Opinion
No. 03 CR 1377 (JG) (MDG).
August 4, 2004
ROSLYNN R. MAUSKOPF, United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, New York, Elizabeth J. Kramer, Assistant United States Attorney.
NANCY LEE ENNIS, Quijano Ennis, P.C., New York, New York, Attorneys for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(g)(2), defendant Yolanda Watson appeals the guilty plea she entered before the Honorable Marilyn D. Go, United States Magistrate Judge, on April 5, 2004. Watson claims that, due to mental illness, she did not and could not understand the terms of her plea or the rights she was waiving. She also claims that the attorney representing her throughout her plea negotiations and during the plea hearing was ineffective. Watson's new counsel, Nancy Lee Ennis, moves to be relieved pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Gomez-Perez, 215 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 2000). For its part, the government moves to dismiss Watson's appeal and for summary affirmance of Watson's conviction. For the following reasons, Ennis's and the government's motions are granted, and the appeal is dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Watson was arrested on October 3, 2003 and arraigned before Judge Go. Attorney Michael Weil of the Legal Aid Society was appointed to defend her. Watson was charged with making a fraudulent claim for money and benefits to the Federal Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA"), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287, a felony punishable by imprisonment for up to five years. Specifically, the government alleged that Watson had illegally obtained $10,856.13, and sought to obtain additional funds, by falsely claiming that her employment had been terminated as a result of the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center attacks.
After negotiations with Weil, the government offered Watson a plea agreement. Under the agreement, Watson would plead guilty to a misdemeanor information charging that, between February 2002 and March 2003, Watson knowingly and intentionally stole money and benefits from FEMA in an amount less than $1000. The proposed plea agreement projected that Watson would face a total offense level, under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, of eight, and a sentencing range of zero to six months. The agreement would also provide for restitution to FEMA in the amount of $10,856.13, paid over time in a schedule to be set by Judge Go, and a waiver of Watson's right to appeal (or otherwise challenge) any sentence of six or fewer months in prison.
Watson accepted the proposed agreement and entered a plea before Judge Go on January 5, 2004. The record of that proceeding reflects that Judge Go questioned Watson at length regarding mental illness and whether she understood the nature of the proceedings:
Watson waived her right to be heard by a District Judge and consented to proceed before a Magistrate.
THE COURT: . . . . If you don't understand anything I say, please say so and I'll reword. Is that clear?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. . . . .
THE COURT: Are you presently or have you recently been under the care of a doctor or a psychiatrist?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am under doctor's care now.
THE COURT: And what have you . . . received treatment for?
THE DEFENDANT: For bipolar disorder.
THE COURT: How long have you received this treatment?
THE DEFENDANT: I started up again. So I believe it's about two to three months that I'm into it.
THE COURT: And you previously had such treatment?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. Seven to eight years right now. No, that's even shorter. I'm sorry. It's about four to five years.
THE COURT: Now, has this disorder in any way affected your ability to understand what's going on?
THE DEFENDANT: At this moment here?
THE COURT: Yes.
THE DEFENDANT: No, I fully understand [w]hat's going on. I'm alert.
THE COURT: And has it affected your ability to make decisions with respect to this case?
THE DEFENDANT: No, it hasn't. My head is very clear now.
THE COURT: Mr. Weil, in your view has your client's condition in any way affected her ability to understand what is going on?
MR. WEIL: Your Honor, there have been occasions in the past where we've taken longer to go over something, but I don't doubt that right now she fully understands what's going on.
THE COURT: And do you have any doubts as to her ability to make any decision with respect to the plea in this matter?
MR. WEIL: No, I don't, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So I'm going to ask you, Ms. Watson, if you feel that you need to stop in today's proceeding because your condition is affecting your ability to understand what's going on —
THE DEFENDANT: I'm sorry, Your Honor, to cut you off. I'm on medication now. Back then when those things were done, I was not on medication. I took myself off.
THE COURT: And so what I'd like you to tell me though is that if during the course of today's proceeding you do feel that you're not able to understand what was going on, or to respond to my questions in any meaningful way, and are not prepared to make the decision whether or not to enter a plea, which I will ask you to do at the end of today's proceeding, then just tell me that you need time to stop and think about it.
THE DEFENDANT: I'm perfectly healthy right now. I was very stressed.
MR. WEIL: Can I have a moment, Your Honor? (Off the record.)
THE COURT: Mr. Weil I think has tried to explain the intent of my questions, or my comments. Please feel free to ask me to stop should you at any point in today's proceeding feel that you're unable to understand what's going on or to make a decision with respect to your plea.
THE DEFENDANT: I understand, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So other than medication for your condition, bipolar condition, have you taken any drugs, medication or alcoholic beverages in the past 24 hours?
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Is your mind clear as you stand here today?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is.
THE COURT: Do you understand the nature of these proceedings?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Weil, have you discussed the question of a guilty plea with your client?
MR. WEIL: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And you've told us in your view she understands the nature of these proceedings?
MR. WEIL: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And do you have any doubts as to her competency to proceed today?
MR. WEIL: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Ms. Watson, have you had a ful opportunity to discuss your case with your attorney?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I have.
THE COURT: Are you fully satisfied with your attorney and the assistance he's given you thus far in this matter?
THE DEFENDANT:Yes.
(Jan. 4, 2004 Hr'g Tr. at 4-8 ("Tr.").)
Judge Go then led Watson through a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b) colloquy, repeatedly asking Watson if she understood everything that was being said and asked. Each time she was asked, Watson responded that she understood. ( Id. at 9-16.) At the end of this colloquy, Judge Go asked Weil whether Watson's bipolar disorder would be a basis for a defense to the misdemeanor charge. Weil responded that he believed it would not, and that he had discussed it with Watson. ( Id. at 17.) Judge Go then asked Watson if she understood that she was waiving any defense based on her bipolar disorder and Watson responded that she did. ( Id.) Watson then allocuted to the crime:
What I did was me and my husband panicked because I was unemployed and he's the only one carrying the bills and he didn't have the money because we were so backed up in foreclosure with several payments.
So we didn't know — we asked anybody that could lend us money. Nobody could assist us.
So I told my husband well, this is the only thing we could do. So I forged the letters, even though I did speak with the clients that I forged their signatures and they did tell me not to do it, but that was the only way I saw out of it.
. . . .
. . . Rotator Services, I forged the payroll supervisor's name.
THE COURT: For a company.
THE DEFENDANT: For a company.
THE COURT: And did you with the forged signature submit an application for benefits from [FEMA]?
THE DEFENDANT: Did I submit that? Yes, I did.
THE COURT: And did you as a result receive money from [FEMA]?
THE DEFENDANT: On my first initial application, but not with my second.
( Id. at 18-19; see also id. at 19-21.)
Judge Go concluded the hearing by again asking Watson if she understood everything that had occurred:
THE COURT: Now, I just want to confirm on the record that you are feeling all right. Are you feeling all right?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I'm feeling all right. I apologize. It's just that it was the only way that I saw for me and my husband —
THE COURT: But are you fully in control of your mental faculties at this time?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
. . . .
THE COURT: . . . . Now, based on the information that I've heard, I find that the defendant is fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea, that she fully understands the charge, her rights and the consequences of this plea and that there is a factual basis for the plea. I, therefore, accept the plea of guilty to the information.
( Id. at 21-22.)
On March 31, 2004, Judge Go sentenced Watson to three years supervised release and restitution in the amount of $10,856, to be paid at a rate of $50 per month. Judge Go also imposed the special conditions that Watson make prompt and full financial disclosure to her probation officer and participate in mental health treatment. No fine was imposed.
Watson then appealed her sentence under Rule 58(g)(2). As her claim was based in part on her attorney's ineffective assistance, I appointed Ennis to represent Watson here. Ennis now moves to be relieved, as Watson's appeal lacks merit and would — if the conviction were vacated — expose Watson to harsher penalties for her criminal acts. The government moves for summary affirmance of Watson's conviction. Having set forth the relevant facts in detail, the motions require only brief discussion.
DISCUSSION
A. Ennis's Motion to Be Relieved
In Gomez-Perez, the Second Circuit held that — where a defendant has executed a waiver of his or her right to appeal, but has nonetheless filed a notice of appeal, and the government has filed a motion to dismiss based on the defendant's waiver —
if defense counsel concludes there is no basis to contest the validity of the waiver then she is responsible for submitting a brief similar to that required by Anders that addresses only the limited issues of: (1) whether defendant's plea and waiver of appellate rights were knowing, voluntary, and competent; or (2) whether it would be against the defendant's interest to contest his plea; and (3) any issues implicating a defendant's constitutional or statutory rights that either cannot be waived, or cannot be considered waived by the defendant in light of the particular circumstances.215 F.3d at 319 (citations omitted).
Citing the plea colloquy before Judge Go, Ennis submits that Watson's plea was knowing and voluntary, despite Watson's claims. Furthermore, Ennis argues, rightly, that allowing Watson to withdraw her plea would do her far more harm than good, as Watson would be exposed to, among other things, a felony charge and the attendant increased penalties. Therefore, based on Ennis's Anders brief and my own review of the record, Ennis's motion to be relieved is granted.
By letter dated June 21, 2004, Watson, writing on her own behalf, claimed that her plea was invalid "on the grounds of [her] Mental Illness and other important facts being left out." Watson wrote that she would provide documentation from her psychiatrist sometime after July 7, 2004. However, no such information was forthcoming. In any event, it would not change my conclusion that Watson's plea was knowing and voluntary, as discussed below.
Furthermore, Watson's appeal is dismissed and her conviction affirmed. As shown in the plea colloquy set forth above, Judge Go extensively questioned Watson regarding her mental health and bipolar disorder. Watson and her attorney repeatedly, and emphatically, assured Judge Go that Watson's mind was clear and that she was competent to proceed, was on medication that relieved the symptoms of her condition, and understood the nature of the proceedings. There is therefore no merit to Watson's claim that her plea was not knowing and voluntary.
Watson's claim that her attorney was ineffective is also meritless. Indeed, Weil achieved the rare feat of negotiating Watson out of a felony charge, which would have carried a maximum prison term of five years. He also made a strenuous argument on her behalf at sentencing (Mar. 31, 2004 Hr'g Tr. at 3-5), after which she received supervised release, despite her exposure to six months in prison. Weil was hardly ineffective; indeed, his representation was excellent and certainly not a basis for vacating Watson's conviction.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Ennis's motion to be relieved is granted. Watson's appeal is dismissed and her conviction affirmed.So Ordered.