Summary
In Usrey v. State, 198 Miss. 17, 20 So.2d 847, 848, it was said that, "The vice of induced confessions, whether under pressure of threat or promise, is seen not so much in the method used as in the result.
Summary of this case from Patton v. StateOpinion
No. 35720.
February 12, 1945.
1. CRIMINAL LAW.
Written confession was admissible though preliminary admonition by officer that anything accused might say would be used against him and also to help him imported a promise of reward, where accused had previously while in custody in another state voluntarily made two separate oral confessions and confessions were all consistent with each other and with physical facts.
2. CRIMINAL LAW.
The improbability of truth of confession induced by threat or promise vitiates such confession.
3. CRIMINAL LAW.
A confession freely made is not necessarily rendered inadmissible by subsequent confession involuntarily made.
APPEAL from the circuit court of Forrest county, HON. F.B. COLLINS, Judge.
A.S. Scott, of Laurel, and Pat Koonce, of Hattiesburg, for appellant.
The court erred in ruling the confession competent over the objection of the defendant that same was not obtained free and voluntary and submitting to the jury, under instructions, the legal question as to the competency, vel non, of the confession.
Ammons v. State, 80 Miss. 592, 32 So. 9; Hamilton v. State, 77 Miss. 675, 27 So. 606; Simon v. State, 37 Miss. 288; Simmons v. State, 61 Miss. 243; Peter v. State, 4 Smedes M. (12 Miss.) 31; Van Buren v. State, 24 Miss. 512; Dick v. State, 30 Miss. 593; Jordan v. State, 32 Miss. 382; Sam v. State, 33 Miss. 347; Frank v. State, 39 Miss. 705; Cady v. State, 44 Miss. 332; Garrard v. State, 50 Miss. 147; Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 28 L.Ed. 262; 6 Am. Eng. Enc. Law, p. 431, note 3, p. 550, note 7.
The doctrine is well established that when a confession is induced by threat or by a promise, or hope of reward or hope of favor to be derived, the confession is not admissible.
Garrard v. State, supra; State v. Bostick, 4 Harrington 563; Commonwealth v. Taylor, 5 Cush. 605.
Appellant objected to admission of the written confession signed by appellant which showed on its face that appellant was therein promised that same would also be used to help him. Such confession should have been excluded.
White v. State, 129 Miss. 182, 91 So. 903; Banks v. State, 93 Miss. 700, 47 So. 437; Durham v. State (Miss.), 47 So. 545; Jones v. State, 133 Miss. 684, 98 So. 150.
A confession should not be admitted if there is a reasonable doubt as to whether it was freely and voluntarily made.
Johnson v. State, 107 Miss. 196, 65 So. 218.
Certainly when chief of detectives promised appellant that any confession made would be also used to help him, same was an inducement and as to degree thereof this Court will not concern itself.
Simmons v. State, 61 Miss. 243; Bonner v. State, 55 Ala. 246; Lacy v. State, 58 Miss. 386; Robinson v. People, 159 Ill. 119; People v. Clark, 105 Mich. 169; People v. McMahon, 15 N.Y. 387; Rex v. Cas, 1 Leach C.C. 293, note; 6 Am. Eng. Ency. Law (2 Ed.), pp. 527, 540, par. (M), note 2.
Where a confession was obtained by a promise of one in authority, express or implied, that if accused confessed efforts would be made to mitigate punishment, same was not admissible in evidence.
Johnson v. State, 89 Miss. 773, 42 So. 606; Harvey v. State (Miss.), 20 So. 837.
It is not the law in Mississippi that a jury should be instructed to disregard a confession unless they find same was freely given.
Bartee v. State, 180 Miss. 141, 177 So. 355.
The jury cannot pass upon the admissibility of a confession. This duty devolves solely upon the trial court.
Ellis v. State, 65 Miss. 44, 3 So. 188; State v. Smith, 72 Miss. 420, 18 So. 482; Johnson v. State, supra; Wright v. State, 173 Miss. 242, 161 So. 870; Williams v. State, 72 Miss. 117, 16 So. 296.
See also Lee v. State, 137 Miss. 329, 102 So. 296; 38 A.L.R. 121; 102 A.L.R. 641. Greek L. Rice, Attorney General, by R.O. Arrington, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
In murder prosecution, confession held properly admitted where at the time there was nothing to show that it was not free and voluntary.
Weatherford v. State, 164 Miss. 888, 143 So. 853.
If the confession had been wrongfully admitted, error was rendered harmless by defendant's taking the stand himself and testifying to the same facts related in confession.
Weatherford v. State, supra.
It has been the long-established rule in this state that it is the exclusive province of the trial judge to pass upon conflicts in the evidence bearing upon the competency and admissibility of confessions, and that his rulings thereon will not be reversed unless clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence.
Wohner v. State, 175 Miss. 428, 167 So. 622; Jones v. State, 58 Miss. 349; Ellis v. State, 65 Miss. 44, 3 So. 188, 7 Am. St. Rep. 634; Brown v. State, 142 Miss. 335, 107 So. 373; Stubbs v. State, 148 Miss. 764, 114 So. 827; Buckler v. State, 171 Miss. 353, 157 So. 353.
In the case at bar, there was no conflict in the evidence as to the admissibility of the oral confession and no conflict in the written confession. Therefore, there can be no question at all about the admissibility of the oral confession because it is clear that it was made before the written confession and is sufficient of itself to support the verdict in this case. Looking at all of the circumstances under which the written confession was given, it appears to be clear and beyond argument that the appellant was not mislead, deceived or induced by any hope of reward, aid, or leniency in the simple statement contained in the warning of the written confession, that, "Anything that you say about this matter will be used against you and will also be used to help you. Knowing that, are you willing to make a statement telling the truth?" Answer: "Yes."
Tyler v. State, 159 Miss. 223, 131 So. 417.
Argued orally by A.S. Scott, for appellant, and by R.O. Arrington, for appellee.
Appellant appeals from a conviction of murder which carried with it a death sentence. His victim was his sister, Mrs. Etta King, who was found choked to death by bits of her own clothing.
The assignments of error are summarized in the contention that a signed confession by the accused was improperly admitted. This statement was admittedly dictated and signed by the accused and presents in detail the reasons for and circumstances of the homicide. It was given in the form of questions to and answers by the defendant, and was taken down by a stenographer who also reported and included in the transcription a preliminary admonition of the officer to whom it was given, the following statement: "Anything that you may say about this matter will be used against you and will also be used to help you. Knowing that, are you willing to make a statement telling the truth?" Answer: "Yes." The contention is that this imports into the confession a promise of reward and is based upon the implication that the confesson might be availed of by the accused to such advantage as he may utilize.
In rejecting this contention, we do not adjudge the effect of this language as standing alone. This was the third confession made by the defendant. The first was voluntarily made orally to an officer, and was substantially in the language of the transcribed answers. A second of like import and effect was made verbally to another officer.
These confessions were made while the accused was in custody of the law in Little Rock, Arkansas. Later, when he was removed to Hattiesburg for trial, he told the sheriff he did not want to discuss the murder, stating "I just don't want to talk about it, I made one confession already and I think that ought to be enough."
The vice of induced confessions, whether under pressure of threat or promise, is seen not so much in the method used as in the result. It is the improbability of its being true that vitiates it, even though the courts takes frequent occasion properly to condemn forcible methods. 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, sec. 817, p. 1426; 30 Am. Jur., Evidence, Sec. 483, p. 422. In any event, the subsequent confession, even though involuntarily made, would not of necessity destroy the admissibility of prior confessions freely made. 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, sec. 817, p. 1437.
The defendant testified on his own behalf. He did not deny making the three confessions, but sought to explain his motive therefor. He testified that he was under parole from the California penitentiary where he had served nearly nineteen years of a life sentence. His expressed purpose was to be extradited to the State of Mississippi, and by thus evading charges lodged against him in Arkansas, to avoid the risk of a revocation of his parole, although the officer to whom he originally confessed testified that the accused denied that he had confessed merely to get back to Mississippi. He admitted having stated to an officer in Little Rock "You are looking at the rottenest" person "that ever lived," and was quoted as deeming himself deserving of the electric chair, which he asked that the sheriff "get ready."
Although there are some intimations adduced by the defendant that he was promised while in Arkansas that only one of three pending charges would be pressed, this is denied by other witnesses. The basis of the attack upon the written confession is, as stated, the language of its preamble.
The confessions are all consistent with each other, and with the physical facts, and reveal an expressed motive, originating in the mind of the defendant himself and not superimposed by outside influences.
We therefore are not willing to overturn the finding of the trial judge that the written confession was under all the circumstances admissible. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and Friday, March 23, 1945, is fixed as the date for the execution of the sentence.
Affirmed.