He does not argue, however, that state classification and/or registration law are controlling, an argument we have rejected in two recent unpublished opinions. See United States v. Gudger, 624 F. App'x 394, 396 (6th Cir. 2015) (applying federal tier classifications where the defendant was "prosecuted for failing to maintain his SORNA registration, not for any defect in his Ohio registration status"); United States v. Walker, 450 F. App'x 464, 467 (6th Cir. 2011) (rejecting challenges predicated "on the assumption that North Carolina registration law trumps federal registration law"). Shepard's argument is made even remotely plausible only by the notable and troubling omission in his brief of the application notes in the commentary to U.S.S.G. ยง 2A3.5, which we recently described as the "fundamental starting point" of the sentencing analysis under SORNA. United States v. Gudger, 624 F. App'x 394, 396 (6th Cir. 2015).
On several occasions, the Sixth Circuit has held that SORNA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because it is not punitive in purpose or effect. See United States v. Felts, 674 F.3d 599, 606 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting the "unanimous consensus among the circuits" that SORNA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); Shannon, 2013 WL 141779, at *5; United States v. Walker, 450 F. App'x 464, 468 (6th Cir. 2011) (examining SORNA's lifetime registration requirement). The Sixth Circuit has also rejected claims that SORNA coerces states in violation of the Tenth Amendment, United States v. Stock, 685 F.3d 621, 626 (6th Cir. 2012); Felts, 674 F.3d at 607-08, exceeds Congress' power to regulate state activity, see United States v. Coleman, 675 F.3d 615, 620-21 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that SORNA is valid under the Commerce Clause), or impermissibly delegates authority to the Attorney General to determine its retroactive applicability, United States v. Stevenson, 676 F.3d 557, 563 n.3 (6th Cir. 2012).