More specifically, the plainness prong demands that the error be " ‘so clear-cut, so obvious,’ a trial judge should be able to avoid it without benefit of objection." Romero v. People, 2017 CO 37, ¶ 6, 393 P.3d 973, 976 (quoting People v. Ujaama, 2012 COA 36, ¶ 42, 302 P.3d 296, 304). Consequently, to be deemed plain, an error must contravene a clear statutory command, a well-settled legal principle, or established Colorado case law.

¶32 That is to say, testimony is not automatically considered expert opinion testimony simply because the witness has extensive training and experience—it is the basis of the witness's opinion that is determinative. Venalonzo, ¶ 22, 388 P.3d at 875 ; People v. Ramos, 2017 CO 6, ¶ 9, 388 P.3d 888, 891 ("[The officer's] extensive experience in identifying blood patterns, by itself, did not transform his testimony from lay to expert."); cf. Romero v. People, 2017 CO 37, ¶ 15, 393 P.3d 973, 977 ("[A]n ordinary citizen could not ... possess the experience, skills, or knowledge required to understand the concept of ‘grooming’ as it relates to sexual predation."). ¶33 It is also significant here that the prosecution did not elicit any testimony regarding Deputy Johnson's training and experience in conducting witness interviews.

¶22 If we determine that a trial court has abused its discretion regarding a preserved, nonconstitutional issue, then we must consider whether the error was harmless. Romero v. People , 2017 CO 37, ¶ 16, 393 P.3d 973, 978. Under this standard, reversal is required only if the error affected the parties' substantial rights.

We review a trial court’s abuse of discretion on a preserved, nonconstitutional issue for harmless error. Romero v. People , 2017 CO 37, ¶ 16, 393 P.3d 973, 978.III.

Here, the trial court should have been able to avoid the error "without benefit of objection." Romero v. People, 2017 CO 37, ¶ 6, 393 P.3d 973, 976 (quoting People v. Ujaama, 2012 COA 36, ¶ 42, 302 P.3d 296, 304 ). Colorado's sentencing scheme explicitly anticipates that the presumptive length of direct sentences to community corrections will parallel DOC sentences.

¶ 63 An error is obvious if it is "so clear-cut" that "a trial judge should be able to avoid it without benefit of objection." Crabtree, ¶ 42, 550 P.3d at 667 (quoting Romero v. People, 2017 CO 37, ¶ 6, 393 P.3d 973, 976). Consequently, an error is obvious if it "contravene[d] a clear statutory command, a well-settled legal principle, or established Colorado case law." Id.

An obvious error is one that is "so clear-cut" that "a trial judge should be able to avoid it without benefit of objection." Crabtree, ¶ 42, 550 P.3d at 667 (quoting Romero v. People, 2017 CO 37, ¶ 6, 393 P.3d 973, 976). As the division explained in Hernandez, a court’s violation of the clear command of a court rule is an obvious error.

Thus, we cannot say that it was plain error for the trial court not to conclude that limiting the sealing of criminal records constitutes a form of "punishment" and that it is "cruel and unusual" to disallow the sealing of a deferred judgment when the defendant was convicted of an of- fense in the same case. See People v. Procasky, 2019 COA 181, ¶ 33, 467 P.3d 1252 (an error is plain when it is obvious, substantial, and so undermines the fundamental fairness of the proceeding as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment); Romero v. People, 2017 CO 37, ¶ 6, 393 P.3d 973 ("To qualify as plain error, the error must be one that ‘is so clear-cut, so obvious,’ a trial judge should be able to avoid it without benefit of objection."

Since Henderson , our supreme court has repeatedly granted certiorari to consider whether to adopt its rule (and, by extension, the rule announced in Johnson ), but it has declined to reach the issue every time. Romero v. People , 2017 CO 37, ¶ 1 n.1, 393 P.3d 973 ; Garcia v. People , 2019 CO 64, ¶ 28, 445 P.3d 1065 ; Howard-Walker v. People , 2019 CO 69, ¶ 49, 443 P.3d 1007 ; Campbell v. People , 2020 CO 49, ¶ 38, 464 P.3d 759 ; Thompson v. People , 2020 CO 72, ¶ 53, 471 P.3d 1045. While divisions of this court may have implicitly rejected Henderson , see, e.g. , People v. Valdez , 2014 COA 125, ¶ 27, 411 P.3d 94 ("[W]here the law is unsettled [at the time of trial], the trial court's alleged error with respect to the law cannot constitute plain error.")

A plain error is (1) obvious; (2) substantial; and (3) undermines the fundamental fairness of the trial itself so as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction. Romero v. People , 2017 CO 37, ¶ 6, 393 P.3d 973 (citing Hagos , ¶ 14 ). "To qualify as plain error, the error must be one that ‘is so clear-cut, so obvious,’ a trial judge should be able to avoid it without benefit of objection."