United States v. Van Wyk

12 Citing cases

  1. U.S. v. Zajac

    748 F. Supp. 2d 1340 (D. Utah 2010)

    at 664:17-665:1.Id. at 642:14-643:2; see also Van Wyk, 83 F. Supp. 2d 515, 523 (D.N.J. 2000).

  2. People v. Coleman

    2014 Ill. App. 5th 110274 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)   Cited 20 times
    In Coleman, the court found no error in admitting testimony from a murder victim's friends that the victim had told them her husband "wanted a divorce because he believed she and the boys were holding him back from realizing his full potential, but he did not want to jeopardize his job by filing for divorce."

    See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315–16 (9th Cir.1995), in which the Ninth Circuit on remand from the Supreme Court noted that “something doesn't become ‘scientific knowledge’ just because it's uttered by a scientist.” ¶ 115 The instant case is similar to United States v. Van Wyk, 83 F.Supp.2d 515 (D.N.J.2000), in which an FBI agent qualified as an expert on the subject of forensic stylistics was not allowed to testify as to authorship of unknown writings, but could testify as to similarities between the defendant's known writings and unknown writings. In reaching that conclusion, the Van Wyk court specifically found a lack of scientific reliability, noting that “[t]he reliability of text analysis, much like handwriting analysis, is questionable because, as discussed supra, there is no known rate of error, no recognized standard, no meaningful peer review, and no system of accrediting an individual as an expert in the field.”

  3. Dia v. Ashcroft

    353 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2003)   Cited 442 times
    Holding that Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process in deportation proceedings, and explaining that these rights “ste[m] from those statutory rights granted by Congress and the principle that ‘[m]inimum due process rights attach to statutory rights.’ ” (quoting Marincas v. Lewis , 92 F.3d 195, 203 (3d Cir. 1996) )

    McNally only qualified this conclusion by noting that he preferred to use original documents (some of the documents he had examined were not originals), and by conceding that "anything is possible" with regard to signatures. The IJ supported her conclusion that handwriting analysis is not probative evidence by referring to United States v. Van Wyk, 83 F.Supp.2d 515 (D.N.J. 2000). However, Van Wyk does not stand for this proposition, but, instead, deals with the admissibility of a forensic stylistics expert's testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence.

  4. United States v. Peter

    CRIMINAL ACTION 21-179 (E.D. La. Apr. 5, 2023)   Cited 1 times

    Doc. 124-1 at 24. See, e.g., United States v. Oskowitz, 294 F.Supp.2d 379, 384 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); Wolf v. Ramsey, 253 F.Supp.2d 1323, 1347-48 (N.D.Ga. 2003); United States v. Hidalgo, 229 F.Supp.2d 961, 968 (D. Ariz. 2002); United States v. Rutherford, 104 F.Supp.2d 1190, 1194 (D. Neb. 2000); United States v. Van Wyk, 83 F.Supp.2d 515, 524 (D.N.J. 2000); United States v. Santillan, No. 96-40169, 1201765, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 1999); United States v. Hines, 55 F.Supp.2d 62, 70-71 (D. Mass. 1999); United States v. McVeigh, 96-68, 1997 WL 47724 (D. Colo. Feb. 5, 1997).

  5. Gallatin Fuels, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Insurance Company

    Civil Action No. 02-2116 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2006)

    As Plaintiff itself recognizes, "it would be an abuse of discretion to exclude expert testimony simply because the trial court does not deem the proposed expert to be the best qualified or because the proposed expert does not have the specialization the court considers most appropriate." United States v. Van Wyk, 83 F. Supp. 2d 515, 518 (D.N.J. 2000) (quoting Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 80 F.3d 777, 782 (3d Cir. 1996)), aff'd, 262 F.3d 405 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Paoli, 35 F.3d at 741 (noting that the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has "eschewed imposing overly rigorous requirements of expertise and [has] been satisfied with more general qualifications."). As set forth more fully in his expert report, resume, and deposition testimony, Priest is a professor of law and economics at Yale Law School, and teaches courses in insurance, insurance regulation, and contracts, among others.

  6. Johnson Pugh v. U.S.

    Civ. No. 03-993 (GEB) (D.N.J. Jul. 28, 2005)   Cited 1 times

    The proponent of the expert testimony has the burden of proving its admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Van Wyk, 83 F. Supp.2d 515, 519 (D.N.J. 2000);Diaz v. Johnson Matthey, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 358, 372 (D.N.J. 1995). B. The Court Finds That The Proffered Expert Testimony Is Sufficiently Reliable Under Federal Rule Of Evidence 702

  7. Wolf v. Ramsey

    253 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (N.D. Ga. 2003)   Cited 14 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding document examiner expert to be qualified because, inter alia, expert was past president of American Society of Questioned Document Examiners, expert was member of American Board of Forensic Document Examiners, expert had authored authoritative texts, expert had completed the United States Army's two-year training program in Questioned Document Examination, and expert taught forensic document examination at several prominent schools

    Such a holding is consistent with numerous other districts that have allowed a qualified handwriting expert to testify as to the "similarities" between a challenged document and a known exemplar, but have not allowed the expert to express his ultimate "opinion" on the matter. See, e.g., United States v. Van Wyk, 83 F. Supp.2d 515, 524 (D.N.J. 2000) (allowing an expert to testify about "the specific similarities and idiosyncrasies between the known writings and the questioned writings, as well as testimony regarding, for example, how frequently or infrequently in his experience, he has seen a particular idiosyncrasy."); United States v. Rutherford, 104 F. Supp.2d 1190, 1194 (D.Neb. 2000) (limiting a forensic document examiner's testimony to "identifying and explaining the similarities and dissimilarities between the known exemplars and the questioned documents."); United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp.2d 62, 68 (D.Mass. 1999) (permitting forensic examiner to testify about unique features common or absent in the writings). But see United States v. Lewis, 220 F. Supp.2d 548, 552 (S.D.W.Va. 2002) (finding that proponent of forensic document expert had failed to establish testimony's reliability); United States v. Saelee, 162 F. Supp.2d 1097, 1106 (D.Alaska 2001) (excluding handwriting expert testimony in its entirety as inherently unre

  8. U.S. v. Ewell

    Crim. No. 00-697 (GEB) (D.N.J. Mar. 21, 2003)   Cited 14 times
    Finding the same, but for “thirteen STR loci”

    The proponent of the expert testimony has the burden of proving its admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Van Wyk, 83 F. Supp.2d 515, 519 (D.N.J. 2000), aff'd, 262 F.3d 405, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 826 (2001); Diaz v. Johnson Matthey, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 358, 372 (D.N.J. 1995). B. Application of the Daubert/Paoli Factors

  9. U.S. v. Llera Plaza

    179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2002)   Cited 10 times

    Id. at 70-71.Accord United States v. Van Wyk, 83 F. Supp.2d 515, 523-24 (D.N.J. 2000) (relying on Hines in permitting a forensic stylist to compare writings of known authorship with writings of unknown authorship, but not permitting the forensic stylist to give an opinion as to the author of the questioned writings). But see United States v. Paul, 175 F.3d 906 (11th Cir. 1999) (upholding trial court's decision to permit a handwriting examiner to give an opinion as to the author of documents in question).

  10. U.S. v. Saelee

    162 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (D. Alaska 2001)   Cited 19 times
    Holding that forensic document analyst testimony was not admissible as opinion by a lay witness or as an expert opinion because the government had not established reliability of the theories and methods used by a document examiner

    Several other district courts that have recently considered whether testimony by a handwriting expert is admissible under Rule 702 have likewise found numerous problems with handwriting comparison testimony and severely limited it at trial. See, United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp.2d 62, 70-71 (Mass. 1999) (document examiner limited to testifying about the similarities between the known handwriting and the questioned document); United States v. Van Wyk, 83 F. Supp.2d 515, 524 (N.J. 2000) (forensic stylistic expert limited to testifying about "the specific similarities and idiosyncracies between the known writings and the questioned writings, as well as testimony regarding, for example, how frequently or infrequently in his experience, he has seen a particular idiosyncrasy"); United States v. Rutherford, 104 F. Supp.2d 1190, 1194 (Neb. 2000) (document examiner's testimony limited "to identifying and explaining the similarities and dissimilarities between the known exemplars and the questioned documents"). This court has gone one step further than other courts by excluding all of Mr. Cawley's testimony, including his comparison testimony.