Opinion
Case No. 2:00-CR-425C
May 14, 2001
ORDER
Defendant Juan Carlos Vidrios ("Vidrios") has moved to suppress evidence obtained during an automobile stop and search conducted by Utah State Trooper Steve Salas ("Salas") on August 25, 2000. Vidrios initially contended that the evidence was acquired without defendant's consent, without probable cause and without a warrant in violation of the Forth Amendment to the United State Constitution. Defendant conceded these bases for suppression at the court's hearing in this matter on May 1, 2001, and solely contended that the evidence should be suppressed because it was the product of an illegal detention. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is denied.
Findings of Fact
Vidrios is charged in a two count indictment, possession of methamphetamine with intention to distribute and possession of marijuana with intention to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1) and punishable under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D). The facts regarding the issue of whether or not the evidence should be suppressed are as follows.
At approximately 10:50 a.m. on August 25, 2000, Salas was patrolling interstate 70 near Green River, Utah. Salas noticed an eastbound maroon Dodge Intrepid with darkly tinted windows and a Colorado license plate. The window tinting on windows was so dark that Salas was unable to see inside the vehicle. Salas believed the car to be in violation of Section 41-6-149 of the Utah Traffic Code which requires that any window tint allow at least 43% of light through the windows on the front passenger and driver's side. (Transcript of December 8, 2000 Hearing [hereinafter "Tr."] at 6-7.) The speed limit in the area is 75 miles an hour. Salas pulled behind the vehicle and maintained a consistent distance behind the car for approximately ten seconds. At that point, Salas determined that the vehicle was exceeding the speed limit and estimated the vehicle's speed to be at least 80 miles an hour. Salas then turned on his emergency lights, initiated a traffic stop, and the vehicle pulled over at approximately 10:52 a.m.
Salas then walked to the driver's side of the car and, because the window was up and he was unable to see inside the car, knocked on the window. Vidrios rolled down the window and Salas noticed that Vidrios was the only occupant in the vehicle. Salas also noticed that the paneling on the middle console-between the car's bucket seats and surrounding the gearshift-was not flush with the carpeting, as if it had been removed or lifted at one time. There was a strong, fruit-like, scent coming from the vehicle, which Salas believed was from two air fresheners he saw in the vehicle-one located on the upper dash and one on the lower dash. Salas also saw energy drinks and fast food wrappers on the passenger seat, and noticed that there was no luggage in the vehicle.
After Vidrios rolled the window down, Salas asked him for his driver's license, vehicle registration and proof of insurance. While Vidrios was searching for these documents, Salas asked Vidrios where he had been traveling. Vidrios said that he had come from Las Vegas, where he had been visiting with some friends. Because Vidrios was alone in the car, Salas asked him where his friends were. After hesitating, Vidrios told Salas that his friends were traveling in another vehicle.
Vidrios then provided Salas with his driver's license and a registration for the vehicle, both which were issued by Colorado. According to the registration, the vehicle was owned by an individual named Victor Vargas. Noting that Vidrios was not the registered owner, Salas asked Vidrios who owned the vehicle. Vidrios replied that the owner's name was Ezequel Lares. Because Lares was not the registered owner, Salas asked a second time for the name of the car's owner. Vidrios replied again that the owner's name was Ezequel Lares. Salas, now suspicious, further questioned Vidrios by asking him where Ezequel Lares lived, and Vidrios replied that he lived in Westminster, Colorado. When asked how he knew Lares, Vidrios stated that they worked together. Salas then asked Vidrios where he worked, and Vidrios responded that he worked in construction. Salas asked Vidrios for the name of the construction company, but Vidrios told Salas that he could not remember the name of the company because he had only worked there for two weeks.
Vidrios then asked why he had been stopped. Salas explained that the dark window tinting appeared to be in violation of the Utah Traffic Code and he also told Vidrios that he had been speeding. Salas told Vidrios that he needed to find out who owned the vehicle and whether Vidrios was in lawful possession of the car. Vidrios again told Salas that Ezequel Lares owned the car. Salas told Vidrios that the car was registered to a man named Victor. In response, Vidrios said that the registration he had given Salas was old and that Ezequel Lares had bought the car from its previous owner in California. Salas then asked Vidrios if he had a current registration or title that would show him this information. Vidrios then gave Salas another registration-which was a current Colorado registration-that also had Victor Vargas named as the car's owner. Salas informed Vidrios this fact, and asked Vidrios who Victor Vargas was and whether Vidrios knew him. Vidrios replied that he did not know Victor Vargas. Vidrios never provided Salas with a registration for the vehicle bearing the name Ezequel Lares.
In an attempt to clarify the issue of the vehicle's ownership, Salas asked Vidrios if he had a telephone number for Ezequel Lares. Vidrios initially stated that Lares did not have a phone or that Lares's phone had been disconnected, but later provided Salas with a phone number for Lares. (Tr. at 18.) Salas again asked Vidrios for the name of the company where he and Lares worked, and, after some time, Vidrios stated that he did know the name of the company-"Asphalt Construction." (Tr. at 19.) Salas also asked if Ezequel Lares had loaned Vidrios the car for the trip to Las Vegas. Vidrios replied that Lares had let him borrow the car and that Vidrios had left his own vehicle with Lares in Colorado. Vidrios and Salas also discussed the length of time Vidrios spent in Las Vegas.
According to Salas's testimony, at this point, based on his own observations and his conversation with Vidrios, Salas was suspicious of criminal activity. (Tr. at 20.) Salas testified that in his experience an overwhelming fragrance can be used to mask the odor of a controlled substance or other contraband. (Tr. at 21.) Salas considered the fruity odor emanating from the car to be such an odor. Salas also testified that, in his experience, a moved or misplaced panel in a car can indicate a hiding place for contraband. (Tr. at 21.) Salas believed that the paneling of the middle console looked as though it had been removed, and that this possibly indicated a hiding place for contraband. Salas also testified that in his experience drug traffickers commonly use energy drinks because they drive long distances in short time periods and need energy to stay awake. Salas also noted that Vidrios was traveling on interstate 70, a known drug trafficking route, and that Vidrios was traveling eastbound, indicating that Vidrios may possibly have been traveling from a drug supplying state. Salas also found unusual that Vidrios was unable to answer simple questions such as the name of the company where he worked.
Salas stated that he also found the circumstances of Vidrios's travel unusual. He thought it strange that Vidrios was on vacation in the middle of the week given Vidrios's statement that he had only been working for a construction company for two weeks. Salas testified that at the time he thought it odd that in only two weeks time, Vidrios had already found someone who would allow him to borrow a car and drive it out of state. Salas found this especially odd given the fact that Vidrios had told him that he borrowed the car even as he also told him that he left his own car with Lares. Vidrios's statement regarding his travel with friends also seemed somewhat inconsistent to Salas. On this point, Salas remarked to the court:
[Vidrios] state[d] that-when I first stopped him he was traveling with buddies, but at no time up to this point did there seem to be any friends or anyone who was traveling with him. My experience, if you're traveling with somebody that's behind you, usually they'll stop and wait until you're done with the traffic accident and then continue on. At no time did he express concern about someone being ahead of him and that he needed to get going because someone was ahead of him. Along with those, also the fact that the vehicle is traveling on a drug trafficking route, which is I-70; the vehicle was also traveling eastbound, which is coming from drug supply-possibly drug supplying states.
(Tr. at 22.)
Salas then asked Vidrios if his driver's license was valid and whether he had ever been arrested before. Vidrios responded that his license was valid and that he had never been arrested. Salas told Vidrios that he would like him to step out of the car and also asked Vidrios if there was anything illegal in the vehicle. He also asked Vidrios if he had any drugs or weapons in the car. Vidrios responded negatively to both questions. Salas asked Vidrios to step to the back of the car so he would be able to see Vidrios while he investigated the issue of the car's ownership.
Salas returned to his patrol car and contacted his dispatcher. Salas asked the dispatcher to run a check on Vidrios's criminal history and driver's license, in addition to a check on the car's license plate to determine if the vehicle was wanted or stolen; he also asked for a check on the car's registration. Dispatch shortly reported back to Salas that Vidrios's driver's license was valid and that the vehicle had not been reported stolen. It also reported to Salas that the car was registered to Victor Vargas. Salas testified that, in his experience, the fact that a car has not been reported stolen does not end an inquiry regarding the status of the vehicle because the owner may not know that the vehicle has been stolen. (Tr. at 25-26.) Salas asked his dispatcher to try to locate a telephone number for the registered owner, Victor Vargas, and attempt to make a determination of whether Vidrios was in lawful possession of the car.
While waiting to hear back from dispatch, Salas wrote out a warning citation for the speeding and window tint violations. He explained the citations to Vidrios and told him that he was going to conduct a test to show Vidrios that the windows were too dark, which he did, and then explained the Utah law regarding window tint to Vidrios. Salas then cited Vidrios with a warning citation and returned Vidrios's driver's license and vehicle registration. However, he also told Vidrios that his dispatcher was trying to contact Victor Vargas to determine whether Vidrios should be in possession of the vehicle Vargas owned. Salas told Vidrios that he was not free to leave because he was waiting for that information.
At this point, Salas asked Vidrios if he could ask him a few more questions. Vidrios agreed and Salas inquired about the trip to Las Vegas. Salas stated that Vidrios told him that he stayed alone at the Boulder Casino and also told him that he had left Las Vegas at 10 p.m. the previous evening, stopping along the way at a rest stop. Salas found Vidrios's comment about staying alone to be at odds with his earlier statement that he had been with friends in Las Vegas. Salas also noted that Vidrios had left Las Vegas thirteen hours before the traffic stop. At the time Salas noted that Las Vegas was only approximately six hours away by car, while thirteen hours would be the approximate driving time from Los Angeles to the site of the traffic stop. Salas believed that it was possible that Vidrios might have actually have been driving from the Los Angeles area. Salas and Vidrios's conversation was interrupted by a radio transmission that informed Salas that there was no telephone listing for Victor Vargas.
At no time during his detention did Vidrios ask to leave. (Tr. at 32.) Salas testified that if Vidrios had, he may have allowed him to walk away, but would at least have either asked Vidrios for consent to search the car or would have held the vehicle for a canine unit. (See id. at 31-32.) Salas again asked Vidrios about his work, and he again responded that he worked at "Asphalt Construction." (Tr. at 32.) He asked what type of work he did and Vidrios stated that he carried stuff; Vidrios then said he carried cement. (See id.) Salas found it suspicious that Vidrios was unable to describe his work. He believed that there was a logical inconsistency with Vidrios's statement that he carried cement while working at an asphalt company because Salas had never known of cement used in conjunction with asphalt. Salas asked Vidrios if he had any receipts from Las Vegas showing he had been there; Salas testified that Vidrios replied: "No. I don't have anything. I left everything there." (Tr. at 33.)
Salas inquired whether there was any marijuana in car. Vidrios responded that there were only cigarettes. Salas asked if there was any cocaine, heroine or methampetamine. Vidrios responded negatively to all of these questions. Salas testified that he then asked Vidrios, as an interview technique, whether there was any reason why someone would contact him and notify him that Vidrios was transporting drugs. Vidrios again responded by saying "no".
Salas at that point asked Vidrios if he could look inside the vehicle to make sure that it contained nothing illegal. Vidrios consented. Salas asked if he could search the entire vehicle and Vidrios again consented. Salas asked Vidrios to stand in front of the vehicle and, at Salas's direction, Vidrios stood approximately thirty feet in front of the car. Salas requested backup by radio and began to search the car. He began in the front area of the car where he had noticed the uneven paneling along the consol. He lifted the panel slightly, checked underneath, but found nothing. He proceeded to search the entire car. During the search Salas, along with a county deputy who arrived to assist, located marijuana under the cushion of the back seat. The officers also found marijuana and methamphetamine in the compartment for the passenger side air bag.
Analysis
The reasonableness of a traffic stop is analyzed under the two step inquiry set forth in Terry v. Ohio. See 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). Under the Terry analysis, a court must first determine if the stop was justified at its inception and then determine if the detention is "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Id. Interpreting the Terry test, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated:
An officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's license and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation. When the driver has produced a valid license and proof that he is entitled to operate the car, he must be allowed to proceed on his way, without being subject to further delay by police for additional questioning.
United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874 878 (10th Cir. 1994). Even given this mandate, however, if an officer had an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion of illegal activity, the officer is may detain the driver for additional questioning unrelated to the original stop. See United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1349 (10th Cir. 1998).
Vidrios does not dispute the validity of the initial traffic stop, but argues that the evidence should be suppressed because his detention was illegal due to the fact that Salas did not have a reasonable suspicion to detain. To determine whether Salas could have had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the court must not consider any one incident to the detention in isolation, but rather must consider the "totality of the circumstances." United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 872 (10th Cir. 1995). In assessing the totality of the circumstances, appropriate deference is given "to a trained law enforcement officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious circumstances." United States v. Mendez, 118 F.3d 1426, 1431 (10th Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court has noted in discussing such deference:
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain common-sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as fact-finders are permitted to do the same-and so are law enforcement officers. . . . [T]he evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement. Trained officers are aware of the modes and patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers can draw inferences and make deductions that might well elude untrained persons.
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). Given the totality of the circumstances in this case, Salas was justified in his detention of Vidrios for two reasons: first, he had reasonable suspicion that the car might be stolen; and second, the totality of the circumstances presented to Salas could give rise to a reasonable suspicion that Vidrios might have been transporting contraband.
First, the Tenth Circuit has held that if a driver is unable to demonstrate that he or she is entitled to be in possession of a vehicle, an officer is justified in detaining that driver for further questioning and investigation. See, e.g., Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d at 1349 (noting that inability to produce indicia of authorization to operate vehicle gives rise to reasonable suspicion vehicle might be stolen and justifying detention); United States v. Doyle, 129 F.3d 1372, 1377 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding reasonable suspicion justifying continued questioning of defendant and to request permission to search car where defendant provided inconsistent evidence regarding ownership of vehicle); United States v. Pena, 920 F.2d 1509, 1514 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that driver's claim that car belonged to one person when it was registered to another justified reasonable suspicion).
In this case, Salas detained Vidrios while he was attempting to determine whether Vidrios was in lawful possession of the car. Vidrios had given Salas a name for the car's owner that was not that of the person named on the vehicle's current registration and never provided Salas with any information that might have explained the discrepancy. Salas inquired into the name Vidrios gave, asked Vidrios the nature of their relationship, including the name of the company where the two allegedly worked. Nothing Vidrios offered could be said to offer a reasonable basis for dispelling Salas's concern about the ownership of the vehicle and the question of whether Vidrios was in lawful possession of it. Dispatch was also never able to give Salas any information regarding whether the registered owner of the vehicle, Victor Vargas, in any way knew Vidrios had his vehicle. Due to these facts, Salas was faced with a driver who was not the registered owner of the vehicle, who admittedly did not know the person to whom the vehicle was registered, and who claimed that an unknown third party owned the car. Under those circumstances, Salas had a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was stolen. His continued questioning of Vidrios was reasonable because Vidrios gave no information indicating that he was in lawful possession of the vehicle and also gave contradicting statements regarding the identity of the vehicle's lawful owner; here, Vidrios provided Salas with a name, Ezequel Lares, that was directly contradicted by the name on the registration he gave Salas-Victor Vargas. See Doyle, 129 F.3d at 1377 (stating that officer's request for consent to search was supported by suspicion raised due to defendant's claim that vehicle owned by one person when computer check revealed vehicle to be registered to another).
Salas's detention was also based on a reasonable suspicion that Vidrios might be transporting contraband. Given that the totality of circumstances must be considered in the court's analysis, it is inappropriate to "pigeonhol[e] each purported fact as either consistent with innocent travel or manifestly suspicious. Rather, the reasonable suspicion calculus turns on whether the specific articulable facts, when viewed together through the lens of a reasonable law enforcement officer, justified a brief roadside detention." Doyle, 129 F.3d at 1376. In addition, factors that by themselves are not proof of any illegal conduct may be, when taken together in the aggregate, sufficient to amount to reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9 (1989).
In addition to the question of lawful possession of the vehicle, many things Salas observed reasonably gave rise to a suspicion that Vidrios might be transporting contraband, thereby justifying his detention. First, Salas noticed a strong odor-due to at least two air fresheners-that in Salas's experience was often used to mask the scent of illegal drugs. The Tenth Circuit has noted that the presence of air fresheners can be considered in determining reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., United States v. Alverez, 68 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 1995) (McKay, J., concurring). Salas noted that the paneling in the middle console had been removed at one time and that this could indicate a hiding place for contraband, an observation that may also contribute to an reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. See Mendez, 118 F.3d at 1432. As Salas noted in this case, the fact that a defendant is driving a car registered to someone else can contribute to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See United States v. Villa-Chaparro, 115 F.3d 797, 802 (10th Cir. 1997). Salas noted the presence of energy drink which, in his experience, are used by drug transporters and also noted that Vidrios was traveling on a known drug trafficking route. In addition, Vidrios told Salas that he left Las Vegas, a six-hour drive by car, approximately thirteen hours before the stop occurred, an inconsistency that also could give rise to reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Kopp, 45 F.3d 1450, 1454 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating implausible travel plans and purpose can contribute to reasonable suspicion). Vidrios demonstrated a relative lack of knowledge about his employer, a factor that can contribute to reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d 1479, 1483 (10th Cir. 1994). Finally, Vidrios was also inconsistent in his statements that he was in Las Vegas with friends and that he stayed alone while there. Such inconsistencies may also give rise to reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. See Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d at 1349. The totality of the circumstances Salas faced therefore gave rise to a reasonable suspicion which justified his detention of Vidrios.
"[A]n experienced law enforcement officer would know that drug couriers . . . frequently, (N.D.Cal. 2000) hide drugs . . . inside the cavities in a car's panels. . . . Disassembled interiors, scratched paint, missing screws or other signs that a vehicle's paneling or natural configuration has been altered often lead law enforcement officers to the discovery of contraband." Mendez, 118 F.3d at 1432.
See, e.g., Mendez, 118 F.3d at 1432. In Mendez, the Tenth Circuit held that an officer's "observations of the dislocated dash and dismounted radio, along with [the defendant's] vague travel plans, provided [the officer] with reasonable suspicion and justified the brief detention of [the defendant] following the traffic stop." Id.