In the Santos decision, Justice Stevens' opinion resolved the case on the narrowest grounds and sets forth the Court's holding. The Eighth Circuit first addressed the Santos decision in United States v. Spencer, 592 F.3d 866 (8th Cir.2010), a case in which one of the defendants was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and money laundering. In the Spencer case, the Eighth Circuit stated: “Santos holds that, in the context of a gambling organization, the word “proceeds” in the money-laundering statute refers to profit, not gross revenue,” 592 F.3d at 879.
“This court's standard of review when no motion for a mistrial was made at trial is only for plain error.” United States v. Spencer, 592 F.3d 866, 880 (8th Cir.2010). See also United States v. Behler, 14 F.3d 1264, 1268 (8th Cir.1994) (“Behler failed to object to the procedures used by the district court or to request a mistrial after the district court spoke with the jurors.
Because Rubashkin's arguments challenge the sufficiency of the evidence and federal statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. United States v. Spencer, 592 F.3d 866, 879 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Stanko, 491 F.3d 408, 413 (8th Cir. 2007). The offense of money laundering prohibits conduct by one who "knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity . . . with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity . . . or knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity. . . ."
On plain error review, we reverse "only if the error prejudices the substantial rights of a party and would result in a miscarriage of justice if left uncorrected." United States v. Spencer, 592 F.3d 866, 880 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Waldman, 310 F.3d 1074, 1078 (8th Cir. 2002)). Robertson first challenges three statements the Government elicited from F.S.'s mother, Rayone. Rayone testified that when F.S. came into the house crying, followed closely by Robertson, F.S. said, "Mom, he done something to me.
In similar cases, we have explained that an informant's statements in a recorded conversation with a defendant are admissible because they provide context for the defendant's statements. See White, 962 F.3d at 1055; United States v. Spencer, 592 F.3d 866, 879 (8th Cir. 2010). The defendant's statements are admissible as admissions of a party-opponent.
361 U.S. 212, 216, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) (quoting Ex parte Bain , 121 U.S. 1, 13, 7 S.Ct. 781, 30 L.Ed. 849 (1887) ); see also United States v. Spencer , 592 F.3d 866, 873 (8th Cir. 2010) ("A constructive amendment of an indictment occurs when jury instructions broaden the scope of an indictment by permitting a conviction for an uncharged offense."). Bender's case, however, is distinguishable from Stirone .
Bender relies on Stirone v. United States, in which the Supreme Court reversed a defendant's conviction because the conviction "no longer [reflected] the indictment of the grand jury." 361 U.S. 212, 216 (1960) (quoting Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 13 (1887)); see also United States v. Spencer, 592 F.3d 866, 873 (8th Cir. 2010) ("A constructive amendment of an indictment occurs when jury instructions broaden the scope of an indictment by permitting a conviction for an uncharged offense."). Bender's case, however, is distinguishable from Stirone.
United States v. Phythian, 529 F.3d 807, 813 (8th Cir.2008) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)). “[C]ircumstantial evidence of a defendant's lack of legitimate income sufficiently establishes that funds defendant used to purchase ... property are drug proceeds.” United States v. Spencer, 592 F.3d 866, 879 (8th Cir.2010) (citing Pizano, 421 F.3d at 723). Relying on Wilson's and the forensic accountant's testimonies, Davis contends the government failed to prove Davis “engaged in money laundering with [illegal drug proceeds].”
Id. at 841. Thus, Joyce “turned on whether it was the defendant himself—rather than a third party—who ended the chain of events leading toward, but not resulting in, the commission of a substantive crime,” Burks, 135 F.3d at 584, as have subsequent decisions, see, e.g., United States v. Spencer, 592 F.3d 866, 878 (8th Cir.2010); Burks, 135 F.3d at 584; United States v. Jonsson, 15 F.3d 759, 762 (8th Cir.1994); Mims, 812 F.2d at 1078. Here, “the government, not the defendant, ended the chain of events.”
"The Confrontation Clause bars `admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.'" United States v. Spencer, 592 F.3d 866, 878 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004)). We review de novo Holmes' constitutional challenge.