Opinion
Case No. 4:01 CR 207
May 7, 2002
ORDER REGARDING REPRESENTATION OF DEFENDANT TRAFICANT
A jury found Defendant Traficant guilty of counts one through ten of the superseding indictment on 11 April 2002. (Docket # 341). On 22 April 2002, Defendant Traficant, who has represented himself throughout the proceedings in this case, filed a timely motion for a new trial. (Docket # 347).
That same day, attorney Percy Squire filed, purportedly on behalf of Congressman Traficant, a motion for leave to appear as counsel to file instanter a supplemental memorandum in support of defendant's motion for a new trial. (Docket # 349). Mr. Squire explained that he "seeks leave to appear as co-counsel for Defendant in this action for the limited purpose of challenging the lawfulness of the N.D. Ohio Jury Selection Plan." (Docket # 349 at 3). Congressman Traficant did not sign this motion. Neither the motion nor the attached memorandum nor any other filings in this case indicate that Congressman Traficant wishes Mr. Squire or anyone else to file motions on his behalf or to appear as his co-counsel.
On 3 May 2002, the government responded to Defendant Traficant's motion for a new trial and Mr. Squire's motion for leave to appear as counsel. (Docket # 354, 355). The government does not object to Mr. Squire entering an appearance as counsel for Congressman Traficant, but does object "to any hybrid representation in which Congressman Traficant appears partly pro se and partly represented by counsel." (Docket # 355 at 1). The government then "requests that Congressman Traficant be ordered to file a response to the Motion for Leave to Appear as Counsel stating whether he wishes to continue representing himself pro se, or if Attorneys Squire and Pierre-Louis is are now his attorneys of record for all remaining matters in this case." (Docket # 355 at 3).
Beginning 11 May 2001 and throughout the proceedings in this case, Congressman Traficant has been adamant that he wants to represent himselfpro se and that he would not accept the assistance of legal counsel for any purpose.
It is well-established that a defendant in a criminal case has no constitutional right to hybrid representation. In Wilson v. Hunt, 29 Fed.Appx. 324, 3 (6th Cir. 2002), the Sixth Circuit explained, "While a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to have counsel conduct his entire defense or to proceed pro se, he has no constitutional right to demand hybrid representation, such as conducting his defense with the occasional assistance of counsel." (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Given the law and the circumstances of this case, Defendant Traficant shall inform the Court in writing on or before 17 May 2002 whether Mr. Squire is representing him in this matter and whether he consents to Mr. Squire's filing, on his behalf, of a supplement to Congressman Traficant's motion for a new trial. If Congressman Traficant wishes to proceed with some form of hybrid representation, in which the Congressman would continue to represent himself while attorneys file legal documents on his behalf as co-counsel, he also shall present any arguments he may have for why this Court should now allow him to proceed in such a manner. Congressman Traficant shall also inform the Court of whether he intends to proceed pro se or with counsel for the remainder of the proceedings in this case in the event this Court declines to permit hybrid representation.