Opinion
J-S52045-15 No. 737 WDA 2015
08-07-2015
W.A.C. Appellant v. C.A.C. Appellee
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Dated April 24, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County
Civil Division at No.: A.D. No. 977 of 2007
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OLSON, J., and WECHT, J. MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.:
W.A.C. ("Father") appeals the April 24, 2015 order that granted C.A.C.'s ("Mother") Motion to Transfer Venue. We affirm.
On April 7, 2007, Father filed a complaint for custody of the parties' two minor children. On the same date, an interim order for shared custody was entered. At that time, the parties and their children resided in Greene County, Pennsylvania. According to the record before us, the next custody order entered was a March 3, 2010 custody order that provided Mother with primary physical custody and Father with alternate weekends and one evening during the week. Although the record is unclear, at some point in 2010, Mother and the children moved to Washington County, Pennsylvania.
On April 10, 2015, Father filed a petition to modify custody in which he sought primary physical custody of the children. Mother filed a motion to transfer venue from Greene to Washington County. On April 24, 2015, after hearing argument, the trial court granted Mother's motion. On April 28, 2015, Father filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. On May 5, 2015, Father filed a notice of appeal and a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial court filed an opinion on May 20, 2015.
Father raises two issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court find the existing venue, Greene County, was inconvenient or reasonably convenient?Father's Brief at 5.
2. Was it proper for the Trial Court to transfer the matter to Washington County from Greene County (the County of initial jurisdiction) despite a finding that it was still convenient?
Because both of Father's issues pertain to venue, we address them together.
[A]ppellate courts review a trial court's ruling on a motion to transfer for an abuse of discretion.Bratic v. Rubendall , 99 A.3d 1, 7 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted). We have defined venue as "the place in which a particular action is to be brought and determined, . . . venue considers the practicalities to determine the appropriate forum." J.K. v. W.L.K., 102 A.3d 511, 513 (Pa. Super. 2014).
In this regard, the trial court's ruling must be reasonable in light of the peculiar facts. If there exists any proper basis for the trial court's decision to transfer venue, the decision must stand. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but occurs only where the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, as shown by the evidence o[f] the record.
Pennsylvania adopted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA"), 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5401 et seq., in 2004. Although the UCCJEA addresses jurisdiction over custody matters between states, its rules are also applied to intrastate jurisdiction between counties. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5471.
Rule 1915.2 was promulgated to address venue in custody cases and is modeled after the jurisdiction rules of the UCCJEA.
(a) An action may be brought in any county
(1)(i) which is the home county of the child at the time of commencement of the proceeding, or
(ii) which had been the child's home county within six months before commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from the county but a parent or person acting as parent continues to live in the county; or
(2) when the court of another county does not have venue under subdivision (1), and the child and the child's parents, or the child and at least one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with the county other than mere physical presence and there is available within the county substantial evidence concerning the child's, protection, training and personal relationships; or
(3) when all counties in which venue is proper pursuant to subdivisions (1) and (2) have found that the court before which the action is pending is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child; or
(4) when it appears that venue would not be proper in any other county under prerequisites substantially in accordance with paragraphs (1), (2) or (3); or
(5) when the child is present in the county and has been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child or a sibling or parent of the child is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.
(b) Physical presence of the child or a party, while desirable, is not necessary or sufficient to make a child custody determination except as provided in subdivision (a)(5) above.Pa.R.C.P. 1915.2.
(c) The court at any time may transfer an action to the appropriate court of any other county where the action could originally have been brought or could be brought if it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and the court of another county is the more appropriate forum. It shall be the duty of the prothonotary of the court in which the action is pending to forward to the prothonotary of the county to which the action is transferred certified copies of the docket entries, process, pleadings and other papers filed in the action. The costs and fees of the petition for transfer and the removal of the record shall be paid by the petitioner in the first instance to be taxable as costs in the case.
At the start of this custody action in 2007, Greene County obviously was the correct venue because the parties lived in Greene County. The issue is whether Greene County has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over this case or whether the trial court could transfer the case to Washington County. In J.K., we reviewed a similar issue and turned to the UCCJEA:
§ 5422. Exclusive, continuing jurisdiction
(a) General rule.—Except as otherwise provided in section 5424 (relating to temporary emergency jurisdiction), a court of this Commonwealth which has made a child custody determination consistent with section 5421 (relating to initial child custody jurisdiction) or 5423 (relating to jurisdiction to modify determination) has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until:
(1) a court of [the county which made the initial custody order] determines that neither the child, nor the child and one parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent have a significant connection with [its county] and that substantial evidence is no longer available in [its county] concerning the child's care, protection, training and personal relationships; or
(2) a court of [the county which made the initial custody order] or a court of another [county] determines that the child, the child's parents and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this [county which made the initial custody order].
(b) Modification where court does not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction.—A court of [a county] which has made a child custody determination and does not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this section may modify that determination only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under section 5421.23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5422.
The J.K. Court inserted the bracketed material to adapt section 5422 to intrastate cases. See J.K. 102 A.3d at 516.
Therefore, the trial court could transfer venue if it determined that it is an inconvenient forum and another county is more convenient, see Pa.R.C.P. 1915.2(c), or if it determined that the child or the child and a parent no longer have a significant connection with the county and substantial evidence is no longer available about the child in the county, see 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5422(a)(1).
Father argues that the trial court did not find that Greene County was inconvenient and that the children still have a significant connection with Greene County because Father and his family still live there. Father's Brief at 8-12.
Father is correct that the trial court determined that both Greene and Washington were convenient forums. Trial Court Order, 4/24/2015, at 1 (unnumbered). In making that decision, the trial court noted that Mother and her family were in Washington, while Father and his family were in Greene County. Further, the trial court determined that the travel distances between the parties' homes and the two courthouses were similar and did not raise an issue of convenience. Id. The court noted that the Greene County judge who made the 2010 custody decision was no longer on the bench in the county, so there was no issue of continuity favoring Greene County. Id. at 1-2. However, the trial court found that the children were entitled to have the decision made in the county in which they resided. Id. at 1. The trial court determined that the children had resided in Washington County for the past five years and their activities and school were in Washington County. Trial Court Opinion, 5/20/2015, at 3 (unnumbered). Given that the geographical distance to either court was not at issue, the trial court exercised its discretion in transferring the case to the county in which the majority of the children's lives, including witnesses and other evidence, was centered. Id. at 2-3. The court determined that the most significant connections for the children were no longer in Greene County as the children's contacts with Greene County have been limited to Father's custody time of every other weekend and one week in the summer. Id. at 4.
A court loses its exclusive, continuing jurisdiction when it determines that the child and a parent no longer have a significant connection with the county. Here, the trial court reached that conclusion because the children and Mother have not lived in Greene County for the past five years and the children's school and activities were in Washington County. Further, whether the case continued in Washington or Greene County, a new judge would be assigned to hear the case, leaving no argument that Greene County should retain the case for the purpose of continuity or judicial economy. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in transferring venue to Washington County.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/7/2015