Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. H-00-1169.
August 27, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pending are Defendant National Health Insurance Company's Motion to Dismiss (Document No. 204), Defendant Deloitte Touche's Motion to Dismiss (Document No. 205), and Defendants' Motions for Entry of Certified Final Judgment (Document Nos. 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 229, 230, 231, 232, 234, 235). The Court has carefully considered the motions, responses, reply, and applicable law.
I. Background
Relator Ramesh Gudur filed this qui tam action alleging that various state agencies, independent school districts, and private corporations violated the False Claims Act (FCA) in connection with the Texas School Health and Related Services (SHARS) program. Gudur alleges that Defendants Texas Department of Health (TDH) and Texas Education Agency (TEA) hired Defendant Deloitte Touche as a consultant to increase federal reimbursement rates for services provided to Medicaid eligible children under the SHARS program. According to Gudur, Deloitte fraudulently inflated cost figures to create excessive and unjustified reimbursement rates, and as a result, that "Defendants" utilized Medicaid funds to cover expenses that are not reimbursable under Medicaid guidelines, increased the permissible federal match rate for state and local funds spent, and failed to spend state and local funds necessary to receive federal matching funds. In addition, Gudur alleges that Deloitte received illegal percentage-based fees for its work, that "Defendants" billed for services not actually provided or provided for free, that "Defendants" billed for services provided to students not eligible for Medicaid and for services performed by unqualified personnel, and that "Defendants" billed Medicaid for expenses that had already been reimbursed.
Defendant National Heritage Insurance Company (NHIC) moves to dismiss Gudur's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that it has sovereign immunity and that the FCA's jurisdictional bar applies to Gudur's claims. Deloitte also moves to dismiss Gudur's claims under the FCA jurisdictional bar, and for failure to plead fraud with particularity under Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). In addition, the school district Defendants, against whom Gudur's claims were dismissed in a prior order, move for entry of certified final judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b).
II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
A. Rule 12(b)(1) Standard of ReviewFed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) provides for dismissal of an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. "Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001); see Ynclan v. Dept. of Air Force, 943 F.3d 1388, 1390 (5th Cir. 1991). The party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of proof when opposing a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss.Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161.
B. Sovereign Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. Amend. XII. "Generally speaking, the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents states from being sued in federal court." Hudson v. City of New Orleans, 174 F.3d 677, 681 (5th Cir. 1999).
Even suits that are not brought against the state itself may be barred by the Eleventh Amendment under the arm of the state doctrine "if the state is the real, substantial party in interest because the suit seeks to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury." Hudson, 174 F.3d at 681 (quotations omitted). Six factors are considered in determining whether an entity is an arm of the state: (1) whether the state statutes and case law view the entity as an arm of the state; (2) the source of the entity's funding; (3) the entity's degree of local autonomy; (4) whether the entity is concerned primarily with local or statewide problems; (5) whether the entity has the authority to sue and be sued in its own name; and (6) whether the entity has the right to hold and use property. See, e.g., Skelton v. Camp, 234 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 2000); Hudson, 174 F.3d at 681; Clark v. Tarrant County, Texas, 798 F.2d 736, 744-45 (5th Cir. 1986). An autonomous private corporation acting as a representative of the state may qualify as an arm of the state. See Shands Teaching Hosps. Clinics, Inc. v. Beech St. Corp., 208 F.3d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d 45, 51-52 (5th Cir. 1975) ("Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the district court lacked jurisdiction over all these defendants, both governmental and private as agents of the Government."). In applying the six "arm of the state" factors, an autonomous private corporation must be viewed in context, not in the abstract. See Shands, 208 F.3d at 1311. NHIC, as the entity asserting sovereign immunity bears the burden of proving that it is an arm of the state. Skelton, 234 F.3d at 297.
Texas statutes and regulations view the functions performed by NHIC as state functions. The SHARS program was created by the Texas Health and Human Services Commission (HHSC), a state agency that supervises the Texas Medicaid Program and that monitors federal funds received by health and human services agencies. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE §§ 32.003(3), (4), 32.021(a); TEX. GOV'T CODE §§ 531.0055; 531.002; 531.021; see also 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 354.1341. TDH, which is also a state agency, see TEX. HEALTH SAFETY CODE § 11.004(b), is charged with reimbursing providers such as independent school districts for providing school health and related services to Medicaid eligible children with disabilities under the Texas SHARS program, see TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 355.8301(a). NHIC contracted with TDH to administer SHARS. Use by TDH of a fiscal intermediary such as NHIC is expressly contemplated by Texas statute, which allows an agency operating part of the Texas medical assistance program to "use any fiscal intermediary . . . it finds most satisfactory and economical." TEX. HUM. RES. CODE § 32.029(b); see also id. at § 32.003(3). Thus, NHIC performed functions otherwise assigned to agencies of the State of Texas and delegated to NHIC as authorized by state law. This factor suggests that NHIC acted as an arm of the state with respect to those functions.
The second, third, and fourth arm of the state factors also indicate that NHIC acted as an arm of the state. Although NHIC is a private corporation with its own funds, it is uncontroverted that the State of Texas reimburses NHIC for all expenses, costs and disbursements relating to the SHARS program from both state and federal funds. NHIC does not set policies governing the SHARS program, does not set reimbursement rates, and does not determine the method of seeking federal matching funds under the SHARS program. Any judgment against NHIC will therefore interfere with policies of the State of Texas and of the Texas Medicaid Program, and could affect the state treasury if reimbursement rates are decreased or state matching funds increased. See Shands, 208 F.3d at 1312. There is no suggestion that NHIC exercised any local autonomy with respect to its administration of the SHARS program. On the contrary, the SHARS program is administered state-wide in accordance with policies created by TDH and HHSC. These factors suggest that NHIC acted as an arm of the state.
The fifth and sixth factors suggest that NHIC is not an arm of the state. NHIC, as a private corporation, has authority to sue and to be sued in its own name, and the authority to hold and use property. Nevertheless, consideration of the six aforementioned factors reveals that NHIC acted as an arm of the state in performing duties relating to the administration of the SHARS program. See United States v. Mack, 48 F. Supp.2d 708, 713-14 (S.D. Tex. 1999); Texas Hosp. Ass'n v. Nat'l Heritage Ins. Co., 802 F. Supp. 1507, 1512 (W.D. Tex. 1992); St. Joseph Hosp. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 573 F. Supp. 443, 449 (S.D. Tex. 1983).
Gudur argues that NHIC is not immune from suit because it acted beyond the scope of its authority by participating in a scheme to defraud the United States. Gudur has not, however, alleged that NHIC acted other than under the control and direction of TDH. In the entire Complaint, there is not a single allegation that NHIC acted other than in conjunction with TDH. See Texas Hosp. Ass'n, 802 F. Supp. at 1512. Every allegation against NHIC is levied against "Defendants" generally, which includes TDH. Gudur's bare allegation that "Defendants" committed various violations of the False Claims Act, without more, is not sufficient to raise an inference that NHIC acted outside the scope of its authority in administering the SHARS program. Cf. Richardson v. S. Univ., 118 F.3d 450, 454 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that state university and board of supervisors were arms of the state and thus were entitled to immunity against claims for violations of due process, false imprisonment, and defamation); Matranga v. Travelers Ins. Co., 563 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating that nothing in record indicated that Medicare fiscal intermediary, which had been sued for willful and wanton misconduct in processing Medicare claims, acted outside perimeters of official duties). The State of Texas clearly is the real party in interest in this action, and accordingly, NHIC is entitled to sovereign immunity as an arm of the state. See Texas Hosp. Ass'n, 802 F. Supp. at 1512.
C. FCA Jurisdictional Bar
Deloitte argues that Plaintiff's allegations were publicly disclosed before Plaintiff filed his Complaint and therefore that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's FCA claims. NHIC also has raised this issue as an alternative to its sovereign immunity argument.
The FCA limits subject matter jurisdiction over qui tam actions:
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information.31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). In determining whether it has jurisdiction over a qui tam action, a court must consider (1) whether there has been a public disclosure of allegations or transactions; (2) whether the action is "based upon" the publicly disclosed allegations; and (3) if so, whether the relator is an "original source" of the information. See Federal Recovery Servs., Inc. v. United States, 72 F.3d 447, 450 (5th Cir. 1995). Once a defendant has challenged the court's jurisdiction over a qui tam action, the burden is on the relator to establish subject matter jurisdiction. See United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 282 F.3d 787, 797 (10th Cir. 2002);United States ex rel. Jones v. Horizon Healthcare Corp., 160 F.3d 326, 329 (6th Cir. 1998).
NHIC and Deloitte contend that the allegations or transactions that form the basis of Plaintiff's claims were previously publicly disclosed in (1) a qui tam lawsuit filed against both NHIC and Deloitte in the Western District of Texas, styledUnited States ex. rel. Barron v. Deloitte Touche, L.L.P.; (2) a General Accounting Office (GAO) report; and (3) testimony before the Senate Finance Committee. Information disclosed in civil litigation and on file with the clerk's office, including civil complaints, constitutes a "public disclosure." Federal Recovery Services, 72 F.3d at 450. Similarly, information publicly disclosed in congressional testimony and in GAO reports constitutes a "public disclosure." 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). Therefore, the Court must consider whether Plaintiff's claims are "based upon" these public disclosures.
Gudur contends that his claims are not "based upon" the aforementioned sources because they were not actually derived from the public disclosure of allegations or transactions. This argument is supported by decisions by the Fourth Circuit and one panel of the Seventh Circuit, which have held that the plain meaning of "based upon" is "derived from," and thus that the FCA's jurisdictional bar applies only if a relator actually obtained the information on which his qui tam claims are based from public disclosures. See United States v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir. 1999); United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1347-50 (4th Cir. 1994).
Most circuit courts, however, have held that an action is "based upon" a public disclosure if it is "supported by" or "substantially similar to" the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions, regardless of whether the allegations are actually derived from the public disclosure. See Minnesota Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health Sys. Corp., 276 F.3d 1032, 1044-47 (8th Cir. 2002); United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Pittsburgh, 186 F.3d 376, 385-88 (3d Cir. 1999); United States ex rel. Biddle v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ., 161 F.3d 533, 539-40 (9th Cir. 1998); United States ex rel. McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 940-41 (6th Cir. 1997); United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees' Club, 105 F.3d 675, 682-85 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Cooper v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 19 F.3d 562, 567-68 (11th Cir. 1994); United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d 548, 552-53 (10th Cir. 1992); United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 324 (2d Cir. 1992); see also United States ex rel. Lamers v. City of Green Bay, 168 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that facts on which relator based fraud claim were publicly disclosed, and thus that court had jurisdiction only if relator was original source). The rationale in these cases is persuasive and more consistent with § 3730 as a whole than is the Fourth Circuit's interpretation. Most important to this Court, however, is the opinion of the Fifth Circuit.
The Fifth Circuit has adopted the majority approach to the "based upon" inquiry. See Federal Recovery Services, 72 F.3d at 451. In Federal Recovery Services, a relator filed a qui tam action alleging facts that formed the basis for an earlier lawsuit against the same defendant. 72 F.3d at 448-49. Holding that it lacked jurisdiction over the action, the Fifth Circuit focused on the similarity between the allegations in the two cases, and gave no consideration to whether the relator actually obtained its information from the prior lawsuit. The court rejected the argument that the relator had alleged additional instances of fraud not present in the earlier lawsuit, holding that the relator could not "avoid the jurisdictional bar simply by adding other claims that are substantively identical to those previously disclosed in the state court litigation." See Federal Recovery Services, 72 F.3d at 451. This Court is bound to follow the approach adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Federal Recovery Services.
Most of Gudur's allegations are substantively identical to allegations or transactions that were publicly disclosed inBarron. Gudur alleges that Deloitte improperly inflated the reimbursement rates for services provided to Medicaid eligible children under the SHARS program and, as a result, that Defendants utilized Medicaid funds to cover expenses that were not reimbursable and increased federal match rate percentages. Likewise, the plaintiffs in Barron alleged that Deloitte conducted time studies to determine billing rates and caused the Districts to submit inflated charges for activities that were not properly allocable to Medicaid. Gudur alleges that Defendants entered into illegal percentage-based fee arrangements for billing and consulting work. Similarly, the plaintiffs inBarron alleged that Deloitte collected up to 20 percent of amounts collected from Medicaid in behalf of school districts. Gudur alleges that Defendants billed Medicaid for services not actually provided, giving as an example the billing of group sessions as individual sessions. Likewise, the plaintiffs inBarron alleged that Texas school districts, under the instructions of Deloitte and with the approval and/or under the supervision of NHIC, billed group therapy sessions as multiple individual sessions. Gudur alleges that Defendants billed for services performed by unqualified personnel. Similarly, the plaintiffs in Barron alleged that SHARS provided services by professionals who were not licensed to practice healthcare outside the school environment and were not properly supervised to meet billing criteria. Gudur's aforementioned allegations are all substantially similar to the allegations in Barron, and are necessarily deemed "based upon" publicly disclosed allegations or transactions.
The Court has no jurisdiction under § 3730 over an action that is even partly "based upon" publicly disclosed allegations or transactions. See Federal Recovery Services, 72 F.3d at 451. In applying the statute to a case where multiple claims are made, "each claim . . . must be treated as if it stood alone." United States ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 205 F.3d 97, 102 (3d Cir. 2000). Plaintiff has not well delineated his claims under the FCA but, instead, has made several factual allegations as a "Statement of Facts," and then alleged a single count for violation of the FCA, incorporating "[t]he actions set out above on the part of Defendants." A careful reading of this Complaint, however, reveals that Plaintiff alleges three different frauds perpetrated by various Defendants. First, Plaintiff alleges that Deloitte and other Defendants wrongfully inflated SHARS reimbursement rates, and that as a result, Medicaid funds were improperly used, the federal match percentage was improperly increased, and local and state expenditures fell below what was necessary to receive the inflated "matching" funds. Second, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants entered into illegal percentage-based fee arrangements. Third, Plaintiff alleges that unspecified Defendants engaged in fraudulent billing practices, including billing for services not actually provided by billing group therapy sessions as individual sessions. As demonstrated in the preceding comparison of Plaintiff's allegations to the allegations in the Barron complaint, each of Plaintiff's claims is based, at least in part, on publicly disclosed allegations or transactions and is therefore, absent some exception to the rule, jurisdictionally barred.
Plaintiff relies on an exception to the jurisdictional bar rule, namely, that if Gudur is the "original source" of the information in his Complaint, then the Court has jurisdiction. The statute reads, in relevant part, "No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transaction . . . unless . . . the person bringing the action is an original source of the information. (Emphasis added.) An "original source" is "an individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing an action under this section which is based on the information." 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
Gudur alleges that in the performance of his duties as a program specialist for TDH, he participated in the development of SHARS reimbursement rates by analyzing the actual costs of services for which SHARS reimbursement was allowed. Gudur alleges that he was present at meetings at which Defendants "discussed ways to improperly inflate the SHARS reimbursement rates." Furthermore, Gudur alleges that he conducted independent analyses and concluded that the reimbursement rates created by Deloitte were excessive and unjustified. These allegations raise an inference that Gudur has direct and independent knowledge that Deloitte inflated SHARS reimbursement rates. Therefore, to the extent that one of Gudur's claims is premised on his being an original source of information that Deloitte used improper data and multipliers wrongfully to inflate the reimbursement rates, the Court has jurisdiction over that claim.
The allegations in Gudur's Complaint do not, however, support an inference that Gudur has direct and independent knowledge regarding his claims that Deloitte received illegal percentage-based fees for its work, or that Defendants engaged in any fraudulent billing practice unrelated to the alleged inflation of reimbursement rates. Because these claims are based upon allegations and transactions publicly disclosed in Barron, they will be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
III. Rule 9(b) Motion to Dismiss
Deloitte argues that Gudur failed to plead his claim with particularity as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). "The complaint in a False Claims Act suit must fulfill the requirements of Rule 9(b)." United States ex rel. Russell v. Epic Healthcare Mgmt. Group, 193 F.3d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 1999); United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 903 (5th Cir. 1997). Rule 9(b) requires that "[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity." To satisfy Rule 9(b), a plaintiff must plead the time, place, and contents of the allegedly false representations, the identity of the speaker, and what the speaker obtained by making the representation. Epic Healthcare, 193 F.3d at 308. These requirements are not relaxed merely because the suit is brought under the False Claims Act.Id. at 308-09.
In Count One of his Complaint, Gudur alleges: "The false representation and certifications to the Government by Defendants are in fact false claims in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq." Persons are prohibited under the FCA from knowingly presenting or causing to be presented to an officer or employee of the United States Government a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval, or from knowingly making, using, or causing to be made or used a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1), (2). Gudur alleges vaguely throughout his Complaint that unspecified "Defendants" made various false representations and claims. Gudur has not, however, pled the time, place, and contents of the alleged false representations and certifications made by Deloitte to the United States government or to any other party to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved, nor has he alleged the identity of the individual who allegedly made false representations and certifications to the United States Government or any other party in Deloitte's behalf. Therefore, Gudur's False Claims Act suit against Deloitte will be dismissed unless Gudur, within fourteen (14) days after the entry of this Order, files a more definite statement in the form of an amended complaint, in which he pleads with sufficient particularity to comply with Rule 9(b), his remaining claim against Deloitte, as to which Plaintiff claims to be an original source, relating to the allegedly inflated SHARS reimbursement rates.
IV. Certified Final Judgment
By Order entered February 15, 2002, the Court dismissed Gudur's claims against the independent school district Defendants in light of the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States ex rel. Garibaldi v. Orleans Parish School Board, 244 F.3d 486 (5th Cir. 2001), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 264 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 808 (2002). Numerous independent school district Defendants now move for entry of partial final judgment on Gudur's claims against them.
"When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, . . . or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment." FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). In determining whether to enter partial final judgment, a district court must consider "judicial administrative interests as well as the equities involved." Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 100 S.Ct. 1460, 1465 (1980) (citations omitted). Rule 54(b) "reflects a balancing of two policies: avoiding the `danger of hardship or injustice through delay which would be alleviated by immediate appeal' and `avoid[ing] piecemeal appeals.'" Eldredge v. Martin Marietta Corp., 207 F.3d 737, 740 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting PYCA Indus., Inc. v. Harrison County Waste Water Mgmt. Dist., 81 F.3d 1412, 1421 (5th Cir. 1996)). "A district court should grant certification only when there exists some danger of hardship or injustice through delay which would be alleviated by immediate appeal; it should not be entered routinely as a courtesy to counsel." PYCA Indus., 81 F.3d at 1421.
The school district Defendants have identified no danger of hardship or injustice that might result in delay of entry of final judgment on Gudur's claims against them. Gudur, who is the party with an interest in appealing the dismissal of his claims, notes that a piecemeal appeal to the Fifth Circuit would be a waste of time and resources in this case. The Fifth Circuit already has held that claims such as Gudur's may not be maintained against independent school districts. See Orleans Parish School Board, 244 F.3d at 495. The United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in United States ex rel. Chandler v. Cook County, Illinois, 277 F.3d 969 (7th Cir. 2002), in which the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the rationale in Orleans Parish School Board and held that counties may be held liable under the FCA. Entry of partial final judgment on Gudur's claims against the school district Defendants would require Gudur to file a piecemeal appeal solely to preserve his claims against the school district Defendants pending the Supreme Court's decision inChandler. Under these circumstances, and because the school district Defendants have asserted no danger of hardship or injustice through delay, the motions for entry of partial final judgment will be denied.
Defendants argue that the Supreme Court's ruling inChandler will not affect Orleans Parish School Board. This argument does not defeat Gudur's assertion that a piecemeal appeal to the Fifth Circuit merely to preserve a future argument that, should the Supreme Court affirm Chandler, Orleans Parish School Board must be reversed, would waste time and resources.
V. Order
Based on the foregoing, it is
ORDERED that Defendant National Health Insurance Company's Motion to Dismiss (Document No. 204) is GRANTED, and Gudur's claims against National Health Insurance Company are DISMISSED on the merits. It is further
ORDERED that Defendant Deloitte Touche's Motion to Dismiss (Document No. 205) is GRANTED. Gudur's claims that Deloitte Touche violated the False Claims Act by receiving illegal percentage-based fees and by participating in various fraudulent billing practices through the Texas SHARS program are DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Gudur's remaining claim that Deloitte Touche violated the False Claims Act by wrongfully inflating reimbursement rates for services provided pursuant to the Texas SHARS program will be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b) unless, within fourteen (14) days after the date of the entry of this Order, Gudur files an amended complaint that sets forth with particularity his "original source" claim against Deloitte in compliance with Rule 9(b). It is further
ORDERED that Defendants' Motions for Entry of Certified Final Judgment (Document Nos. 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 229, 230, 231, 232, 234, 235) are DENIED.
The Clerk will enter this Order and provide a correct copy to all counsel of record.