The IRA's provisions constitute one chapter in a long and complicated history of interactions between the United States and American Indians. Our dissenting colleague asserts a trust relationship arises between the Indians and the United States only after the Government acquires land for the Indians, Dissenting Op. at 36, but this confuses the fiduciary relationship that arises because the United States is to hold newly-acquired land "in trust" under section 5 of the IRA, see Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Wilson, 881 F.2d 596, 600 (9th Cir. 1989), with the pre-existing "special relationship" that arose by virtue of the Government's historical relations with the Indians, see 1 FELIX R. COHEN. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.04[4][a] (2005) ("HANDBOOK").
The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party's] position will be insufficient.'” United States v. Wilson, 881 F.2d 596, 601 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). “The deciding court must view the evidence, including all reasonable inferences, in favor of the non-moving party.”
The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party's] position will be insufficient.'" United States v. Wilson, 881 F.2d 596, 601 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). "The deciding court must view the evidence, including all reasonable inferences, in favor of the non-moving party.
Here, the defendants have offered an overwhelming amount of evidence to refute Tripati's allegations and to substantiate that the search and seizure was the culmination of an extensive investigation into Tripati's fraudulent practices--an investigation that ultimately led to a criminal conviction. Tripati's conclusory statements and self-serving declarations are too speculative to survive a motion for judgment as a matter of law. SeeUnited States v. Wilson, 881 F.2d 596, 601 (9th Cir.1989). Thus, the district court did not err in granting judgment as a matter of law for each of his claims.
Plaintiffs, however, have not pointed to "statutes and regulations [that] clearly give the Federal Government full responsibility to manage Indian resources and land for the benefit of the Indians[, and that] thereby establish a fiduciary relationship and define the contours of the United States' fiduciary responsibilities." United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 224, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983); see alsoUnited States v. Wilson, 881 F.2d 596, 600 (9th Cir.1989). The Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177, cannot serve this purpose here as Plaintiffs do not sue as an Indian tribe.
The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [ non-moving party's] position will be insufficient.’ " United States v. Wilson , 881 F.2d 596, 601 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). "The deciding court must view the evidence, including all reasonable inferences, in favor of the non-moving party."
The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party's] position will be insufficient.'” United States v. Wilson, 881 F.2d 596, 601 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). “The deciding court must view the evidence, including all reasonable inferences, in favor of the non-moving party.”
Conclusory assertions are insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 881 F.2d 596, 601 (9th Cir. 1989) (self-serving and conclusory declarations of fact are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (summary judgment motion cannot be defeated by relying solely on conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data). Thus, Plaintiff fails to create an issue of fact that he was retaliated against and placed in "IDU" in response to requesting a grievance form.
In the Ninth Circuit, “[c]onclusory allegations unsupported by factual data will not create a triable issue of fact.” Marks v. United States, 578 F.2d 261, 263 (9th Cir.1978); see also United States v. Wilson, 881 F.2d 596, 601 (9th Cir.1989) (self-serving and conclusory declarations of fact are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989) (“summary judgment motion cannot be defeated by relying solely on conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data”); Calif. ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. United States, 561 F.2d 731, 733 n. 4 (9th Cir.1977) (stating same rule; concluding that conclusory declaration did not create triable issue of disputed fact). The relevant statement in Aron's Declaration, that Alberta chose not to foreclose on the intangible assets, is conclusory.
See generally, 3 SCHWARZER, TASHIMA, AND WAGSTAFFE, FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL, Ch. 14 "Summary Judgment" (2001). Where the non-moving party opposes summary judgement on the basis of affirmative defenses, the Ninth Circuit has held that "a conclusory statement of fact" in support of an affirmative defense is not enough to deny summary judgement (United States v. Wilson, 881 F.2d 596,601 (9th Cir. 1989)); Aroma has not even provided a conclusory statement of fact. D. Alleged Consumer Misuse