U.S. v. Torres

10 Citing cases

  1. U.S. v. McGhee

    651 F.3d 153 (1st Cir. 2011)   Cited 18 times
    Holding that Massachusetts youthful offender violations do not qualify as career offender predicates

    Winston McGhee was convicted of drug crimes committed in July 2006 and at sentencing determined to be a career offender, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 (2008), based in part on a prior state youthful offender adjudication. On appeal, we affirmed both the conviction and the resulting sentence, United States v. McGhee, 627 F.3d 454, 461 (1st Cir. 2010), noting that the career offender designation was compelled by United States v. Torres, 541 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1987, 173 L.Ed.2d 1090 (2009). McGhee then petitioned for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc to challenge Torres.

  2. U.S. v. Dunbar

    553 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2009)   Cited 81 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding initial stop justified based on officer's observation and video showing defendant's vehicle following another car too closely

    The plain-error standard is met if (1) the district court erred; (2) the error was "plain" — that is, clear or obvious; (3) the error affected the defendant's substantial rights and (4) the error "'seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.'" United States v. Torres, 541 F.3d 48, 53 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Brandao, 539 F.3d 44, 57 (1st Cir. 2008)). Here, there is no error, let alone plain error.

  3. U.S. v. Peguero-Martinez

    Case Number: 1: 10 CR 10132-001-PBS; USM Number: 92218-038 (D. Mass. Nov. 30, 2010)   Cited 1 times

    This case presents a matter of first impression. Upon careful consideration of the clear language of the Application Note and the scheme implemented by the Commonwealth's youthful offender act, the Court finds that the defendant's youthful offender adjudication does not fall within § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii)'s scope. Both parties cite to the First Circuit's decision in United States v. Torres, 541 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2008), which held that the defendant's criminal convictions in New Jersey for offenses committed before he was eighteen could count toward a career offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Id. at 51.

  4. United States v. Blewitt

    920 F.3d 118 (1st Cir. 2019)   Cited 5 times

    This is a claim of procedural error, and we review claims of procedural error in sentencing appeals for abuse of discretion.See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007) ; United States v. Torres, 541 F.3d 48, 51 (1st Cir. 2008). "Within this rubric, we assay the district court's factfinding for clear error and afford de novo consideration to its interpretation and application of the sentencing guidelines."

  5. U.S. v. McGhee

    627 F.3d 454 (1st Cir. 2010)   Cited 12 times
    Noting that the Melendez–Diaz Court was “sharply divided” and that the Court's “new slant on the Confrontation Clause is likely to be contested territory for some years”

    See id. § 4B1.2 cmt. n. 1. However, United States v. Torres, 541 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1987, 173 L.Ed.2d 1090 (2009), intervened; the district court held that it was directed by Torres to count the youthful offender adjudication as a prior felony conviction. McGhee concedes in his appellate brief that Torres controls his case; he "raises this challenge . . . in order to preserve the issue for further en banc review."

  6. U.S. v. Merced

    603 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2010)   Cited 165 times
    Finding that, though there is no "mandatory script for sentencing," the District Court must demonstrate that it has carefully considered and analyzed the sentencing factors

    Merced's 60-month sentence was 128 months less than what a similarly situated recidivist crack cocaine dealer could expect to receive under the circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Tupuola, 587 F.3d 1025, 1026 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing career offender who pleaded guilty to distribution of crack cocaine, had an advisory Guidelines range of 188-235 months, and received a 188-month sentence); Welton, 583 F.3d at 495-96 (same); United States v. Sharkey, 543 F.3d 1236, 1238 (10th Cir. 2008) (same); United States v. Torres, 541 F.3d 48, 50-51 (1st Cir. 2008) (describing defendant who sold 10 grams of crack cocaine, qualified as a career offender, fell within the same Guidelines range as Merced, and received a 195-month sentence). Before the District Court granted such a large variance, it should have explained why that variance would .not contribute to unwarranted sentencing disparities pursuant to § 3553(a)(6).

  7. United States v. González-Castillo

    562 F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 2009)   Cited 27 times
    Vacating a defendant's 71-month sentence at the top of the guideline range for violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326 because the district court based the defendant's deterrent sentence on the "non-existent material fact" that he illegally entered the United States two times in a two year period

    Notably, this was a procedural error, which, under a different procedural posture, would constitute an "abuse of discretion." See United States v. Torres, 541 F.3d 48, 51 (1st Cir. 2008) (listing "selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts" as among the "procedural errors amounting to an abuse of discretion" by the sentencing court). Nevertheless, because our review is for plain error, we must proceed to the third and fourth prongs of the plain error analysis and inquire whether the sentencing court's error affected appellant's substantial rights, and whether basing the sentence on this erroneous fact of apparent significance to the sentencing court impaired the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceeding.

  8. U.S. v. Perazza-Mercado

    553 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2009)   Cited 109 times
    Holding that the erroneous imposition of a condition of supervised release, which banned possession of all pornography by a sex offender, affected the defendant's substantial rights because the lack of explanation for the ban created a reasonable probability that the court might not have imposed the condition if it had explained the basis for the condition or made sure that “the record illuminated the basis for the condition”

    Therefore, I cannot agree that, on plain error review, allowing the ban on pornographic material to stand would seriously impugn the "fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." See United States v. Torres, 541 F.3d 48, 53 (1st Cir. 2008). The majority criticizes my approach as mandating a ban on the possession of adult pornography in every case where a defendant is convicted of a sexual offense with a minor.

  9. U.S. v. Jones

    762 F. Supp. 2d 270 (D. Mass. 2010)   Cited 7 times

    Here, although he is but 20 years old, Jones is already a career offender. Defense counsel challenges categorizing Jones as a career offender but recognizes that, in this circuit, as his juvenile convictions count against him, United States v. Torres, 541 F.3d 48, 51-53 (1st Cir. 2008), he is properly so characterized. Accordingly, the maximum sentence to which Jones could have been sentenced is 327 months. Sentencing Transcript, Nov. 18, 2010 ("Sent.

  10. U.S. v. Davis

    CAUSE NO.: 1:05-CR-55-TS (N.D. Ind. Nov. 17, 2008)

    So have several other federal circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Sharkey, 543 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Ogman, 535 F.3d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Johnson, No. 08-50403, 2008 WL 4189662 (5th Cir. Sept. 11, 2008); United States v. Torres, 541 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Moore, 541 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2008). The Defendant also argues that the Court should "in its sole discretion schedule a re-sentencing in this instant case."