Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2493-12T2
06-04-2014
TEODOMIRO UZURIAGA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DIEUJUSTE SMITH AND MAGALIE SMITH, Defendants-Respondents.
Kenneth C. Marano, attorney for appellant. Respondents Dieujuste Smith and Magalie Smith have not filed a brief.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Lihotz and Hoffman.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, Docket No. L-2430-11.
Kenneth C. Marano, attorney for appellant.
Respondents Dieujuste Smith and Magalie Smith have not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
In this automobile negligence action, plaintiff Teodomiro Uzuriaga appeals from two Law Division orders. The first order denied his motion to reinstate his complaint, which the court had dismissed for lack of prosecution pursuant to Rule 1:13-7. The second order denied his motion for reconsideration of the first order. In denying plaintiff's motions, the court found plaintiff had not shown exceptional circumstances, the standard in Rule 1:13-7 that applies to multi-defendant cases. Because the court applied the exceptional circumstances standard in a situation in which its purpose did not apply, and because the court's application of that standard barred plaintiff from having his case decided on its merits, we conclude the court mistakenly exercised its discretion by denying plaintiff's motions. Accordingly, we reverse and remand so the case can be decided on its merits.
Plaintiff was struck by a vehicle owned by defendant Dieujuste Smith and operated by defendant Magalie Smith on May 20, 2009. Plaintiff filed his complaint on May 19, 2011; thereafter, his counsel attempted to locate and serve defendants, without success. On December 2, 2011, the court issued an order of dismissal without prejudice, pursuant to Rule 1:13-7(a).
Upon receiving the dismissal order, plaintiff's counsel retained an investigator to locate and serve defendants. The investigator located defendants and served them with the summons and complaint on January 10, 2012. The investigator sent counsel original certifications of service, which counsel inadvertently placed in his file, rather than filing with the court along with a reinstatement motion.
When reviewing his files ten months later, plaintiff's counsel realized the error and filed a motion to reinstate the complaint on November 1, 2012. On November 16, 2012, the court denied the motion, citing a lack of "exceptional circumstances as required by [Rule] 1:13-7a." Plaintiff's counsel then filed a motion for reconsideration, along with a supporting certification explaining that due to his son's marriage and mother's death, he was indisposed from November 2011 through early 2012; in early 2012, counsel's aunt became terminally ill, requiring him to perform various care-taking activities for her until she died in July 2012. The judge denied the application, noting that while plaintiff's counsel "was burdened with some extraordinary hardships, over a short period of time, these hardships had ended by mid-July 2012. This motion was not filed until November of 2012." This appeal followed.
"Our review of an order denying reinstatement of a complaint dismissed for lack of prosecution proceeds under an abuse of discretion standard." Baskett v. Kwokleung Cheung, 422 N.J. Super. 377, 382 (App. Div. 2011). In our review, we are not bound by the Law Division's legal conclusions or its "'interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts . . . .'" Alfano v. BDO Seidman, LLP., 393 N.J. Super. 560, 573 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).
Plaintiff argues the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to reinstate his complaint under Rule 1:13-7. For that reason, we begin our analysis by reviewing the text of the rule, its purpose, and the principles governing its interpretation. The text of Rule 1:13-7(a) requires, in pertinent part, that a court dismiss a case for lack of prosecution
whenever an action has been pending for four months . . . , without a required proceeding having been taken therein . . . , [at which time] the court shall issue written notice to the plaintiff advising that the action as to any or all defendants will be dismissed without prejudice 60 days following the date of the notice . . . unless, within said period, action specified in subsection (c) is taken. If no such action is taken, the court shall enter an order of dismissal without prejudice as to any named defendant and shall furnish the plaintiff with a copy thereof.
The rule permits a plaintiff whose complaint has been dismissed to file a motion to reinstate the complaint. A court ruling on such a motion must decide whether the plaintiff has established good cause on one hand, or exceptional circumstances on the other, depending on the timing of the motion and the number of parties in the case:
After dismissal, . . . [i]f the defendant has been properly served but declines to execute a consent order, plaintiff shall move on good cause shown for vacation of the dismissal. In multi-defendant actions in which at least one defendant has been properly served, the consent order shall be submitted within 60 days of the order of dismissal, and if not so submitted, a motion for reinstatement shall be required. The motion shall be granted on good cause shown if filed within 90 days of the order of dismissal, and thereafter shall be granted only on a showing of exceptional circumstances.
[R. 1:13-7(a).]
The rule "is an administrative rule designed to clear the docket of cases in which plaintiff has failed to perform certain acts." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 1.1 on R. 1:13-7 (2014). The reason the rule requires plaintiff to demonstrate exceptional circumstances in multi-defendant cases is because of a management problem that arises in such cases. Pressler & Verniero, supra, comment 1.2 on R. 1:13-7. In multi-defendant cases where the complaint has been dismissed as to only one defendant,
[t]he case likely will have proceeded and discovery undertaken at least with respect to the action(s) against the remaining defendant or defendants. Thus vacation of the dismissal has the capacity of substantially delaying all further proceedings. To permit appropriate case management, the rule requires a consent order to be submitted within 60 days after the dismissal or, in the alternative, on
motion for good cause shown within 90 days of the order of dismissal or on a showing of exceptional circumstances thereafter.
[Ibid.]
When interpreting Rule 1:13-7, a court should bear in mind that
[t]he rules in Part I through Part VIII, inclusive, shall be construed to secure a just determination, simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay. Unless otherwise stated, any rule may be relaxed or dispensed with by the court in which the action is pending if adherence to it would result in an injustice.
[R. 1:1-2(a).]
The general concept of relaxing a rule when adherence to it would result in an injustice takes on added significance when a rule involves case management and a party is facing the ultimate sanction of dismissal with prejudice.
"We appreciate the desirability of the prompt disposal of cases. Courts should not forget, however, that they merely provide a disinterested forum for the just resolution of disputes. Ordinarily, the swift movement of cases serves the parties' interests, but the shepherding function we serve is abused by unnecessarily closing the courtroom doors to a litigant whose only sin is to retain a lawyer who delays in filing an answer during settlement negotiations. Eagerness to move cases must defer to our paramount duty to administer justice in the individual case."
[Ghandi v. Cespedes, 390 N.J. Super. 193, 198 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Audubon Volunteer Fire Co. No. 1 v. Church Constr. Co., 206 N.J. Super. 405, 406 (App. Div. 1986)).]
We noted in Ghandi that "[b]ecause . . . 'any rule may be relaxed or dispensed with by the court in which the action is pending if adherence to it would result in an injustice,' [R.] 1:1-2, 'courts should be reluctant to penalize a blameless client for the mistakes of the attorney.'" Ibid. (quoting Familia v. Univ. Hosp. of Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 350 N.J. Super. 563, 568 (App. Div. 2002)). We further noted the "'general disinclination to invoke the ultimate sanction of dismissal where the statute of limitations has run.'" Ibid. (quoting Mason v. Nabisco Brands, Inc., 233 N.J. Super. 263, 268-69 (App. Div. 1989)).
With those principles in mind, we turn to the facts in the case under review. The motion judge applied the "exceptional circumstances" standard in Rule 1:13-7 at a juncture in the case when application of that standard did not serve the purpose of the rule. Both defendants were served at the same time, at a point when no other defendants had been served or filed answers and no discovery had occurred. Consequently, the management problem the rule was intended to address — delay of all further proceedings against defendants that have participated in the case and taken discovery — did not exist. Nor was the rule's implicit purpose of prompting counsel to take action, or risk dismissal of the complaint served here. The notice of dismissal did prompt counsel to take immediate action to locate and serve the complaint upon defendants, which he completed within six weeks. Moreover, there is no evidence defendants were prejudiced and defendants did not oppose the motions.
The only other defendants listed in the caption were John Doe defendants, pursuant to Rule 4:26-4.
In terms of judicial discretion, we can discern nothing fair or equitable that was accomplished by applying the exceptional circumstances standard in this case. See Cosme v. Borough of East Newark Twp. Comm., 304 N.J. Super. 191, 202 (App. Div. 1997); Ghandi, supra, 390 N.J. Super. at 197-98. The ultimate result was defendants, who did not oppose the motion, had a complaint against them dismissed with prejudice before filing a responsive pleading because plaintiff's attorney had mistakenly placed the proofs of defendants' service in his file, rather than filing them with the court along with a routine reinstatement motion. Significantly, the statute of limitations had run.
"'Good cause' is an amorphous term, that is, it 'is difficult of precise delineation. Its application requires the exercise of sound discretion in light of the facts and circumstances of the particular case considered in the context of the purposes of the Court Rule being applied.'" Ghandi, supra, 390 N.J. Super. at 196 (quoting Delaware Valley Wholesale Florist, Inc. v. Addalia, 349 N.J. Super. 228, 232 (App. Div. 2002)). "Notwithstanding the adoption of the good cause standard, we are satisfied that, absent a finding of fault by the plaintiff and prejudice to the defendant, a motion to restore under the rule should be viewed with great liberality." Id. at 197.
Having considered all of the foregoing circumstances, we are convinced the good cause standard applied, and was satisfied. By its ruling, the court, in effect, imposed the ultimate sanction on a plaintiff whose attorney, upon receiving the notice of dismissal, promptly located and served defendants, who, in turn, neither opposed the reinstatement motion nor claimed any prejudice relating to its delayed filing. Additionally, serious family issues encountered by plaintiff's attorney caused much of the delay. More importantly, the court applied the exceptional circumstances standard in an instance where it had no relationship to its purpose. We fail to discern how dismissing a case under those circumstances constituted the exercise of "'sound discretion guided by law so as to accomplish substantial justice and equity.'" Cosme, supra, 304 N.J. Super. at 202 (quoting In re Presentment of Bergen Cnty. Grand Jury, 193 N.J. Super. 2, 9 (App. Div. 1984)).
We conclude the denial of plaintiff's motions constituted a mistaken exercise of discretion. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this matter so defendants may file an answer, the parties may complete discovery, and the parties may have a just resolution of this action on its merits.
Reversed and remanded.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION