Specifically, the People argue that the trial court erred because this is the standard for whether someone is seized under the Fourth Amendment. See People v. Shoen, 2017 CO 65, ¶ 10, 395 P.3d 327, 330. We have previously stated that "[a] trial court errs by applying the ‘free to leave’ standard in evaluating whether a suspect is in custody under Miranda doctrine."
¶47 Indeed, in case after case we mention our jurisdiction under section 16-12-102(2) by simply dropping a footnote to acknowledge the prosecution's certification that the suppressed evidence is substantial. See, e.g. , People v. Cox , 2017 CO 8, ¶ 10 n.3, 401 P.3d 509, 511 n.3 ("The People certified that this appeal was not taken for the purposes of delay and that the evidence suppressed is a substantial part of the proof in the People's case."); People v. Ashford , 2020 CO 16, ¶ 8 n.1, 458 P.3d 124, 126 n.1 (same); People v. Threlkel , 2019 CO 18, ¶ 12 n.2, 438 P.3d 722, 726 n.2 (same); People v. Brown , 2019 CO 63, ¶ 8 n.2, 461 P.3d 1, 2 n.2 (same); People v. Shoen , 2017 CO 65, ¶ 6 n.2, 395 P.3d 327, 330 n.2 (same); People v. Chavez-Barragan , 2016 CO 16, ¶ 7 n.2, 365 P.3d 981, 983 n.2 (same); People v. Delacruz , 2016 CO 76, ¶ 1 n.1, 384 P.3d 349, 351 n.1 (same); People v. N.A.S., 2014 CO 65, ¶ 4 n.5, 329 P.3d 285, 288 n.5 (same). We do this because we have consistently recognized that it is the role of prosecutors to make informed and careful certifications, and it is not our role to determine whether the prosecution has properly assessed the value of the suppressed evidence.
We defer to the trial court's factual findings if those findings are supported by competent evidence in the record; however, we review the trial court's legal conclusions de novo." People v. Shoen , 2017 CO 65, ¶ 8, 395 P.3d 327, 330 (citation omitted). ¶ 23
People v. Marujo , 192 P.3d 1003, 1006 (Colo. 2008). The first two are seizures, and thus need to be justified, see People v. Fields , 2018 CO 2, ¶ 12, 411 P.3d 661 (describing the necessary justifications for arrests and for investigatory stops), while the last is not a seizure, and requires no justification, see People v. Shoen , 2017 CO 65, ¶ 10, 395 P.3d 327 ("Consensual encounters between police and citizens do not implicate Fourth Amendment protections ...."). Traffic stops are typically investigatory stops.