District courts have "substantial discretion" in determining how restitution is to be paid. See United States v. Tarbox, 361 F.3d 664, 665 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. McGlothlin, 249 F.3d 783, 784 (8th Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Corbett, 357 F.3d 194, 195 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Once having considered the mandatory factors specified by § 3664(f)(2), the sentencing judge is afforded very broad discretion in setting the schedule."). While the government has the burden of "demonstrating the amount of loss sustained by a victim," the defendant has the burden of demonstrating his "financial resources" and the "financial needs of [his] dependents."
The cases cited by Petitioner in support of his argument on this point stand for the proposition that a "court cannot delegate to others its 'inherent responsibility' over matters of punishment, which includes 'final authority over all payment matters.'" United States v. Tarbox, 361 F.3d 664, 665 n. 1 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Merric, 166 F.3d 406, 409 (1st Cir. 1999)); see also United States v. Kassar, 47 F.3d 562, 568 (2nd Cir. 1995) (finding delegation by sentencing court to the probation office the setting of an installment payment schedule for a court-ordered fine and restitution to be impermissible). Thus, if the court had specified that Petitioner's $10,000 fine was to be paid in installments, it could not have empowered the BOP, the probation office, or some other entity "to make the final decision as to the installment schedule for payments."
The cases cited by Petitioner in support of his argument on this point stand for the proposition that a "court cannot delegate to others its 'inherent responsibility' over matters of punishment, which includes 'final authority over all payment matters.'" United States v. Tarbox, 361 F.3d 664, 665 n. 1 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Merric, 166 F.3d 406, 409 (1st Cir. 1999)); see also United States v. Kassar, 47 F.3d 562, 568 (2nd Cir. 1995) (finding delegation by sentencing court to the probation office the setting of an installment payment schedule for a court-ordered fine and restitution to be impermissible). Thus, if the court had specified that Petitioner's $10,000 fine was to be paid in installments, it could not have empowered the BOP, the probation office, or some other entity "to make the final decision as to the installment schedule for payments."
Petitioner's contention that the BOP "lacked any authority to collect fines," and deprived him of a protected liberty interest by attempting to do so despite this absence of mandate, fails as well. The cases cited by Petitioner in support of his argument on this point stand for the proposition that a "court cannot delegate to others its `inherent responsibility' over matters of punishment, which includes `final authority over all payment matters.'" United States v. Tarbox, 361 F.3d 664, 665 n. 1 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Merric, 166 F.3d 406, 409 (1st Cir. 1999)); see also United States v. Kassar, 47 F.3d 562, 568 (2nd Cir. 1995) (finding delegation by sentencing court to the probation office the setting of an installment payment schedule for a court-ordered fine and restitution to be impermissible). Thus, if the court had specified that Petitioner's $10,000 fine was to be paid in installments, it could not have empowered the BOP, the probation office, or some other entity "to make the final decision as to the installment schedule for payments."