined by the trial judge after submission of all the evidence.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that defendants ImerysTalc America, Inc., and Cyprus Amax Minerals Company's motion pursuant to CPLR §3212 for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint and all cross-claims asserted against them, is granted only to the extent of dismissing plaintiff's claims for the years 1977 - 1979, and it is further,
ORDERED that plaintiff's claims against defendants Imerys Talc America, Inc. and Cyprus Amax Minerals Company, alleging exposure to asbestos from their talc for the years 1977 - 1979, are severed and dismissed, and it is further,
ORDERED that the remainder of the summary judgment relief sought by defendants Imerys Talc America, Inc. and Cyprus Amax Minerals Company on plaintiff's claims alleging exposure to asbestos from their talc for the years 1980 - 2011, is denied, and it is further
ORDERED that defendants Imerys Talc America, Inc., and Cyprus Amax Minerals Company's, motion to dismiss plaintiffs' punitive damages claim is denied. Dated: January 9, 2019
ENTER:
/s/_________
MANUEL J. MENDEZ
J.S.C.