Opinion
Criminal No. 03-733-1.
October 18, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
The defendant Clifford Taliaferro has filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, after he was found guilty by a jury of drug-trafficking and weapons charges. The motion will be denied.
Police officers obtained a search warrant which authorized them to search the apartment in which the defendant resided. The search turned up a large quantity of cocaine and crack cocaine, as well as numerous firearms. The disputed issues at trial were whether the narcotics were in defendant's control, or whether they were the property of a person who had been rooming in defendant's house, but had died shortly before the search; and whether the weapons were possessed by the defendant in furtherance of drug activities. The arguments on both sides were ably presented, and the jury rendered its decision. There is no basis for disturbing the jury's verdict, which was supported not only by the results of the search, but also by the testimony of a co-defendant, Mr. Durham.
In support of the pending motion, the defendant argues, at some length, that his arrest was illegal. A police officer had been notified by telephone to stop the defendant's vehicle if it left the vicinity of his apartment. The officers who issued that instruction had obtained a search warrant for defendant's apartment, but not an arrest warrant. The defendant was nevertheless detained (in handcuffs) until the search warrant was executed. After the apartment search was concluded, the officers obtained a search warrant to search the defendant's automobile and, allegedly, found a small quantity of drugs in the car later that evening.
It is unnecessary to reach a firm conclusion as to whether the defendant was arrested when he was detained, or as to whether such arrest was illegal. No evidence was obtained as a result of the arrest. The legality of the alleged arrest was simply not an issue at trial. Defendant's conviction was based upon the drugs found in his apartment, together with the testimony of the co-defendant Durham. It should be noted that the defendant was acquitted of the charges relating to the small quantity of drugs allegedly found in his vehicle.
The defendant further contends that he was prejudiced by the government's refusal to disclose the identity of a confidential informant, and by the court's refusal to require the government to make that disclosure. The informant in question had initially caused the police to focus upon the defendant as a suspect, by causing the police to believe that the defendant was a drug dealer. The government's decision not to disclose the identity of the informant was based upon the assertion that the informant is continuing to provide valuable information with respect to drug activities, and that disclosure of his identity would hamper other ongoing investigations and, more importantly, would endanger his life. In the course of the trial, I conducted a brief in-camera review of certain police records, and satisfied myself that there were indeed other ongoing investigations in which the confidential informant seemed to be involved. My denial of the defendant's motion for disclosure was expressly conditioned upon precluding the government from bringing to the jury's attention any information supplied by the informant.
Disclosure of the informant's identity was not essential to the validity of the search warrant; the affidavit of probable cause made clear that the officers believed the informant to be reliable, and that he had provided reliable information on various previous occasions. The search warrant was validly issued, and the officers had no reason to fail to execute it.
The defendant argues that the searching officers exceeded the scope of the warrant when they took possession of not only the narcotics and weapons, but also various items of jewelry and cash. It was entirely reasonable for the searching officers to seize the cash, as perhaps representing proceeds of drug activity. I assume the seizure of jewelry did exceed the scope of the warrant, but that is, for present purposes, entirely irrelevant.
Defendant testified at trial, and was cross-examined at some length concerning a series of cash deposits which he had made in various bank accounts, and concerning various other financial records pertaining to him. The only objection expressed at trial was that the government had only recently obtained the records, and had not disclosed them to defense counsel. That objection was overruled, and the cross-examination continued. I concluded that the failure to disclose the records to defense counsel before trial did not preclude their use in cross-examination; obviously, the defendant was at least as familiar with those records as the government. And it should surprise no one that a defendant accused of being a large-scale drug dealer could expect to be cross-examined about his financial dealings, if he testified at trial.
To summarize, the evidence at trial was amply sufficient to support the verdict, and the defendant has advanced no adequate reason for granting a new trial. Indeed, the defendant's motion does not seek a new trial; his brief merely "joins in the argument being made on behalf of Mr. Jackson," who did seek a new trial.
An Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of October 2004, upon consideration of the post-trial motion of the defendant Clifford Taliaferro, IT IS ORDERED:
1. That the defendant's motion is DENIED.