Decided June 3, 2004. Appeal from the 2d Dept: 307 AD2d 1032. Motion for leave to appeal/dismissed on finality ground.

Here, we conclude that plaintiff made a sufficient showing that service upon defendant pursuant to CPLR 308(1), (2), or (4) was impracticable, and thus that the court providently exercised its discretion in directing an alternative method of service ( see State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Coakley, 16 A.D.3d 403, 790 N.Y.S.2d 412,lv. dismissed5 N.Y.3d 746, 800 N.Y.S.2d 375, 833 N.E.2d 710;Uzo v. Uzo, 307 A.D.2d 1032, 1032, 763 N.Y.S.2d 758,lv. dismissed2 N.Y.3d 823, 782 N.Y.S.2d 240, 815 N.E.2d 1105;Astrologo, 240 A.D.2d at 606–607, 659 N.Y.S.2d 481;cf. David v. Total Identity Corp., 50 A.D.3d 1484, 1485, 857 N.Y.S.2d 380). Plaintiff submitted evidence that defendant left the United States with the parties' child and declared her intention to remain in Iran with her family ( see Astrologo, 240 A.D.2d at 606–607, 659 N.Y.S.2d 481).

The defendants' claim that the motion for leave to amend should have been denied as time-barred is without merit since LaPalmer was united in interest with his employer, the defendant MTA/Long Island Bus, which was timely served ( see Gottlieb v. County of Nassau, 92 A.D.2d 858). Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the cross motion pursuant to CPLR 308(5) ( see Uzo v. Uzo, 307 A.D.2d 1032). The defendants' remaining contention does not warrant reversal.