Lying, she claims, does not constitute concealment under section 1071 because it is not a physical act, thus the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support her conviction. In support of her contention, Hayes relies on the Eighth Circuit cases of United States v. Zerba, 21 F.3d 250 (8th Cir. 1994) and United States v. Erdman, 953 F.2d 387 (8th Cir. 1992). We addressed the application of section 1071 in United States v. Hash, 688 F.2d 49 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), stating that the government had the burden of proving three essential elements: (1) the defendant had specific knowledge that a federal warrant had been issued for the person's arrest, (2) the defendant harbored or concealed the person for whom the arrest warrant had been issued, and (3) the defendant intended to prevent the person's discovery and arrest.
When Cymbalista would not pay her for the quantities, she testified that she called Brown, who persuaded Cymbalista to pay her. Buck interpreted an intercepted telephone conversation in which she asked Brown to tell Cymbalista that she needed to talk to him. According to Buck, this was one occasion that she used Brown to persuade Cymbalista to pay her. See United States v. Nunn, 940 F.2d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 1991) (evidence sufficient to support conspiracy conviction where defendant made calls to collect money from prior drug sales made by other co-conspirators). Cf. United States v. Zerba, 21 F.3d 250, 252 (8th Cir. 1994) (evidence sufficient to support drug conspiracy conviction relying in part that defendant acted as drug debt collector for another). Brown frequently drove Cox and Cymbalista to Buck's house where they would purchase cocaine, albeit for their own personal use. Cf. Nunn, 940 F.2d at 1132 (affirming conviction where defendant drove others to various places for drug transactions).
"In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the government." United States v. Zerba, 21 F.3d 250, 252 (8th Cir. 1994). "The government receives the benefit of all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence."
Our standards for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence are well-known: We examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and the government receives the benefit of all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. United States v. Zerba, 21 F.3d 250,251-52 (8th Cir. 1994). (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 124, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2911, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974).
At trial, the government acknowledged that Mrs. Santone did not have the requisite intent to be a principal so that Ms. Vizzachero could not be convicted for aiding her in harboring and concealing under 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). In order to convict Ms. Vizzachero for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1071, the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Vizzachero: 1) knew a federal warrant had been issued for Mr. Mastrangelo's arrest; 2) engaged in physical acts that aided Mr. Mastrangelo in avoiding detection and apprehension; and 3) intended to prevent Mr. Mastrangelo's detection. United States v. Zerba, 21 F.3d 250, 252 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Lockhart, 956 F.2d 1418, 1423 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Udey, 748 F.2d 1231, 1235-36 (8th Cir. 1982) In order to convict Ms. Vizzachero for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Vizzachero: 1) knew a federal warrant had been issued for Mr. Mastrangelo's arrest; 2) caused Mrs. Santone to engage in physical acts that aided Mr. Mastrangelo to avoid detection and apprehension; and 3) intended to prevent Mr. Mastrangelo's detection.
" See Donnell, 596 F.3d at 921 (holding that evidence of defendant's role as "enforcer" "buttress[ed] the conclusion that [he] was an active participant in the conspiracy"). Further, Harper testified that Taylor, Bob Zacher, and Ty Zacher collected the money for Slagg's bail and that she, Heid, and Taylor discussed gathering money from people who owed Slagg money. Cf. United States v. Zerba, 21 F.3d 250, 252 (8th Cir. 1994) (relying, in part, on evidence that defendant acted as drug debt collector for another in holding evidence sufficient to support conspiracy conviction). The Government also introduced a petition for remission, submitted to the DEA by Heid, which stated that Taylor gave Heid $10,000 to help bail Slagg out of jail. See. Fregoso, 60 F.3d at 1325 (relying, in part, on evidence that the defendant "provided the bail money" when an alleged co-conspirator "was arrested . . . on an unrelated drug charge" in holding evidence sufficient to support conspiracy conviction); see also United States v. Woodard, 88 Fed.Appx. 154, 155 (8th Cir. 2004) (unpublished per curiam).
Generally, the government must "prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) a federal warrant has been issued for the fugitive's arrest, (2) the harborer had knowledge that a warrant had been issued for the fugitive's arrest, (3) the defendant actually harbored or concealed the fugitive, and (4) the defendant intended to prevent the fugitive's discovery or arrest." United States v. Mitchell, 177 F.3d 236, 238 (4th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Zerba, 21 F.3d 250, 252 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1543 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Lockhart, 956 F.2d 1418, 1423 (7th Cir. 1992). 18 U.S.C. § 1071 provides:
Because Rosario did not move in limine prior to trial to preclude this evidence, and did not object when the evidence was offered at trial, we review the issue for plain error. See United States v. Zerba, 21 F.3d 250, 253 (8th Cir. 1994). To establish plain error, Rosario must show an obvious error affecting his substantial rights.
Conviction under § 1071 requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant: (1) knew that a federal arrest warrant had been issued; (2) engaged in physical acts that aided the fugitive in avoiding detection and apprehension; and (3) intended to prevent the fugitive's discovery. United States v. Zerba, 21 F.3d 250, 252 (8th Cir. 1994). Green maintains that the Government failed to prove either his knowledge of Colomb's federal arrest warrant or, after learning of its existence, his providing assistance to him.
Our en banc holding in Causey, however, requires that we ignore this pretextual submission and confine our examination to the propriety of the officers' objective actions. United States v. Flores, 63 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1995). See 18 U.S.C. §(s) 1071; United States v. Zerba, 21 F.3d 250 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Lockhart, 956 F.2d 1418 (7th Cir. 1992). Tex. Penal Code Ann. Section(s) 38.05; Antu v. Eddy, 914 S.W.2d 166 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1995).