See United States v. Mills, 987 F.2d 1311, 1315 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 403, 126 L.Ed.2d 351 (1993). We conclude that the note Bell handed to the teller expressed a sufficient immediate threat of death to warrant the two-level increase, see United States v. Smith, 973 F.2d 1374, 1378 (8th Cir. 1992), and that the district court did not err in imposing a consecutive sentence. See United States v. Glasener, 981 F.2d 973, 975-76 (8th Cir. 1992).

The Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have also addressed what constitutes an "express threat of death" under the Guidelines. In United States v. Smith, 973 F.2d 1374 (8th Cir. 1992), a defendant who had been found guilty of two counts of bank robbery, handed a teller a note stating, "Please give me all your hundreds, fifties, and twenties." Smith, 973 F.2d at 1375.

A robber need not be armed in order to make an express threat of death. Whether a bank robber actually has a gun during the robbery is immaterial to the express threat of death determination, United States v. Hunn, 24 F.3d 994, 997 n. 5 (7th Cir. 1994), because an unarmed robber may make an express threat of death, United States v. Smith, 973 F.2d 1374, 1378 (8th Cir. 1992), as may an armed robber when the victim is unaware that the robber has a weapon, United States v. Robinson, 20 F.3d 270, 276-77 (7th Cir. 1994). The crucial determination, as we discuss below, is whether a reasonable victim would fear for his or her life because of the robber's actions.

¶ 47. In United States v. Smith, 973 F.2d 1374 (8th Cir. 1992), when the defendant's wife opened the door, the officers drew their weapons and told her they were looking for the defendant. Id. at 1375.

Mr. Hill also argues that Ms. Orozco's testimony established that she was not afraid of him. Even if this were the case, which it is not, this argument is misplaced because Ms. Orozco's subjective feelings are irrelevant. Smith, 131 F.3d at 687-88; United States v. McCarty, 36 F.3d 1349, 1357 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Smith, 973 F.2d 1374, 1377 (8th Cir. 1992). Rather, the intimidation element has an objective test: would the defendant's acts cause an ordinary person to reasonably feel threatened? McCarty, 36 F.3d at 1357; Smith, 973 F.2d at 1377.

hreat to shoot a firearm at a person during a robbery, created by an combination of threats or gestures that would put ordinary victim in reasonable fear of his life is express threat of death); United States v. France, 57 F.3d 865, 866-68 (9th Cir. 1995) (adopting view of other circuits that statements and other conduct may constitute express threat of death in absence of robber's explicit threat to kill victim); United States v. Hunn, 24 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 1994) (rejecting restrictive reading of guideline); United States v. Robinson, 20 F.3d 270, 276-77 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding without detailed exposition that "I have a gun and am not afraid to use it" warranted enhancement); United States v. Lambert, 995 F.2d 1006, 1008 (10th Cir.) (stating without detailed discussion that robber's statement to teller to put money in bag or "the person behind me will shoot someone" is considered an express threat under the guidelines, citing the commentary), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 333 (1993); United States v. Smith, 973 F.2d 1374, 1378 (8th Cir. 1992) (concluding that combination of threatening teller with statement "You don't want to find out" and appearance as if he had gun under his coat constituted express threat of death); United States v. Strandberg, 952 F.2d 1149, 1151 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that "[s]ection 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) does not require that the defendant state that he intends to kill the teller if his demands are not met"). In so ruling, these courts have looked to the commentary to Section(s) 2B3.1(b)(2)(F), which provides:

The Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have followed reasoning similar to that in Strandberg and Eaton, holding that statements and other conduct sufficed to find an "express threat of death" in the absence of a robber's explicit threat to kill the victim. See United States v. Hunn, 24 F.3d 994, 996-98 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Bell, 12 F.3d 139, 140 (8th Cir. 1993) (following United States v. Smith, 973 F.2d 1374, 1375 (8th Cir. 1992) (when teller asked robber if he was joking, robber said "You don't want to find out," and kept his hand under his coat as if he had a gun)); United States v. Lambert, 995 F.2d 1006, 1008 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 333, 126 L.Ed.2d 278 (1993). Compare Moore, 6 F.3d at 722 (appearing to require mention of death to the victim teller in the demand note) with Strandberg, 952 F.2d at 1151 ("Section 2B3.1(b)(2) (F) does not require that the defendant state that he intends to kill the teller if his demands are not met.").

Id. A reversal is in order only if we conclude that a reasonable factfinder could not have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Smith, 973 F.2d 1374, 1377 (8th Cir. 1992). In this case, without doubt, there was sufficient evidence of intimidation. First, Smith's attack on the inconsistent testimony of Ferguson and Webster goes solely to credibility.

This was held admissible to show his lack of character for truthfulness—method (1). See United States v. Smith , 973 F.2d 1374, 1378–79 (8th Cir. 1992). See also Balogun , 463 Fed. Appx. at 483 (statement of testifying defendant).

Furthermore, we have held gestures and actions like those made by Parks constituted implied consent in similar encounters. See United States v. Smith, 973 F.2d 1374, 1376 (8th Cir. 1992) (implying consent when the defendant's wife stepped aside and motioned for officers to enter); United States v. Turbyfill, 525 F.2d 57, 59 (8th Cir. 1975) (implying consent when the defendant's wife opened the door and stepped back to let officers enter); see also United States v. Ramirez – Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 752 (11th Cir. 2002) (implicit consent to enter trailer found based on testimony that the defendant's body language indicated that he yielded the right of way to the officers). Finally, Faler's “more logical conclusion” argument is conjecture and does not demonstrate clear error on the part of the district court.