Opinion
Case No. 2:01CR0037, 2:01CR0038
October 28, 2003
OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT PAUL J. YOUNG'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS
Before the Court is Defendant Paul J. Young's Motion to Suppress Statements. Defendant Young has moved the Court to suppress all statements made by him during an October 15, 1999, interview conducted by Agent Michael Anderson of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Special Agent McDermott of the Internal Revenue Service. Young argues that the interview was essentially an interrogation, that the interview was custodial in nature and therefore he should have received full Miranda warnings. Young further argues that the statements made were involuntary due to coercion on the part of the Government. The Court having heard testimony and having reviewed the briefs issues the following Opinion and Order.
BACKGROUND
On September 16, 2003, the Court heard testimony on Young's Motion to Suppress. The United States represented by Stewart Walz, Assistant United States Attorney, called as witnesses Agent Michael Anderson from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Special Agent McDermott from the Internal Revenue Service. Young, represented by Edwin Wall, testified in his own behalf regarding the interview.
Testimony from Agent Anderson established that sometime prior to October 15, 1999, Agent Anderson contacted Young for the purpose of conducting an interview. Agent Anderson and Young agreed that the interview would take place in the Provo, Utah office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on October 15, 1999, at approximately 5:00 p.m. Young voluntarily appeared at the interview at the designated time and was allowed into the building by Agent Anderson. Agent Anderson escorted Young to Agent Anderson's supervisor's office where the interview was to take place. Special Agent McDermott was in the office waiting when Young arrived.
At the inception of the interview Young was instructed that he was the subject of the criminal investigation. Young was also advised that he was free to choose whether or not to attend the interview, that he was not in custody and that he could leave at any time, but that anything he said could be used against him. Both of the Agents testified that the defendant was not given the full detailed Miranda warning language because the defendant was never considered to be in custody. However, both agents testified that the defendant was advised of the right to counsel and the right to stop the interview and leave at any time.
The interview lasted between four and five hours. The majority of the questions were asked by Agent Anderson. After approximately two hours of questioning, Young became extremely emotional, began to cry, was obviously suffering from a great deal of anxiety and appeared, to the agents, to possibly be contemplating drastic measures. At this point Young was again advised of his right to discontinue the interview and to seek legal counsel before responding to any further questioning. Young chose to continue the interview, which did resume.
Young asserts that during portions of the interview Agent McDermott became extremely caustic with him threatening him with prison, loss of his law license, his home, family and standing in his church. Both agents testified that Young was never threatened or treated in an abusive manner by either agent. Each agent also denied raising their voices during the duration of the interview. Both Agent Anderson and McDermott were adamant in their testimony that no threatening tactics or coercive techniques were used to force Young's testimony. The Court finds the agents' testimony to be credible.
The evidence established that Young is and was an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Utah. According to Young's resume, which was introduced into evidence at the hearing, he has had substantial experience in the area of criminal defense, including defense of tax crimes, and has appeared on behalf of some 11,000 people in IRS proceedings. According to the hearing and the evidence submitted, Young was and is no stranger to the Miranda warnings and his constitutional rights.
DISCUSSION
Young argues that he should have been given full Miranda warnings during the interview because the interview became custodial in nature and he was coerced into making statements. Miranda warnings are to be given when the defendant is placed in custody and when the interview or questioning falls within the legal definition of "interrogation." Thus the Court must determine whether the actions taken by Agents Anderson and McDermott amounted to a "custodial interrogation." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); see also Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977). The Tenth Circuit has held that a defendant is not entitled to Miranda warnings where the interrogation is not custodial Custody has been defined as the deprivation in any significant way of the freedom of the defendant's action. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; see also United States v. Griffin, 7 F.3d 1512, 1518 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that the relevant inquiry for determining whether an individual is in custody is whether a reasonable person would believe freedom of action curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest).
The Court finds that Young was never in custody at any time during the interview with Agents Anderson and McDennott Young's decision to attend the interview was his alone; he was not forced to come to the interview by external forces. Agent Anderson did not lure Young to the interview based on false pretenses. Young understood prior, during and subsequent to the interview, that he was the subject of the criminal investigation. Young came to the interview voluntarily and remained at the interview of his own free will and choice.
During the interview Young was given an abbreviated version of the Miranda warnings. Young was instructed that he was not required to continue answering questions, that he had the right to have an attorney present, and that he had the right to leave the interview if he so chose. The Court finds that Young understood that he had these rights and that he chose not to employ them. Nothing about the circumstances of the interview give credence to Young's position that he was in custody or that his free will was overcome by the interview process.
Young is a practicing attorney that was and is intimately familiar with the rights a defendant may choose to exercise in an interview setting where the defendant is the subject of a criminal investigation. The Court finds that Young was well aware of his constitutional rights, including all of the rights addressed in the Miranda warnings. The Court finds that even if the interview were custodial, which it was not, Young understood his rights prior to the interview as a result of his experience as a practicing criminal defense attorney. Furthermore, Young was told on two separate occasions by Agent Anderson during the interview that he had the right to leave, that he had the right to have an attorney present, that the information derived from the interview would be used against him, and that he could wait until he had counsel present to continue answering questions. Young's position as a defense attorney coupled with the recitation on two occasions of his rights by Agent Anderson, satisfied Miranda's requirements even if he had been considered to be in a custodial interrogation.
With respect to Young's contention that his statements were unduly coerced by governmental force and intimidation, the government has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's statements to law enforcement personnel were made voluntarily, Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972); United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087 (10th Cir. 1996). To determine whether a statement is made voluntarily the Court must assess whether under the totality of the circumstances the statement was made due to law enforcement's overbearing the will of the accused. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513-14 (1963).
In determining whether law enforcement obtained Young's statement by overbearing his will, the focus is on the conduct exhibited by law enforcement and whether the conduct created undue pressure, and also the defendant's ability to cope with the pressure exerted. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 399-401 (1978). The Court also considers the age and intelligence of the defendant, the length of the detention, the length and nature of the questioning, whether the defendant was read his or her constitutional rights, and whether physical punishment was used to determine whether or not a confession was coerced, United States v. Glover, 104 F.3d 1570. 1579 (10th Cir. 1997).
The Court finds that there was no pressure exerted by law enforcement personnel which would rise to the level of coercion. The Court accepts the testimony of both Agents Anderson and McDermott that no aggressive tactics were used and that no threats were made during the entire duration of the interview. Furthermore, as stated above, Young was and is a practicing criminal law attorney who was intimately familiar with his constitutional rights. Young's ability to handle pressure would exceed that of the laymen because of his understanding of his rights to leave the interview or to refuse to answer questions even if he were being threatened. The Court finds that the tactics used by Agents Anderson and McDermott were not coercive, improper or aggressive. Even when Young broke down emotionally at one point in the interview, no coercive, improper or aggressive tactics were employed by the agents to cause Young's emotional reaction.,
The Court further finds that the lengthy duration of the interview was not coercive. See Jenner v. Smith, 982 F.2d 329, 334 (8th Cir. 1993) cert. denied, 510 U.S. 882 (1993). (finding interrogation which extended for six or seven hours was not per se unconstitutional). The Court finds that Young was free to leave at any point during the interview and that Young agreed to the duration by his voluntary decision to stay. The Court finds as a matter of law that the statements made by Young were not forced or coerced and that the Young's constitutional rights were not violated.
The Court therefore DENIES Young's Motion to Suppress Statements made in connection with the interview that took place on October 15, 1999.