Opinion
Case No. 4:09-cr-066.
July 20, 2010
Summary : The defendant requested a substitute attorney based on a complete breakdown of communications. The Court granted the request, finding that the defendant showed justifiable dissatisfaction with counsel.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL
This matter comes before the Court as a result of the Defendant's verbal request for a substitute attorney at his change of plea hearing on July 19, 2010. The defendant expressed dissatisfaction with his current attorney, assistant federal public defender William Schmidt.
It is well-established in the Eighth Circuit that the trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to grant a request for substitution of counsel, particularly when the issue is raised close to the date of trial. United States v. Vallery, 108 F.3d 155 (8th Cir. 1997). The right to choice of counsel must not obstruct orderly judicial procedure or deprive courts of their inherent power to control the administration of justice. If a defendant's attempted exercise of his choice of counsel is dilatory, the trial court can require him to proceed with designated counsel. United States v. Reeves, 674 F.2d 739, 748 (8th Cir. 1982).
Whether to grant a motion for new counsel is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court. United States v. Exson, 328 F.3d 456 (8th Cir. 2003). A defendant must show a justifiable dissatisfaction with counsel in order to be granted a substitute. Justifiable dissatisfaction sufficient to warrant that new counsel be appointed includes a conflict of interest, an irreconcilable conflict, or a complete breakdown in communications between the attorney and the defendant. Id. quoting Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1991). The proper focus in evaluating claims of dissatisfaction with counsel is on the quality of the advocacy.
When a defendant makes a request for substitute counsel, the Court should inquire into the reason(s) for the defendant's dissatisfaction with his attorney before ruling on the request.See McMahon v. Fulcomer, 821 F.2d 934 (3rd Cir. 1987). A defendant does not have the absolute right to counsel of his own choosing. The primary aim of the Sixth Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant, rather than to ensure each defendant will be represented by the lawyer he prefers. Nerisen v. Solem, 715 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1983).
At the hearing on July 19, 2010, the Court inquired of the Defendant as to the reason(s) for his dissatisfaction with his court-appointed attorney. Trainor informed the Court that he was dissatisfied with defense counsel because he felt there had been a complete breakdown in communications. In essence, Trainor stated he was extremely dissatisfied with his court-appointed defense counsel, he was not being properly represented, and he requested substitute counsel to adequately protect his rights.
It is incumbent upon a defendant to show justifiable dissatisfaction with counsel in order to be granted a substitute. As previously noted, justifiable dissatisfaction sufficient to warrant that new counsel be appointed includes a conflict of interest, an irreconcilable conflict, or a complete breakdown of communications between the attorney and the defendant. United States v. Exson, 328 F.3d 456 (8th Cir. 2003). The Court finds the defendant, Richard Trainor, has shown justifiable dissatisfaction under the circumstances.
A defendant does not have the absolute right to counsel of his own choosing. The primary aim of the Sixth Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant, rather than to ensure that each defendant will be represented by the lawyer he prefers. The Defendant's verbal request for substitution of counsel is GRANTED. As per Trainor's request, the Court appoints attorney Ryan Sandberg as substitute counsel.
IT IS SO ORDERED.