Opinion
No. 09-30012.
Argued and Submitted November 2, 2009.
Filed November 24, 2009.
Carl Andrew Colasurdo, Special Assistant U.S., Helen J. Brunner, Esquire, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Lynn Hartfield, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender's Office, Seattle, WA, for Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 2:07-cr-00337-JLR.
Before: ALARCÓN, FERNANDEZ and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Stacy Earl Stith appeals his conviction on drug charges based on three alleged trial errors. While the issues Stith raises might require reversal in an appropriate case, the overwhelming evidence against Stith's entrapment defense rendered any error harmless. We affirm.
We assume without deciding that the government's cross-examination regarding Stith's prior not-guilty pleas infringed on Stith's constitutional right to be proved guilty of those charges beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Norris, 910 F.2d 1246, 1247 (5th Cir. 1990). We need not decide that issue because even if there was error, it was harmless.
The amount of drugs that Stith had with him when he was arrested, his conduct in recorded telephone calls, and his implausible explanation of the informant's scheme leave us convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that any error was harmless. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). The evidence against Stith's entrapment defense was overwhelming. Cf. United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (considering the weight of evidence in determining whether an officer's comments on a defendant's silence were harmless); United States v. Nobari, 574 F.3d 1065, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2009) (considering the same in determining whether a prosecutor's misconduct was harmless).
The evidence against Stith also resolves the remaining issues because more deferential standards of review apply to non-constitutional and unpreserved errors. Assuming there was improper admission of hearsay, that testimony more probably than not had no material affect the verdict. See United States v. Seschillie, 310 F.3d 1208, 1214 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Rangel, 534 F.2d 147, 149 (9th Cir. 1976). And assuming that the unpreserved Confrontation Clause error occurred, it did not affect Stith's substantial rights. See United States v. Ramirez, 537 F.3d 1075, 1086 (9th Cir. 2008).
We do not conclude that the cumulative effect of the errors "rendered the criminal defense far less persuasive and thereby had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury's verdict." Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 928 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations omitted); see also Nobari, 574 F.3d at 1083. Stith's entrapment defense would have been unpersuasive in an errorless trial.
AFFIRMED.