Opinion
No. CV07 5010522 S
October 26, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT #114
The plaintiff has filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that there is no genuine issue of fact that exclusionary clause provisions in a Renters Protection Policy issued to the defendant Jonathan Edington apply to this case and relieve the plaintiff of the obligation to defend and indemnify Edington for the financial consequences of his intentional and criminal acts. The defendant, Charlene Benoit, Administratrix for the Estate of Barry James, has filed an objection arguing that there is a question of fact as to whether the plaintiff must defend and indemnify Edington in an underlying civil suit filed by Benoit, Rita James and Charles James. See. Charlene Benoit, et al v. Christina Edington, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV07 5010327.
This action was withdrawn by the plaintiff on September 11, 2008. There is a pending matter titled Charlene Benoit, et al v. Jonathan Edington, Docket No. CV06 5006056, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport. This matter has been assigned a trial date of November 5, 2009.
The defendant Benoit argues that the subject policy's intentional or criminal acts exclusion provisions do not apply in the present case because Edington was suffering from extreme emotional disturbance at the time he stabbed and killed the deceased, Barry James. Accordingly, Benoit argues that Edington's mental state negates the intent of his actions, and therefore, the plaintiff must defend and indemnify Edington in the underlying civil action. In summary, Benoit argues that Edington's mental state and the issue of his intent is a question of fact that cannot be addressed as a matter of law.
In determining the merits of the motion for summary judgment, the court has considered each party's memorandum of law and the following additional materials submitted by the parties:
1. Verified copy of United Services Automobile Association Casualty Insurance Company Renters Policy, 012224224REN002, with applicable endorsements and forms issued to Christina Edington, effective August 28, 2006;
2. Copy of psychiatric report of Dr. Ezra E.H. Griffith, Yale University School of Medicine, Department of Psychiatry, dated April 25, 2007;
3. Transcript copy of plea hearing for Jonathan Edington before the Hon. Richard F. Comerford, Jr., dated June 15, 2007, in the matter of State of Connecticut v. Jonathan Edington, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CR060218305;
4. Copy of Amended Complaint dated February 18, 2008, and Answer and Special Defense to Amended Complaint, dated September 24, 2008, in the matter of Charlene Benoit, Executrix, et al v. Jonathan Edington, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. FBT-CV06 5006056 S;
5. Defendants' Reply to Plaintiff's Requests for Admissions, dated April 14, 2008.
I Standard of Law
"A Motion for Summary Judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue where there is no real issue to be tried." Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 576 A.2d 829 (1989). "In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Hertz Corp. v. Federal Ins., Co., 245 Conn. 374, 381, 713 A.2d 820 (1998). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any issues exist. Nolan v. Borkowski, 206 Conn. 495, 500, 538 A.2d 1031 (1988). The moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Hertz Corp. v. Federal Ins. Corp., supra, 245 Conn. 381. "The opposing party must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. "A material fact is a fact which will make a difference in the result of a case." Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229 Conn. 99, 639 A.2d 507 (1994); Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 259 Conn. 527, 556, 791 A.2d 489 (2002). "The existence of the genuine issue of material fact must be demonstrated by counter affidavits and concrete evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mozeleski v. Thomas, 76 Conn.App. 287, 290, 818 A.2d 893, cert. denied, 264 Conn. 904, 823 A.2d 1221 (2003).
"Under our law, the terms of an insurance policy are to be construed according to the general rules of contract construction . . . The determinative question is the intent of the parties, that is, what coverage the . . . [insured] expected to receive and what the [insurer] was to provide, as disclosed by the provisions of the policy . . . If the terms of the policy are clear and unambiguous, then the language, from which the intention of the parties is to be deduced, must be accorded its natural and ordinary meaning . . . However, [w]hen the words of an insurance contract are, without violence, susceptible of two [equally reasonable] interpretations, that which will sustain the claim and cover the loss must, in preference, be adopted . . . [T]his rule of construction favorable to the insured extends to exclusion clauses." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Allstate Ins. Co. v. Barron, 269 Conn. 394, 405, 848 A.2d 1165 (2004); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Namerow, 261 Conn. 784, 796, 807 A.2d 467 (2002).
II Factual and Procedural Summary
The plaintiff issued a Renters Protection Policy ("policy") to the defendant Jonathan Edington for the policy period of May 26, 2006 to February 18, 2007. According to the underlying civil lawsuit filed against Edington, on August 28, 2006, Edington entered the home of the decedent Barry James by breaking through a screen on the bedroom window. Edington then struck and stabbed James multiple times with a large kitchen knife. The injuries inflicted on James by Edington ultimately led to the death of Barry James. See Charlene Benoit et al. v. Jonathan Edington, supra. The complaint in the civil lawsuit filed by Benoit alleges that Edington received a series of telephone calls from his wife who told him that their two-year-old daughter had related to Mrs. Edington that their neighbor, Barry James, had entered the Edington residence and had "some form of contact with her." The Benoit complaint further alleges that Edington was in a state of extreme emotional disturbance and improperly concluded that his two-year-old daughter was sexually molested by Barry James. The complaint further alleges that Edington struck and stabbed James "in a state of extreme emotional disturbance."
On or about August 15, 2007, the plaintiff, USAA, initiated this lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the USAA Renters Policy did not obligate USAA to defend or indemnify Edington for this incident. USAA also sought declaratory relief against Christina Edington, Jonathan Edington's wife, as she was also a named defendant in a lawsuit filed by Benoit. However, on August 14, 2008 the court granted Christina Edington's motion to strike all counts on the grounds that she had no duty to control the actions of her husband. See Benoit et al. v. Christina Edington, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV07 5010327(August 14, 2008, Gilardi, J.). The plaintiff, thereafter withdrew this action against Christina Edington. Thus, all claims against Christina Edington have been extinguished. Following Judge Gilardi's granting of said motion to strike, USAA amended its complaint in the present action on September 11, 2008 and removed Christina Edington from this action. USAA did, however, add as direct defendants in this claim for declaratory relief, Charlene Benoit, Administratrix of the Estate of Barry James, Rita James and Charles James ("Benoit defendants"), who are all claimants in the separate Benoit complaint against Jonathan Edington
III Discussion
On June 15, 2007, Edington pleaded guilty to the crime of manslaughter in the first degree General Statutes § 53a-55(a)(1), in connection with the death of Barry James. General Statutes § 53a-55(a)(1) provides:
USAA has submitted a transcript of Edington's plea proceedings and a certified copy of the conviction record for Edington.
(a) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; . . .
The USAA Renters Protection Policy Amendatory Endorsement issued to Edington contains the following language:
If a claim is made or suit is brought against an insured for damages because of bodily injury or property damage caused by an occurrence to which this coverage applies, we will:
1. Pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which the insured is legally liable; and
2. Provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice, even if the suit is groundless, false or fraudulent . . . This coverage does not provide defense to any insured for criminal prosecution or proceedings.
Occurrence means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same harmful conditions, which results, during the policy period, in:
a. bodily injury; or
b. property damage.
We will not pay for punitive damages or exemplary damages, fines or penalties.
The USAA policy contains the main policy portion, then an Amendatory Endorsement for Connecticut policies. In the main policy section entitled "Liability and Medical Payments Exclusions," the USAA policy provides as follows:
The exclusions listed in the main policy are replaced with those set forth in the Amendatory Endorsement, including exclusions for bodily injury or property damage:
a. caused by the intentional or purposeful acts of any insured, including conduct that would reasonably be expected to result in bodily injury to any person or property damage to any property.
4. arising out of the commission of, attempting to flee from, or avoiding apprehension for a criminal act for which intent is a necessary element.
USAA argues that in Wilderman v. Powers, 110 Conn.App. 819, 956 A.2d 613 (2008), the Appellate Court recently upheld a grant of summary judgment to an insurer on an "almost identical" criminal act exclusion as in this case. In Wilderman v. Powers, supra, the victim of a stalker who conducted voyeuristic surveillance against the victim, filed a complaint against the stalker. The stalker then filed a third-party action against his insurer, seeking a defense and indemnity. The insurer filed a motion for summary judgment based on its criminal act exclusion. The stalker entered a plea of guilty to a charge of disorderly conduct, and evidence of the plea was submitted in support of summary judgment. The insurer also submitted excerpts from a deposition transcript of the stalker's deposition in which he was asked if various acts committed by him relating to the stalking and surveillance fell "within the definition of disorderly conduct, which is what you have [pleaded] guilty to." Id., 831. The stalker answered in the affirmative and also admitted that he believed he was guilty of those acts. Id. The Wilderman court concluded that the statements by the third-party plaintiff were an admission that he was criminally liable for the crimes for which he had been arrested. Id., 832. On this basis, the court affirmed the decision of the trial court in granting summary judgment that the conduct of the stalker, the third party plaintiff, was criminal in nature, which was "dispositive of the issue of liability of the third-party defendant [insurer]. . ." Id.
The exact language of that provision was:
Homeowners Additional Coverage Endorsement (H-142) also provides an exclusion to coverage:
Section II Exclusions do not apply to personal injury. Personal injury insurance does not apply to
2. Injury caused by a violation of a penal law or ordinance committed by or with the knowledge or consent of an insured; . . .
On the basis of this evidence, we conclude, as did the trial court, that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the conduct of the third party plaintiff, as alleged in the complaint, was criminal in nature. This conclusion is dispositive of the issue of the liability of the third party defendant regardless of whether the plaintiffs could demonstrate that such conduct caused them any degree of harm for which damages might be awarded. The third party plaintiff asserts that the third party defendant's contractual duty to defend and indemnify arose from an endorsement to the homeowner's policy. Specifically, the third party plaintiff claims that the plaintiffs' injuries constitute "personal injury" as defined by the endorsement. That endorsement, however, provides in relevant part: "Personal injury insurance does not apply to . . . injury caused by a violation of a penal law or ordinance committed by or with the knowledge of an insured . . ." On the basis of the admissions of the third party plaintiff, we conclude that the third party defendant proved as a matter of law that this policy exclusion applied . . .
Id., 832-33
USAA argues that in the present matter, Edington pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the first degree, § 53a-55(a)(1). He did not plead guilty to § 53a-55(a)(2), for which extreme emotional disturbance is a mitigating factor allowing the reduction of a murder charge to manslaughter in the first degree. When the court conducted the plea canvass, Edington admitted that his attorney explained to him the elements of the crime of manslaughter in the first degree, § 53a-55(a)(1), which included an intent to cause serious physical injury and, in fact, caused the death of Barry James. Edington also admitted that the facts related to the crime, as set forth in court, were substantially correct. Therefore, USAA argues the Criminal Act Exclusion in USAA's Renter's Policy excludes from coverage claims for bodily injury arising from a commission of a crime for which intent is a necessary element.
Sec. 53a-3(11) defines "intentionally" as follows:
Except where different meanings are expressly specified, the following terms have the following meanings when used in this title:
(11) A person acts "intentionally" with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense when his conscious objective is to cause such result or to engage in such conduct . . .
The plaintiff also argues that while an insured's intent may be negated by a finding that the insured didn't understand the wrongfulness of his actions or was deprived of the capacity to control himself, extreme emotional disturbance does not negate intent. In support of its position, USAA cites Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Jones, 220 Conn. 285, 596 A.2d 414 (1991). In Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Jones, supra, the plaintiff insured Russell Manfredi who beat his wife with a baseball bat, leading to her death. Manfredi was convicted of General Statutes § 53a-55(a)(2), the subsection of the manslaughter statute in which extreme emotional disturbance can be a mitigating factor, in contrast to Edington's conviction of General Statutes § 53a-55(a)(1).
Our Supreme Court has held that "[e]xtreme emotional disturbance is a mitigating circumstance which will reduce the crime of murder to manslaughter . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ruben T., 104 Conn.App. 780, 785, 936 A.2d 270 (2007), quoting State v. Crespo, 246 Conn. 665, 675-76, 718 A.2d 925 (1998).
The verdict in Manfredi's criminal case required the jury to have found that the state had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt that Manfredi had intentionally caused the death of his wife, and also to have found that Manfredi suffered from an extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the killing. The Aetna insurance policy contained an exclusion from coverage for any injuries intentionally caused by the insured [Manfredi]. Id., 299 n. 15. Aetna initiated a declaratory judgment action claiming that the finding by the jury in Manfredi's criminal trial, that he had intentionally caused the death of his wife collaterally estopped Manfredi and the administratrix of the wife's estate from relitigating the issue of Manfredi's intent. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment filed by Aetna. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court and determined that the criminal trial resolved the issue of Manfredi's intent in favor of the insurer. Id., 295. The court held, "[I]f Manfredi acted with the intent required by § 53a-55(a)(2), it logically and necessarily follows that he also acted with the intent delineated by the insurance policies." Id., 298. The Aetna court further noted that, "while the jury found that [Manfredi] suffered from an extreme emotional disturbance, the presence of an extreme emotional disturbance `does not make the action any less intentional.'" Id., 298-99, citing State v. Elliot, 177 Conn. 1, 6, 411 A.2d 3 (1979).
[T]he defense of extreme emotional disturbance does not serve to negate intent, but rather is raised to establish circumstances that mitigate culpability. "The influence of an extreme emotional disturbance explains the defendant's intentional action, but does not make the action any less intentional. The purpose of the extreme emotional disturbance defense is to permit the defendant to show that his actions were caused by a mental infirmity not arising to the level of insanity, and that he is less culpable for having committed them."
(Internal quotation marks omitted, citations omitted.) State v. Elliot, supra, 177 Conn. 6.
The Benoit defendants object to summary judgment, arguing that there is a question of fact as to whether USAA must defend and indemnify Edington in the underlying civil action. The defendants argue that the intentional and criminal acts exclusions contained in the USAA policy issued to Edington do not apply because Edington was suffering from extreme emotional disturbance when he stabbed and killed Barry James. Thus, his mental state negates his actions, and his mental state and the issues of intent are questions of fact and not questions of law.
The defendants have submitted a report of Dr. Ezra Griffith who interviewed Edington and his wife. Griffith also obtained information regarding the incident from police reports and other sources. Specifically, Dr. Griffith stated:
Jonathan Edington committed the act of stabbing Mr. James while under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance. Mr. Edington was agitated and suffering from a brief episode of depersonalization that had been brought on by severe stress. His social isolation from others, his personality structure, and his enmeshed life with his wife contributed to his believing that Barry James had in someway molested Rebecca. It is my conclusion that Mr. Edington lost his self-control; his reason was overborne by his fear, helplessness, anxiety and rage; his intellectual controls failed, and his normal rational thinking no longer prevailed at the time of the stabbing.
Rebecca is the minor daughter of Edington.
In the course of the underlying civil lawsuit, Edington filed an Answer and Special Defenses in which he alleged, among other things, that he was suffering from extreme emotional disturbance.
The defendants have also submitted a transcript of the plea. Contained in the transcript are the remarks of the prosecuting State's Attorney who states among other things:
As I indicated, I think it's a classic case of extreme emotional disturbance. So it's for that reason, we have substituted the information down to a charge of manslaughter one. I, frankly, don't believe there is any such thing as a manslaughter one subsection A three, murder reduced to extreme emotional disturbance. But it's based upon my review of the entire case law which causes me to substitute the Information down to this.
A review of the plea transcript then reveals that following this statement by the State's Attorney, the court (Comerford, J.) conducted a thorough plea canvass. During the plea canvass, Edington, who was represented by counsel stated that he had sufficient time to discuss the matter with his counsel. The elements of the crime were explained to him. He was informed the state at trial would have to prove Edington committed the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Edington responded that he was pleading guilty of his own free will and he agreed with the facts that the State's Attorney related to the court regarding the circumstances surrounding the incident. Based on the responses of Edington and the comments of Edington's counsel, the court made a finding that Edington's guilty plea was entered voluntarily and knowingly with the assistance of competent counsel and that the requisite factual basis for said plea existed. The court then entered a finding of guilty to manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55(a)(1). In the course of the underlying civil lawsuit, Edington filed an Answer and Special Defenses in which he alleged, among other things, that he was suffering from extreme emotional disturbance.
The defendants argue that the mental state of an insured is a issue of fact as it may negate the applicability of an insurance policy's intentional act exclusion and that the issue is governed by Home Insurance v. Aetna Life Casualty Co., 35 Conn.App. 94, 644 A.2d 933 (1994), rev'd on other grounds, 235 Conn. 185 (1995). Thus, summary judgment is inappropriate. "Intent is clearly a question of fact that is ordinarily inferred from one's conduct or acts under the circumstances of the particular case . . . Thus, whether the actor knows that the consequences of his or her conduct are certain or substantially certain to result from his or her act and still proceeds with the conduct, so that he or she should be treated by the law as though he or she in fact desired to produce the result, is a question of fact for the jury . . . It is for the finder of fact, not the court on summary judgment, to determine what inferences to draw . . . [S]ummary judgment procedure is particularly inappropriate where the inferences which the parties seek to have drawn deal with questions of. intent . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 102. "[T]he mental condition of an insured may affect the application of a policy's intentional act exclusion clause." Id., 106. "[A]n insured's actions are not considered intentional where, because of mental illness or defect, the insured does not appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, or is deprived of the capacity to control his actions regardless of his understanding of the wrongfulness of his action." Id., 105-06.
The defendants further argue that the legal principles set forth in Home Insurance v. Aetna Life Casualty Co., supra, 35 Conn.App. 94, were applied in Allstate v. Barron, 269 Conn. 394, 848 A.2d 1165 (2004). "[W]e adopt the Appellate Court's persuasive reasoning and holding in that case as the governing law herein. It is clear to us that, under Home Ins. Co., the crucial issue of fact in the present case is not whether Kelly's [insured's] actions were intentional in the narrow sense that they were deliberate, but whether her intent was negated by her inability to understand the wrongfulness of her conduct or to control her conduct." Allstate v. Barron, 269 Conn. 408-09. As to the mental state of Kelly S., while she was not psychotic, she suffered from depression, anxiety, and was suicidal. She had a history of impulsive decisions and was unable to control herself. Id., 399-402. The trial court granted summary judgment to Allstate, which had filed a declaratory judgment action claiming it had no duty to defend or indemnify the woman's actions because of the intentional or criminal acts exclusion in its policy. Id. Our Supreme Court reversed the decision and held that the trial court had improperly determined there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the insured's state of mind and the applicability of the subject policy exclusion. Id., 417.
As the Appellate Court stated in Home Ins. Co., which we have adopted as the governing law in this opinion, the standard for determining whether an insured's conduct is intentional within the meaning of the intentional conduct exclusion clause is consistent with our test for mental capacity in the criminal context. See General Statutes § 53a-13(a). We have concluded that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Kelly's mental incapacity . . . negated her intent within the meaning of the intentional conduct exclusion clause. We also conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Kelly's mental incapacity negated her criminal intent within the meaning of the criminal conduct exclusion.
Id. Allstate v. Barron, supra, relied upon the opinion in Home Insurance v. Aetna Life Casualty Co., supra, 35 Conn.App. 94, that an insured's mental condition may negate his intent and bar the application of an intentional act exclusion clause. Id., 106. The Home Insurance court concluded that the clause would not apply if, "because of mental illness or defect, the insured did not understand the nature or wrongfulness of his conduct, or was deprived of the capacity to control his actions regardless of his understanding of the nature or wrongfulness of his action." Id., 106-07.
In Allstate v. Barron, supra, there was an affidavit from a psychiatrist, Walter Borden, who concluded that Kelly S. "was incapable of appreciating the nature of her behavior, unable to control herself and incapable of forming rational intent to do the acts attributed to her." Id., 402. Our Supreme Court concluded that there was an issue of fact raised by this affidavit and that along with other evidence submitted by an additional treating psychiatrist, Kelly S. might have been incapable of forming the requisite intent for her actions. Id., 410-11.
In both Home Insurance v. Aetna Life Casualty Co., supra, 35 Conn.App. 94, and Allstate v. Barron, supra, 269 Conn. 394, there were claims that the insured's mental condition was sufficient to negate the requisite intent. Since the subject insurance policies disclaimed coverage for either intentional acts or criminal acts, the insured's mental condition might preclude he or she from being able to understand the wrongful nature of his or her conduct or from being able to control his or her conduct. Therefore, the inquiry started with the nature of the mental illness. However, in the present matter Jonathan Edington, the insured, voluntarily pleaded guilty to a crime for which intent is a necessary element of the crime. A review the report of Dr. Griffith, the forensic psychiatrist who interviewed Edington reveals that Dr. Griffith, with reasonable medical certainty, concluded that Edington, at the time he stabbed Barry James, was under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, but nevertheless, was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, and he was able to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Edington, as noted, did not plead guilty to § 53a-55(a)(2) where Edington's extreme emotional disturbance might be relevant. General Statutes § 53a-55(a)(2) provides:
(2) with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person under circumstances which do not constitute murder because he committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as provided in subsection (a) of section 53a-54a, except that the fact that homicide was committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance constitutes a mitigating circumstance reducing murder to manslaughter in the first degree and need not be proved in any prosecution initiated under this subsection; . . .
General Statutes § 53a-54a(a) contains the definition of "extreme emotional disturbance" and reads as follows in relevant part:
(a) . . . [I]t shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be, provided noting contained in this subsection shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime.
Regarding the criminal act exclusion, there is no doubt that Edington committed a crime for which intent is a necessary element when he pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the first degree, § 53a-55(a)(1). Edington voluntarily admitted to the commission of a criminal act, as a result of his plea and conviction. In Allstate v. Barron, supra, 269 Conn. 394, the insured, Kelly S. perished in the same fire that killed her children and was never charged with a crime. Thus, she was never convicted of a crime. This distinguishes the holding in Allstate v. Barron, supra, from the present case.
The court agrees with the plaintiff, USAA, and finds that Wilderman v. Powers, supra, 110 Conn.App. 819, controls in this matter. Here, as in Wilderman, the insured entered into a guilty plea and answered questions revealing that he understood the elements of the crime with which he was charged. Edington admitted to being guilty. The plea establishes the criminal nature of his conduct and his intent to commit the crime. Both the criminal act exclusion and the intentional act exclusion contained within the subject insurance policy apply to this case and relieve USAA of the obligation to defend and indemnify Edington.
The defendants in support of their objection to summary judgment have also asked the court to consider the recent decision in Vermont Mutual Ins. Co. v. Walukiewicz, 290 Conn. 582, 966 A.2d 672 (2009). The central question presented by that case was whether an incident of self-defense constitutes an "accident' and whether bodily injuries inflicted therein are "expected or intended" within the meaning of an intentional injury exclusion in a liability insurance policy. Id., 592. In a case of first impression in Connecticut, our Supreme Court agreed that there is coverage when an insured acts in self-defense and reversed the judgment of the trial court. Id. "Acts legitimately taken in self-defense, . . . are by their very nature instinctive, spontaneous and unplanned . . . Thus, when the insured acts in self-defense, the insured is not in control of the risk of loss (injury). Instead, the insured is attempting to avoid a mishap that has been forced upon the insured. It is the fortuitous nature of an imposed situation of potential danger or harm upon an insured that provides the rationale for permitting self-defense to be an exception to the exclusionary clause." (Citations omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 600.
The present case does not present a claim of self defense. There was no fortuitous, imposed situation of potential danger or harm facing Edington when he left his residence to enter his neighbors' residence with the intent of inflicting serious bodily injury to Barry James, resulting in the death of James. This was not a case of self defense. Vermont Mutual Ins. Co. v. Walukiewicz, is not applicable. Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, the motion for summary judgment filed by the plaintiff USAA, is hereby granted.