We must then construe and apply those statutes, reviewing the district court's interpretation de novo. See Mosley v. People , 2017 CO 20, ¶ 15, 392 P.3d 1198 ; People v. Walker , 252 P.3d 551, 552 (Colo. App. 2011). ¶ 7 When construing a statute, our primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent.

UMB Bank, N.A. v. Landmark Towers Ass'n, Inc. , 2017 CO 107, ¶ 22, 408 P.3d 836, 840. Because "[w]e presume that the legislature intends a just and reasonable result when it enacts a statute," Mosley v. People , 2017 CO 20, ¶ 16, 392 P.3d 1198, 1202, "[w]e also avoid constructions that would render any words or phrases superfluous or that would lead to illogical or absurd results." Winninger v. Kirchner , 2021 CO 47, ¶ 20, 488 P.3d 1091, 1095. "If the statutory language is clear, then we will apply it as written."

Because this kind of local waiver requirement would effectively nullify many provisions of TECDA, we hold that school districts may not require teachers to waive benefits granted to them under TECDA as a condition of employment. See Mosley v. People, 2017 CO 20, ¶ 16, 392 P.3d 1198, 1202 ("[W]e avoid statutory interpretations that defeat legislative intent or lead to absurd results."). ¶23 PSD argues next that, notwithstanding the fact that waiver was required in the online application and the employment agreement, Stanczyk voluntarily waived her right to port her nonprobationary status by applying to a teaching position advertised as "probationary," and then accepting the terms of her employment agreement.

Because this kind of local waiver requirement would effectively nullify many provisions of TECDA, we hold that school districts may not require teachers to waive benefits granted to them under TECDA as a condition of employment. See Mosley v. People, 2017 CO 20, ¶ 16, 392 P.3d 1198, 1202 ("[W]e avoid statutory interpretations that defeat legislative intent or lead to absurd results."). ¶23 PSD argues next that, notwithstanding the fact that waiver was required in the online application and the employment agreement, Stanczyk voluntarily waived her right to port her nonprobationary status by applying to a teaching position advertised as "probationary," and then accepting the terms of her employment agreement.

¶16 Colorado's speedy trial statute is intended to safeguard a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial. Mosley v. People, 2017 CO 20, ¶ 17, 392 P.3d 1198, 1202. Whether a defendant's statutory speedy trial right has been violated is a matter of statutory interpretation and is therefore reviewed de novo.

¶12 Colorado’s speedy trial statute is intended to safeguard a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial and to prevent unnecessary prosecutorial and judicial delays in the prosecution of a criminal case. Mosley v. People , 2017 CO 20, ¶ 17, 392 P.3d 1198, 1202 ; People v. Runningbear , 753 P.2d 764, 767 (Colo. 1988).

This reading of the statutory provisions considers them "as a whole" and "give[s] consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all [their] parts." Mosley v. People, 2017 CO 20, ¶ 16, 392 P.3d 1198, 1202. Petitioner's reading does not.

In re 2000–2001 Dist. Grand Jury , 97 P.3d 921, 924 (Colo. 2004) ; see People v. Mosley , 397 P.3d 1122, 1126 (Colo. App. 2011), aff'd , 2017 CO 20, 392 P.3d 1198. In the face of this ambiguous silence, we turn to extrinsic aids to guide our interpretation of section 42-4-1307.

This reading of the statutory provisions considers them "as a whole" and "give[s] consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all [their] parts." Mosley v. People , 2017 CO 20, ¶ 16, 392 P.3d 1198, 1202. Petitioner’s reading does not.

¶ 16 Delacruz argues that, because this language in subsection (6) refers only to subsection (1), the exclusions do not apply to the speedy trial calculation for a new trial following the reversal of a defendant's convictions on appeal, as provided in subsection (2). We rejected this contention in our decision today in Mosley v. People . 2017 CO 20, ¶¶ 24–34, 392 P.3d 1198. Construing the statute as a whole, we explained that subsection (1) of the statute establishes the basic right to a speedy trial, as well as the remedy of dismissal for violation of that right. Id. at ¶ 28.