Summary
holding that a suspect's incriminating statements made immediately after police informed him of the crimes he was being charged with were spontaneous and not a result of custodial interrogation
Summary of this case from United States v. BaileyOpinion
No. 06-2311.
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) April 19, 2007.
Filed: May 9, 2007.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Criminal Action No. 04-cr-00716), District Judge: Honorable R. Barclay Surrick.
Floyd J. Miller, Office of United States Attorney, Philadelphia, PA, for United States of America.
Alan J. Tauber, Levant, Martin, Tauber Levin, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellant.
Sharif Young was convicted by a jury of one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Young appeals the District Court's denial of his pretrial motion to suppress a statement he made while in custody and eventually used against him at his trial. Young argues that admitting the statement in evidence violated his privilege against self-incrimination set out in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
The facts found by the District Court are straightforward and not clearly erroneous. After Detective Christopher Gilman had read Young his Miranda warnings and inquired whether he wanted to make a statement, Young said that he "didn't want to sign anything." Detective Gilman responded, "Well, . . . I guess that means you really don't want to . . . give me a statement in reference to this matter." Young then asked what he was being charged with, and Detective Gilman told him. According to Detective Gilman, Young then said that "Jason was trying to shoot him with an AK-47 and that he shot at Jason numerous times because Jason was trying to shoot him."
We review the facts underlying a district court's evidentiary rulings for clear error and exercise plenary review over the legal conclusions properly drawn from the facts. United States v. Lockett, 406 F.3d 207, 211 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002).
After our own review, we find that we have little to add to the District Court's thorough analysis. See United States v. Young, No. 04-CR-00716, 2005 WL 2789185 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 25, 2005). Even assuming that Young had asserted his right to remain silent — a fact that is far from clear given the Supreme Court's decision in North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979) (holding that waiver of the right to remain silent can be inferred from a defendant's apparent willingness to talk, despite refusing to sign a written waiver) — his statement was not made as a result of custodial interrogation. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). Rather, Young gave his incriminating statement spontaneously and voluntarily after Detective Gilman answered a benign, factual question put by the Young himself. See McGowan v. Miller, 109 F.3d 1168, 1170-71, 1175 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Taylor, 985 F.2d 3, 6-8 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Jackson, 863 F.2d 1168, 1172 (4th Cir. 1989).
We therefore affirm Young's conviction for the reasons given by the District Court.