Opinion
No. 731 C.D. 2014
02-20-2015
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Justin Dwayne Branch, pro se, appeals from the March 27, 2014 Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) denying Branch's March 21, 2014, emergency motion (Emergency Motion), in which he sought compensation for what he believed was the illegal confiscation of his 1998 Ford Crown Victoria (Vehicle) by the Philadelphia Parking Authority (Authority). On appeal, Branch argues that his rights have been violated under an assortment of different laws, including, inter alia, the United States Constitution; the Pennsylvania Constitution; the United States Code; the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC); and, curiously, a centuries' old treaty establishing bilateral relations between the United States and Morocco. Discerning no error, we affirm.
Between July 2, 2013, and January 13, 2014, Branch's Vehicle was ticketed by the Authority "ten separate times, for reasons ranging from having an expired inspection permit, to parking illegally, to parking in front of an expired meter." (Trial Ct. Op. at 1.) Branch failed to pay the fines or fees arising from the tickets; therefore, his Vehicle was immobilized by the Authority on January 13, 2014. (Trial Ct. Op. at 1.) "On February 4, 2014, [the Authority] initiated a petition action, through which it sought judicial approval to sell a number of automobiles at auction, in order to recoup at least a portion of the outstanding costs and fees owed to it by the vehicles' owners." (Trial Ct. Op. at 1-2.) Branch's Vehicle was included in the petition and, on February 5, 2014, the Authority informed Branch that it intended to sell his Vehicle at auction. (Trial Ct. Op. at 2.) Although some of the vehicles listed in the petition were sold at an auction held in mid-February 2014, Branch's Vehicle was not sold at the auction. (Trial Ct. Op. at 2 n.1.) On March 21, 2014, Branch filed his Emergency Motion in which he requested $1,000,000 in compensation due to alleged violations of his rights. (Trial Ct. Op. at 2.) The Emergency Motion contained 72 pages of "rambling and incoherent argument based upon various sections of the [UCC], the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions, and a smattering of cases from both state and federal courts." (Trial Ct. Op. at 2.)
On March 27, 2014, the trial court conducted a hearing. (Trial Ct. Op. at 2.) The Authority established that Branch's Vehicle had been ticketed repeatedly, that Branch had failed to pay any of the ensuing fees or fines, that the Vehicle had been lawfully immobilized, and that the Authority had given Branch proper notice that it intended to sell the Vehicle at auction. (Trial Ct. Op. at 2.) Branch responded by testifying "that he had reserved all constitutional rights, all human rights, all indigenous rights, that Supreme Court precedence [sic] says you don't need to register your vehicle, and that he did not need to pay the fines and fees levied against him because he" did not have a contractual agreement with the Authority. (Trial Ct. Op. at 2 (quotation omitted).) The trial court found Branch's claims "to be without a shred of merit" and denied the Emergency Motion. (Trial Ct. Op. at 2.)
Thereafter, Branch appealed to this Court, and the trial court directed Branch to provide it with a Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal (Statement) pursuant to Rule 1925(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. (Trial Ct. Op. at 2.) Branch's Statement was received by the trial court on May 12, 2014.
Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b). Rule 1925(b) provides, in relevant part, that:
Direction to file statement of errors complained of on appeal; instructions to the appellant and the trial court.—If the judge entering the order giving rise to the notice of appeal (''judge'') desires clarification of the errors complained of on appeal, the judge may enter an order directing the appellant to file of record in the trial court and serve on the judge a concise statement of the errors complained of on appeal (''Statement''). . . .
The trial court determined that Branch's Statement failed to comply with Rule 1925(b) and, therefore, he had waived his right to challenge the disposition of the Emergency Motion. (Trial Ct. Op. at 3.) The trial court determined that Branch's Statement was "woefully insufficient and that he ha[d], thus, waived any ability to contest the substance of" its March 27, 2014 Order. (Trial Ct. Op. at 4.) Due to Branch's broad references to, inter alia, the UCC, United States Code, and Supreme Court precedent, the trial court concluded that Branch "fail[ed] to enumerate, with anything approaching clarity, what specific legal errors he believed were committed by" the trial court. (Trial Ct. Op. at 4.) Because Branch waived his right to appeal by failing to comply with Rule 1925(b), the trial court stated that Branch's appeal to this Court should be quashed. (Trial Ct. Op. at 4.)
On appeal, Branch argues, inter alia, that the Authority's actions violate: (1) his right to travel under the United States Constitution; (2) his rights under Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution; (3) United States Supreme Court precedent; (4) Title 18, Section 242 of the United States Code; (5) several sections of the UCC; and (6) the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the United States and Morocco. The Authority argues that Branch has waived his right to appellate review due to his deficient Statement.
This Court's scope of "review is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, whether it committed an error of law or whether its findings are supported by substantial evidence." Commonwealth v. Smothers, 920 A.2d 922, 924 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
Article I, Section 1 provides:
All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness.Pa. Const. art. I, § 1.
18 U.S.C. § 242. Section 242, entitled "Deprivation of rights under color of law," provides that:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.
This treaty marked the inception of diplomatic relations between the United States and Morocco. Sultan Sidi Muhammad Ben Abdullah sealed the treaty in Marrakesh on June 23, 1786, and it was later signed by Thomas Jefferson in Paris on January 1, 1787, and by John Adams in London on January 25, 1787. The treaty was ratified by Congress on July 18, 1787. This was the first treaty between the United States and any African, Arab, or Muslim state. U.S. Morocco Relations - The Beginning, United States Diplomatic Mission to Morocco, http://morocco.usembassy.gov/early.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2015). --------
Under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b)(4)(ii), the Statement must "concisely identify each ruling or error that the appellant intends to challenge with sufficient detail to identify all pertinent issues for the judge." Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii). Any "[i]ssues not included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with [Rule 1925](b)(4) are waived." Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii).
This Court has held that "a concise statement that is too vague to allow the court to identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of no statement at all." Caln Nether Company, L.P. v. Board of Supervisors of Thornbury Township, 840 A.2d 484, 490 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004); see also, Lineberger v. Wyeth, 894 A.2d 141, 148 (Pa. Super. 2006) (quotation omitted) (concluding that appellate review was waived where the "Concise Statement was not specific enough for the trial court to identify and address the issue Appellant wished to raise on appeal"). Vague statements of errors complained of on appeal are waived because, "[w]hen a trial court has to 'guess' what issues an appellant is appealing," it prevents meaningful review. Caln Nether, 840 A.2d at 490. Further, our Superior Court has concluded that "the statement must be 'concise' and coherent [so] as to permit the trial court to understand the specific issues being raised on appeal." Jiricko v. Geico Insurance Company, 947 A.2d 206, 211 (Pa. Super. 2008) (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). Where the statement is so incoherent, confusing, or redundant that it impairs appellate review, issues in the statement are deemed waived. Id. at 213.
In the instant case, Branch's Statement provides, as follows:
1. The trail [sic] court erred by failing to identify where [Branch] violated the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1787 between Morocco and the United States.
2. The trial court erred by failing to acknowledge or adhere to my Constitutional Rights or the violation of.(Trial Ct. Op. at 3 (quoting Statement).) We agree with the trial court that Branch's vague Statement does not sufficiently identify the issues being raised on appeal. Caln Nether, 840 A.2d at 490. The Statement neither identifies the specific constitutional rights violated by the Authority, nor identifies the relevant sections of the UCC, CFR, or United States Code that are applicable to the confiscation of Branch's Vehicle. Thus, because the trial court had to guess what issues Branch was appealing, meaningful review is prevented. Id. Moreover, Branch's broad reference to Supreme Court precedent, the UCC, CFR, United States Code, and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Morocco and the United States is incoherent and confusing. Jiricko, 947 A.2d at 213. Accordingly, because Branch's Statement was too vague to allow the trial court to identify or understand the issues being raised on appeal, the trial court correctly determined that Branch waived his right to appellate review. Caln Nether, 840 A.2d at 490.
3. The trail [sic] court erred in failing to acknowledge or adhere to Supreme Court precedent in favor of [Branch].
4. The trial court erred by not acknowledging or adhering to notice of violation of the Code of Federal Regulation [(CFR)] by [the Authority].
5. The trail [sic] court erred by not acknowledging or adhering to notice of violation [of the] United States [C]ode by [the Authority].
6. The trail [sic] court erred by not acknowledging or adhering to [the UCC] or violation of by [the Authority].
However, even if Branch had not waived appellate review of the issues he argues in his brief, he would not be entitled to relief. First, Branch argues that the Authority's confiscation of his Vehicle has violated his fundamental right to travel under the United States Constitution. "The 'constitutional right to travel' from one State to another is a right encompassed by both Article IV, § 2 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." Wert v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 821 A.2d 182, 188 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (quoting Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501-03 (1999)). The right to travel encompasses three different components including: "1) the right of a citizen of one State to enter and leave another State, 2) the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien, and 3) the right to be treated like citizens of that State." Id. (citing Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500). In Wert, however, this Court held "that the right to travel does not include the right to be excused from another state's highway laws." Id. at 189. Similarly, in Shultz v. Heyison, 439 F. Supp. 857, 860-61 (M.D. Pa. 1975), the United States Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania held that the ownership of an operator's license is not a fundamental right and that a Pennsylvania statute requiring the suspension of an operator's license and vehicle registration for the failure to pay a judgment resulting from vehicle operation did not impinge on the operator's constitutional right to travel.
Here, although Branch's Vehicle has been confiscated, he has not lost the ability to travel by other means and he is still free to travel to another state if he wishes. Thus, because Branch has only been deprived of the possession of his Vehicle, the Authority did not violate his constitutional right to travel. Since Branch's fundamental right to travel has not been violated, his inherent and indefeasible rights under Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution have also not been violated. Moreover, because Branch's constitutional rights have not been violated, we conclude that he has not been deprived of any rights under the color of law pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 242.
Next, Branch argues that the Authority's actions violated his rights under the UCC. The UCC, however, only applies to commercial transactions. Section 1103 of the UCC, 13 Pa. C.S. § 1103. Therefore, because the confiscation of Branch's Vehicle did not involve a contract between Branch and the Authority, the UCC is inapplicable to this matter.
Lastly, Branch argues, without elaboration, that his rights were violated under the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the United States and Morocco. While this Court appreciates the originality of Branch's argument regarding the Authority's alleged violation of that treaty, unfortunately, without a more specific explanation, we do not see the treaty's relevance to the present case.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the trial court's Order is affirmed. PER CURIAM ORDER
NOW, February 20, 2015, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, entered in the above-captioned matter, is hereby AFFIRMED.