U.S. v. York Obstetrics Gynecology

Full title: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Plaintiffs v. YORK OBSTETRICS…

Court: United States District Court, D. Maine

Date published: Aug 25, 2000

Docket No. 00-8-P-DMC (D. Me. Aug. 25, 2000)

Opinion

Docket No. 00-8-P-DMC

August 25, 2000

DAVID R. COLLINS, OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY, PORTLAND, ME, JAY P. MCCLOSKEY, JAMES M. MOORE, Esq., BANGOR, ME, BILL LANN LEE, ACTING ASST ATTY GNL U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, WASHINGTON, DC, for plaintiff.

KENNETH D. PIERCE, ESQ., MONAGHAN, LEAHY, HOCHADEL LIBBY, PORTLAND, ME, for defendant.

DANIEL RAPAPORT, PRETI, FLAHERTY, BELIVEAU, PACHIOS HALEY, LLC, PORTLAND, ME, for STNDRD.

EDWINNA C. VANDERZANDEN, GETMAN, STACEY, TAMPOSI, SCHULTHESS STEERE BEDFORD, NH, for WAGRIGHT LLC, defendant.

MORANDUM DECISION ON DEFENDANT YORK OBSTETRICS GYNECOLOGY, P.A.'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT¹

1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 6369c), the parties have consented to have United States Magistrate Judge David M. Cohen conduct all proceedings in this case, including trial, and to order the entry of judgment.

DAVID M. COHEN, United States Magistrate Judge.

York Obstetrics Gynecology, P.A. ("York"), one of two defendants in this action alleging violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the Maine Human Rights Act, 5 M.R.S.A. § 4551 et seq., moves for summary judgment on all claims brought by the plaintiff United States and the intervener plaintiffs, Megan Smith-McLaren and Raymond R. McLaren. I deny the motion as to the United States and grant in part the motion as to the individual plaintiffs.

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only if the record shows "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "In this regard, 'material' means that a contested fact has the potential to change the outcome of the suit under the governing law if the dispute over it is resolved favorably to the nonmovant. . . . By like token, 'genuine' means that 'the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the non moving party. . . .'" McCarthy v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 315 (1st Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate an absence of evidence to support the non moving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). In determining whether this burden is met, the court must view the record in the light most favorable to the non moving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences in its favor. Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 959 (1st Cir. 1997). Once the moving party has made a preliminary showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, "the nonmovant must contradict the showing by pointing to specific facts demonstrating that there is, indeed, a trialworthy issue." National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). "This is especially true in respect to claims or issues on which the nonmovant bears the burden of proof." International Ass'n of Machinists Aerospace Workers v. Winship Green Nursing Ctr., 103 F.3d 196, 200 (1st Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).

II. Factual Background

The following undisputed facts are appropriately supported in the parties' submissions. Plaintiff Megan Smith-McLaren became pregnant in February 1998. Defendant, York Obstetrics Gynecology's Statement of Material Undisputed Facts ("Defendant York's SMF") (Docket No. 31), ¶ 1; Joint Response of All Plaintiffs to Defendant York Obstetrics Gynecology's Statement of Material Facts ("Plaintiffs' Responsive SMF") (Docket No. 44), ¶ 1. She contacted Mary Edgerton, an advocated for the deaf at the Maine Center on Deafness, to obtain assistance in retaining an interpreter for her prenatal medical care. Id. Edgerton sent a letter dated February 20, 1998 to Dr. Stephen Wagoner, one of the York practitioners, advising him that Smith-McLaren would need an interpreter. Id. ¶ 2; Exh. 3 attached to Plaintiffs' List of Citations, filed with Objection of Plaintiffs Megan Smith-McLaren and Raymond McLaren to Defendant York Obstetrics Gynecology's Motion for Summary Judgment ("McLaren Plaintiffs' Objection") (Docket No. 43).

Edgerton then called York's office and spoke with Dr. Lynda Wright, who told Edgerton that it was her preference that York's practitioners meet with Smith-McLaren to discuss her communication needs and wishes before proceeding with an interpreter. Defendant York's SMF ¶ 2; Plaintiffs' Responsive SMF ¶ 2. However, Dr. Wright agreed during this conversation that York would provide an interpreter for Smith-McLaren's initial visit and that, rather than following York's usual practice of scheduling separate visits for initial intake and an initial exam, she would schedule both for a single three-hour time slot. Id. ¶ 3. Edgerton agreed to this arrangement, id., and thereafter sent a confirmatory letter to Dr. Wright which also elaborated at some length on the need for deaf individuals to have a sign language interpreter for medical appointments, Exh. 5 to Plaintiffs' List of Citations. Smith-McLaren's first visit to York was with Dr. Wagoner, on March 20, 1998. Defendant York's SMF ¶ 4; Plaintiffs' Responsive SMF ¶ 4. An American Sign Language interpreter was present for that visit. Id.

Following the completion of Smith-McLaren's first visit with York, a second routine prenatal visit was scheduled for April 17, 1998. Id. ¶ 5. Arrangements were made for an interpreter to attend that visit as well. Id. On March 23, 1998 Smith-McLaren called York's office complaining of high blood pressure and headaches. Id. ¶ 6. She spoke with a nurse, who made an appointment for the following day and asked Smith-McLaren if she would need an interpreter. Id.; Deposition of Carletta Prendergast (Exh. ¶ to Plaintiffs' List of Citations) at 27. Smith-McLaren, who did not expect to see a physician at this appointment, Deposition of Megan Smith-McLaren ("Plaintiff's Dep."), Exh. 2 to Plaintiffs' List of Citations, at 224, indicated that an interpreter would not be necessary if the visit was short and writing was used to communicate. Defendant York's SMF ¶ 6; Plaintiffs' Responsive SMF ¶ 6.

Smith-McLaren was seen by Dr. Wright at the March 24, 1998 appointment. Id. ¶ 7. During this visit they discussed Smith-McLaren's need for an interpreter and her headaches. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. Smith-McLaren told Dr. Wright that she had had an unpleasant experience with her first pregnancy and delivery, when she thought decisions were made without her input and people spoke to her with their backs turned. Id. ¶ 9. Dr. Wright made a notation in Smith-McLaren's chart directing providers to look at her when speaking and to remember that decisions were hers. Id. Smith-McLaren testified under oath on one occasion that she told Dr. Wright during this meeting that face-to-face communication without an interpreter would be okay, although she was uncomfortable with it. Plaintiff's Dep. at 220-21. The remainder of the substance of the conversation during this visit is disputed by the parties.

At some point, York determined that it would be important for Smith-McLaren to have an interpreter for group sessions such as the birthing class that would take place at York Hospital. Defendant York's SMF ¶ 11; Plaintiffs' Responsive SMF ¶ 11.

Between March 24, 1998 and August 6, 1998 Smith-McLaren continued to receive prenatal care at York's office without an interpreter. Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff Raymond McLaren, who is also deaf, attended several visits with his wife. Plaintiffs' Opposing Statement of Material Facts, included in Plaintiffs' Responsive SMF ("Plaintiffs' SMF"), ¶¶ 17, 19; York Obstetrics Gynecology's Reply Statement of Material Facts (Docket No. 52) ¶¶ 17, 19. The York employees who interacted with Smith-McLaren during this time believed that their communication with her was effective, Defendant York's SMF ¶¶ 13-18, but Smith-McLaren believed otherwise, Plaintiffs' Responsive SMF ¶¶ 13-18; Plaintiffs' SMF ¶¶ 17-19. At some point during this period, Smith-McLaren was told by Edgerton that Edgerton would contact York and request an interpreter if that was what Smith-McLaren preferred. Defendant York's SMF ¶ 25; Plaintiffs' Responsive SMF ¶ 25.²

2 The plaintiffs do not respond to this factual assertion in York's statement of material facts. Because it is supported by the record citation provided in York's statement of material facts, it is deemed admitted. Local Rule 56(e).

Around July 27, 1998 Smith-McLaren was diagnosed with gestational diabetes and referred by Dr. Wagoner to the York Hospital nutritionist. Id. ¶ 19. On or about August 6, 1998 Dr. Susan Gaire, who was also associated with the York practice, learned from a York Hospital nurse that Smith-McLaren had told someone that she needed an interpreter. Id. ¶ 20. When Dr. Gaire saw Smith-McLaren on August 6, 1998 she asked whether Smith-McLaren wanted an interpreter. Id. Smith-McLaren indicated that she did, and "[t]he decision was made at that time to provide an interpreter for all subsequent visits." Id. York referred Smith-McLaren to Dr. Michael Pinette, a specialist in high-risk pregnancies, and arranged for an interpreter to attend a visit with him scheduled for August 12, 1998. Id. ¶ 21.

Smith-McLaren did not receive services from York after August 6, 1998. Id. ¶ 23. After that date, she received the rest of her prenatal and delivery care from Women's Harbor Health in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Id. ¶ 22.

This action was initiated by the United States on January 6, 2000. Docket. The motion of the McLarens to intervene as plaintiffs was granted on February 24, 2000. Endorsement, Motion of Megan Smith-McLaren and Raymond R. McLaren to Intervene as Plaintiffs (Docket No. 2) at 4.

III. Discussion

The United States alleges that York has violated the ADA and seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, civil penalties, and monetary damages for the McLarens. Complaint (Docket No. 1) at 15-17.

The McLarens allege violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the ADA, and the Maine Human Rights Act ("MHRA") and seek injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, attorney fees and costs, and civil penalties pursuant to the state statute. [Intervener] Complaint (Docket No. 13)³ at 8-11. York seeks summary judgment on each of these claims.

3 Two documents with the title "Complaint of Plaintiffs-Interveners Megan Smith-McLaren and Raymond R. McLaren" appear in the court's file, one dated February 3, 2000 (Docket No. 12) and one dated February 28, 2000 (Docket No. 13). The documents are not identical, although the claims for relief are similar. Counsel for the plaintiffs has indicated that the more recent version is intended as the operative document. The pleading appearing at Docket No. 12 is accordingly stricken. All references to the McLarens' complaint in this opinion are to Docket No. 13.

A. Claims of the United States

York argues that the claims of the United States are barred by Smith-McLaren's agreement to proceed without an interpreter after her initial visit for prenatal medical care. The United States responds, without citation to case law, that the McLarens were not required to request an interpreter, suggesting that York was required to provide an interpreter even if Smith-McLaren agreed that one was not necessary; that, in any event, Smith-McLaren made repeated requests for an interpreter after the March 24, 1998 visit during which York contends she agreed to forego such assistance; and that Smith-McLaren's professed agreement to proceed without an interpreter was "involuntarily forced" by York. Opposition of the United States of America to the Motion of Defendant York Obstetrics Gynecology for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 38) at 1-3.

The relevant section of the ADA provides:

No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.

42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). The parties also refer to subsection (b)(2)(A)(iii), which defines discrimination as that term is used in subsection (a) of the statute as a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.

The applicable federal regulation provides:

A public accommodation shall furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to ensure effective communication with individuals with disabilities.

28 C.F.R. § 36.303(c).

There is no First Circuit case law on point. However, there is case law holding that the plaintiff in a case brought under section 12182 (sometimes referred to as "Title III") must prove that a modification (or aid) was requested, Johnson v. Gambrinus Co./Spoetzl Brewery, 116 F.3d 1052, 1059 (5th Cir. 1997), and the government's further modification of this argument to contend that the provider of a public accommodation has a duty to provide an auxiliary aid in the face of a disabled person's direct and unequivocal statement that such an aid is unnecessary is simply untenable. The potential for abuse inherent in such an interpretation of the ADA is obvious, and, in the absence of an allegation that the disabled plaintiff's agreement was coerced by the defendant, which the plaintiffs do assert here, it would clearly be unreasonable for the courts so to expand the ADA. The provider of a public accommodation is entitled to rely on the objectively reasonable statement of a disabled person that she does not desire or need a proffered aid, service, accommodation or modification.

The other points made by the United States are well-taken, however. York's contention that Smith-McLaren agreed to forego an interpreter is clearly disputed. There is evidence in the summary judgment record, albeit disputed by York, that both Smith-McLaren and her husband requested the services of an interpreter from York on several occasions between March 24 and August 6, 1998. E.g., Plaintiff's Dep. at 89-91, 131-32, 165, 175, 225-27; Raymond McLaren's Responses to Interrogatories of York Obstetrics Gynecology, Exh. 9 to Plaintiffs' List of Citations ("Interrogatory Responses"), No. 5. There is evidence that the McLarens did not understand all that was said to them in the absence of interpreters during their visits to York. E.g., Plaintiff's Dep. at 188; Interrogatory Responses No. 5; Deposition of Victoria M. McGarrell, Exh. 11 to Plaintiffs' List of Citations, at 203-05 (Smith-McLaren was not following instructions for care of her diabetes). York does not argue that a plaintiff's consent to proceed without an interpreter may not be disregarded for purposes of the ADA when that consent was coerced, but rather contends that Smith-McLaren's testimony on this point must be disregarded as a matter of law because it is "incredible," citing Medina-Munoz v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990). Reply Memorandum of York Obstetrics Gynecology, P.A. in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, etc. (Docket No. 48) at 4-5. The rule that credibility determinations are not to be made in connection with a motion for summary judgment is so well-established in this circuit as to require no citation to authority. To the extent that York contends that the testimony of Smith-McLaren and the interrogatory answers of McLaren are merely "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, [or] unsupported speculation," Medina-Munoz, 896 F.2d at 8, I disagree. I can only conclude on the summary judgment record that York is not entitled to summary judgment on the claims raised by the United States.

B. The McLarens' Claims

York attacks the claims raised by the McLaren plaintiffs on several grounds. It contends that the undisputed evidence bars recovery on any of the claims; that these plaintiffs lack standing to seek injunctive relief; that they are not entitled to recover compensatory damages under the ADA or the MHRA; that they are not entitled to punitive damages; and that Mr. McLaren is not entitled to civil penalties under the MHRA. Motion of Defendant, York Obstetrics Gynecology, P. A., for Summary Judgment on Complaint of Megan Smith-McLaren and Raymond McLaren ("Defendant York's McLaren Motion") (Docket No. 30) at 1-2.

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence.

York's contention that the evidence does not support recovery on any of the McLarens' claims is based on the same analysis presented in its motion for summary judgment on the claims of the United States, id. at 3-4, and I reject it for the reasons set forth above in my discussion of the merits of that motion.

2. Request for Injunctive Relief.

The request for injunctive relief arises under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1), which provides, in relevant part:

The remedies and procedures set forth in section 2000a-3(a) of this title are the remedies and procedures this subchapter provides to any person who is being subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of this subchapter or who has reasonable grounds for believing that such person is about to be subjected to discrimination in violation of section 12183 of this title.

The relevant remedies and procedures set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) are the following: "[A] civil action for preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order, may be instituted by the person aggrieved." Attorney fees are available to a prevailing party other than the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b).

The McLarens' complaint cannot be read to allege a past or impending violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12183, which deals with construction and alterations in public accommodations. The complaint, reasonably interpreted in favor of the individual plaintiffs, also fails to allege a current violation of section 12182. However, York does not base its motion on this fact but rather relies on the general law of standing to seek injunctive relief. A person seeking injunctive relief must show more than a past injury; she must demonstrate a "real and immediate threat of repeated injury." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496 (1974). Here, the plaintiffs offer nothing in their statement of material facts to demonstrate that there is a likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury. Id. at 111; Berner v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 1997). They have included no facts that can reasonably be interpreted to show that they are likely to use York as a health care provider again and that, if they did so, York is likely to discriminate against them in a manner that violates the ADA. See, e.g., Proctor v. Prince George's Hosp. Ctr., 32 F. Supp.2d 830, 832 (D.Md. 1998); Atakpa v. Perimeter Ob-Gyn Assocs., P.C., 912 F. Supp. 1566, 1573 (N.D.Ga. 1994). This court's consideration of a motion for summary judgment is limited to the evidence presented in the parties' statements of material facts. Local Rule 56(e). Accordingly, York is entitled to summary judgment on the McLaren plaintiffs' demand for injunctive relief under the ADA.

The McLarens concede that compensatory damages are not available under the ADA on their individual claims. Objection of Plaintiffs Megan Smith-McLaren and Raymond McLaren to Defendant York Obstetrics and Gynecology's Motion for Summary Judgment ("McLaren Plaintiffs' Objection") (Docket No. 43) at 17 n. 8. They maintain that, even if this court concludes that they lack standing to obtain injunctive relief under the ADA, Count II of their complaint, which is based on the ADA, remains viable because proof of a past violation of the ADA would entitle them to declaratory judgment and attorney fees. Id. at 18 n. 9. However, 42 U.S.C. § 12188, which establishes the relief available to individuals under the ADA, and 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a), which is incorporated in section 12188 by reference, do not mention declaratory relief. In addition, and more important, the McLarens' complaint does not seek declaratory relief. [Interveners'] Complaint at 10-11. Under these circumstances, no demand for declaratory relief under the ADA is before the court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (a) (court may declare rights and legal relations upon filing of an appropriate pleading). Because no claim under the ADA remains before the court, summary judgment for York on Count II of the McLarens' complaint is in order and will be entered.

3. Compensatory Damages Under the MHRA.

York contends that the McLarens are not entitled to compensatory damages under the MHRA, citing 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 4613(2). Defendant York's McLaren Motion at 12. The plaintiffs do not respond to this argument. The MHRA specifically provides compensatory damages only in cases of employment discrimination, discriminatory housing practices and price discrimination. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4613(2)(B)(2), (6), (8) (9). The McLarens' complaint does not allege any such discrimination. While the statute also provides that available remedies are not limited to those listed, 5 M.R.S.A. § 4613(2)(B), this court has held that compensatory damages are not available under the MHRA when section 4613 specifies the damages that are available, LaPlante v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 810 F. Supp. 19, 22 (D.Me. 1993). Under the circumstances of this case, I conclude that compensatory damages are not available to the McLarens under the MHRA.

4. Punitive Damages.

York argues that the individual plaintiffs are not entitled to punitive damages on any of their claims. If their ADA claim were still before the court, it is clear that punitive damages would not be available. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(4). Punitive damages are made available under the MHRA only for claims of intentional employment discrimination. 5 M.S.R.A. § 4613(2)(B)(8)(c). Understandably, the plaintiffs limit their opposition to York's motion on this point to an assertion that they are entitled to punitive damages on their Rehabilitation Act claim. McLaren Plaintiffs' Objection at 19. York is entitled to summary judgment on any claim for punitive damages under the MHRA.

While there is authority to the contrary, see, e.g., Moreno v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 99 F.3d 782, 788-92 (6th Cir. 1996) (punitive damages not available under Rehabilitation Act), this court has held that punitive damages are available under the Rehabilitation Act, Kilroy v. Husson College, 959 F. Supp. 22, 24 (D.Me. 1997). Accord, Pandazides v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 823, 830 (4th Cir. 1994) (punitive damages available). The First Circuit has not taken a position on the question. York argues that Kilroy is distinguishable because it did not involve "a claim that a public accommodation failed to provide an appropriate auxiliary aid." Reply Memorandum of York Obstetrics and Gynecology, P.A. in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims by Megan Smith McLaren and Raymond McLaren (Docket No. 51) at 6. It is not possible to tell from the opinion in Kilroy whether the factual basis of the plaintiff's claim included an allegation that the defendant failed to provide an auxiliary aid; all that appears from the opinion is that the plaintiff claimed that the defendant violated the Rehabilitation Act by failing to reasonably accommodate him. 959 F. Supp. at 24. In any event, the Rehabilitation Act, and specifically 29 U.S.C. § 794, upon which the McLarens' claims are based, unlike the ADA, is not divided into subcategories of discrimination (employment, housing, public accommodations, etc.). The language of Kilroy is not limited to certain types of claims; it holds, generally, that punitive damages are available on claims arising under section 794. Id. I see no reason to depart from Judge Brody's ruling on this issue.

York also contends that there is insufficient evidence to allow the plaintiffs to recover punitive damages on this claim. In order to recover punitive damages on federal civil rights claims, a plaintiff must show that the defendant knew that he might be acting in violation of federal law, or acted in the face of a perceived risk that his actions would violated federal law. Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 26 (1st Cir. 1999). In this case, if the individual plaintiffs' testimony and interrogatory answers are credited, York received from Edgerton an explanation of the plaintiffs' rights under federal law concerning an interpreter before any of its physicians or employees met with either plaintiff and before they began to ignore the plaintiffs' requests for an interpreter. At the summary judgment stage, this evidence is sufficient to allow the plaintiffs to proceed with their claim for punitive damages.

York is not entitled to summary judgment on the individual plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages on Count I of their complaint.

5. Relief for Raymond McLaren under the MHRA.

York contends that plaintiff Raymond McLaren is not entitled to recover attorney fees and civil penalties under the MHRA because he did not file a claim with the Maine Human Rights Commission before bringing this action. Defendant York's McLaren Motion at 13. The plaintiffs respond that this exhaustion requirement, found at 5 M.R.S.A. § 4622, is specifically made inapplicable to claims asserting discrimination by places of public accommodation by 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 4591—94-F. McLaren Plaintiffs' Objection at 20. Section 4622, which requires a plaintiff to file a claim with the Maine Human Rights Commission in order to obtain attorney fees and civil penalties in a court action under the MHRA, also provides:

This subsection does not apply to or limit any remedies for civil actions filed under subchapter V if one or more additional causes of action are alleged in the same civil action that do not require exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Subchapter V of the MHRA statute consists of sections 4591 to 4594-F of Title 5, which deal with public accommodations and include section 4592, which is invoked in the McLarens' complaint. [Interveners'] Complaint at 10. Accordingly, because the complaint also alleges a cause of action under the Rehabilitation Act that does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies, Brennan v. King, 139 F.3d 258, 268 n. 12 (1st Cir. 1998), York is not entitled to summary judgment on McLaren's claims for attorney fees and civil penalties under the MHRA.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the motion of defendant York Obstetrics Gynecology for summary judgment on the claims raised by the United States is DENIED. The motion of defendant York Obstetrics Gynecology for summary judgment on the claims raised by Megan Smith-McLaren and Raymond McLaren is GRANTED as to Count II of their complaint, any claims for injunctive relief, and any claims for compensatory and punitive damages under the Maine Human Rights Act (Count III of their complaint); and otherwise DENIED. Remaining for trial are all claims asserted against defendant Wagright, L.L.C.; the claims of the United States against defendant York Obstetrics Gynecology under the Americans with Disabilities Act; and the claims of the individual plaintiffs against defendant York Obstetrics Gynecology under the Maine Human Rights Act, with remedies limited as set forth above.