Opinion
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
D.C. No. CR-96-00021-WDK
Editorial Note:This opinion appears in the Federal reporter in a table titled "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions". (See FI CTA9 Rule 36-3 regarding use of unpublished opinions)
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California William D. Keller, District Judge, Presiding.
Before FARRIS, CANBY and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Gregory Vinegar appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction for conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d), and use of a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We affirm.
Vinegar contends that the district court erred by imposing periodic drug testing as a condition of his supervised release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), because there was no evidence that Vinegar was engaged in actual drug use. This contention lacks merit.
Because Vinegar failed to object to the drug testing condition at sentencing, we review the district court's decision for plain error. See United States v. Scrivner, 114 F.3d 964, 966 (9th Cir.1997). We will correct an action under this standard "only where there indeed is an error, where the error is obvious, and where the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Id. (internal quotations, alterations and citations omitted).
The district court could have properly determined that Vinegar's unsubstantiated and self-serving statements to the probation officer that he had used controlled substances in the past, but had since stopped, did not amount to "reliable sentencing information indicat[ing] a low risk of future substance abuse by the defendant." See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)(5)). We cannot say, therefore, that the district court erred by imposing the drug testing condition. See United States v. Carter, 159 F.3d 397, 400 (9th Cir.1998); see also United States v. Jackson, 189 F.3d 820, 825 (9th Cir.1999).
Although section 3583(d) refers to section 3563(a)(4), this is clearly a ministerial error.
AFFIRMED.