Summary
In Sherman, the defendant was arrested on May 2, 2004, for influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a federal official and for assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain officers or employees — charges that are virtually identical to those in the present case.
Summary of this case from U.S. v. SheetsOpinion
CR 04-1179-TUC-CKJ.
April 27, 2006
ORDER
Pending before the Court is the Government's request to involuntarily medicate Defendant. For the reasons stated below, the request is denied.
I. Background
On 5/2/04, Defendant was arrested for Influencing, Impeding, or Retaliating against a Federal Official and for Assaulting, Resisting, or Impeding Certain Officers or Employees. On 5/5/04, Magistrate Judge Marshall ordered Defendant detained and further ordered a mental health evaluation. See Doc. #'s 4-6. On 6/10/04, Magistrate Judge Fiora held a status hearing whereby she noted that the Competency Evaluation found that Defendant was not competent to stand trial, both parties stipulated to this finding, and it was ordered that Defendant be committed to the appropriate facility to possibly restore competency. See Doc. #10; see also Doc. #11 (Psychiatric Evaluation of Defendant).
On 9/24/04, another status hearing was held before Magistrate Judge Fiora whereby the minute entry recognized that: "On June 6, 2004, the Magistrate Judge ordered that the defendant was not competent to go forward in this matter. By an error of the clerk, the U.S. Marshal's office was never notified. Gerard Guerin states that he will file a formal motion and order for the court today to commit this defendant to the appropriate facility for treatment and possible restoration." See Doc. #12. That same day, on 9/24/04, a formal order was entered by Magistrate Judge Edmonds which stated that Defendant "shall be transported forthwith to the custody of the Attorney General . . . pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241 . . . for a period not to exceed four months. The Attorney General . . . shall hospitalize the defendant in a suitable facility for a reasonable period of time as is necessary to allow the defendant to undergo treatment to restore his competency to stand trial and to undergo a psychiatric evaluation in order to determine whether he was insane at the time of the offense and whether he is suffering from a mental disease or defect." See Doc. #15.
On 11/5/04, Magistrate Judge Fiora granted the Bureau of Prisons' ("BOP") request that the evaluation period begin on 10/20/04 (the day Defendant was admitted to the Butner, NC Mental Health Unit) and the 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) evaluation period would end on 2/15/05. See Doc. #16. In March of 2005, a copy of the forensic evaluation of Defendant was given to Magistrate Judge Fiora; the evaluation concluded that Defendant was insane at the time of the offenses in question, was not competent to stand trial, and could not be restored to competency unless involuntarily medicated. On 4/7/05, Magistrate Judge Edmonds set a status hearing for April 18, 2005; however, at the request of defense counsel who wanted more time to review the mental health reports, the status hearing was continued to 4/26/05. See Doc. #'s 17-18. As reflected in the minute order pertaining to the 4/26/05 status conference held by Magistrate Judge Edmonds, the parties had reviewed the Sell case, probation was ordered to prepare a report calculating the likely guidelines sentence, and the court stated that it would contact the physician who treated Defendant to set up a hearing. See Doc. #19. On 5/6/05, due to her retirement, Magistrate Judge Fiora referred the case to Magistrate Judge Estrada. See Doc. #20.
On 5/19/05, Magistrate Judge Edmonds set a video conference hearing regarding Defendant's competency; the hearing was held on 6/20/05. See Doc. #'s 22, 24. As she stated at the outset of the hearing: "[W]e are here for a hearing pursuant to Sell . . . we have received a report from the Bureau of Prisons medical staff at Butner indicating that it is their belief that Mr. Sherman is not competent to proceed to trial. And they have asked this Court to order that he be forced to take psychotropic medications against his will in order to restore his competency in this matter. That is why we're holding this hearing." See Transcript at 3. Dr. Jill R. Grant (staff psychologist at Butner) and Dr. Peter Quintieri (a fellow in forensic psychiatry at Butner) were involved in treating Defendant and appeared at the hearing to testify.
As Dr. Grant made clear, they were never specifically ordered to evaluate dangerousness (they were only ordered to evaluate criminal responsibility and competency issues), that the dangerousness evaluation usually occurs only after the competency evaluation, and therefore dangerousness was never evaluated by any experts. See Transcript of Hearing at 13, 23. Rather, they only evaluated him for dangerousness in the facility, as opposed to dangerousness in the community pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246. See id. at 23. However, Dr. Grant did testify that Defendant was not criminally responsible at the time of the crimes in question, that he is not competent as he suffers from a delusional psychotic disorder (the persecutory type) which is typically treated by anti-psychotic medications, and she thinks that psychological counseling would not be helpful without the medications. See id. at 21, 24. Dr. Quintieri testified that the common side effect of the medications in question was sedation, but the sedation side effect could be lessened by adjustment of the doses of the medications. See id. at 27. He also testified that his medical record shows that Defendant previously reacted well to these medications within 4-6 weeks, and there was no record of Defendant having adverse reactions to the medications See id. at 27-28, 31. Lastly, Dr. Quintieri concluded that counseling alone would not improve Defendant's condition, and only medication could restore his competency. See id. at 29.
Near the end of the 6/20/05 hearing, Magistrate Judge Edmonds asked: "Now what's the feeling of either counsel that we should have the Bureau of Prisons do a report on the issue of dangerousness . . . [in relation] to the statute [i.e., 18 U.S.C. § 4246]. See id. at 35. In response, the Government stated "the Government would request it . . ." Id. Defense counsel, Paul Bates, also stated in response: "Judge, I have no objection . . ." Id. As such, Magistrate Judge Edmonds stated: "I will order then . . . that the Bureau of Prisons do a dangerousness analysis pursuant to the statute [i.e., 18 U.S.C. § 4246] . . ." See id. at 36. In addition, the 6/20/05 minute entry stated: "COURT ORDERS the following: 1) Bureau of Prisons is to prepare a dangerousness analysis pursuant to the statute . . ." See Doc. #24.
Mr. Bates also indicated that he did not intend to obtain his own expert. See Transcript of Hearing at 39. Mr. Bates again indicated at the 10/28/05 status conference that he did not intend to obtain his own expert in light of the government experts who had already concluded that Defendant was not criminally responsible and was presently incompetent to stand trial.
Thereafter, the Government filed a Motion to Compel medication on 6/30/05, and the next entry in the docket is on 10/24/05 whereby Defense counsel requested a status conference. See Doc. #'s 25, 27. As of 10/24/05, there was no indication in the record that the relevant authorities at the Bureau of Prisons were notified, or that an actual dangerousness analysis had occurred, or that the Bureau of Prisons was in the process of conducting a dangerousness analysis pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246.
As such, this Court began managing the case and held a status conference on 10/28/05. The Court indicated that the Government likely did not have a compelling interest to compel involuntary medication pursuant to Sell as the Government's own experts stated that Defendant was not criminally responsible for the offenses in question. Thereafter, the Court ordered the parties to submit briefs regarding civil commitment procedures pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246 no later than 11/14/05. See Doc. #'s 32, 33. After reviewing the briefs, relevant law and holding a hearing on 11/28/05, this Court ordered that Defendant be committed to the custody of the Federal Medical Facility in Butner, North Carolina ("FMC") pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246; the FMC was ordered to evaluate Defendant to "determine whether the defendant is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another." See Doc. #34. In March of 2006, this Court received the FMC's forensic evaluation which concluded that Defendant does not meet the statutory criteria for dangerousness as outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 4246. As such, as the Government concedes, the civil commitment procedures under § 4246 are inapplicable. See Doc. #41. In light of the most recent evaluation from the FMC, this Court held another status conference on 3/23/06 and asked the parties to submit additional briefing on the pending issue of involuntarily medicating Defendant. See Doc. #39. This Court received the additional briefing from the parties on 4/17/06 and 4/20/06. See Doc. #'s 41, 43. As of the date of this Order, all of the forensic mental health evaluations conclude that Defendant was insane at the time of the offenses in question, Defendant is incompetent to stand trial, and Defendant's mental disease or defect would not create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to the property of another if Defendant were released from custody. In light of these facts, the Court will discuss the appropriateness of the Government's request to involuntarily medicate Defendant.
II. Discussion
In support of its request to involuntarily medicate Defendant, the Government essentially argues that due to Defendant's criminal history of engaging in threatening behavior similar to the instant charges, the Government has an important interest in involuntarily medicating Defendant such that he is restored to competency for trial. The Government argues that: "Forced medication will significantly further those interests in that forced medication will restore the defendant to competency and allow the case to be adjudicated. In light of the apparent unavailability of 18 U.S.C. Section 4246, adjudication and conditional release under a prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4243(e) would address state interests and also be in the best interest of the defendant." See Doc. # 41 (Government's Brief at 3).
While there is no question that it would likely be in Defendant's best interest to have a prescribed regimen of psychiatric treatment given the consistent record of his continuing mental disease or defect, the Court is without authority to order the involuntary medication of Defendant in light of recent Supreme Court authority and the undisputed facts in this case.
In Sell v. U.S., the Supreme Court discussed the four requirements for involuntarily medicating a defendant. See 539 U.S. 166. The Court in Sell stated in relevant part:
First, a court must find that important governmental interests are at stake . . . Second, the court must conclude that involuntary medication will significantly further those concomitant state interests . . . Third, the court must conclude that involuntary medication is necessary to further those interests . . . Fourth . . . the court must conclude that administration of the drugs is medically appropriate, i.e., in the patient's best medical interest in light of his medical condition.Id. at 180-181(emphasis in the original); see also U.S. v. Rivera-Guerrero, 426 F.3d 1130, 1136-1137 (9th Cir. 2005). As the Ninth Circuit discussed subsequent to Sell, the Supreme Court has recognized "a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of anti-psychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . Sell orders are disfavored . . . the [Supreme] Court's [decisions reflect] reluctance to permit involuntary medication except in rare circumstances." Rivera-Guerrero, 426 F.3d at 1136-1137.
The Government can not meet the first two requirements under the Sell decision to forcibly medicate Defendant. While the Supreme Court has recognized that the "Government's interest in bringing to trial an individual accused of a serious crime is important . . . Courts, however, must consider the facts of the individual case in evaluating the Government's interest in prosecution. Special circumstances may lessen the importance of that interest." Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. Under the unique circumstances of this case, the Government's important interest in prosecution has been significantly reduced; further, those significantly lessened interests would not be advanced by involuntarily medicating Defendant. As the undisputed record in this case demonstrates, Defendant was insane at the time of the offenses in question; both of the forensic evaluations from the FMC make this conclusion. In light of these findings, and the lack of anything in the record to demonstrate otherwise, it appears to be a near certainty that a jury would have to conclude that Defendant would be not guilty by reason of insanity. Indeed, the Government seems to concede this fact. In its brief, the Government seeks to involuntarily medicate Defendant such that the case can be adjudicated and he can ultimately be given psychiatric treatment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4243(e). However, as § 4243 is only triggered if a defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity, the Government's primary purpose to proceed to trial is to get an inevitable not guilty by reason of insanity verdict triggering § 4243. See 18 U.S.C. § 4243(a). Section 4243, however, allows the continued detainment of a defendant and an accompanying regimen of psychiatric treatment only if it is determined that the defendant's release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to another's property. See 18 U.S.C. § 4243(d), (e), and (f). As the FMC officials have already concluded that defendant's release would not create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to another's property in relation to their evaluation under 18 U.S.C. § 4246, § 4243 would ultimately be inapplicable and defendant would have to be released from custody forthwith.
Accordingly, in light of these considerations, the Government's interest in involuntarily medicating Defendant to restore his competency for trial is minimal as Defendant will almost surely be found not guilty by reason of insanity. Further, the Government's interest of proceeding to trial in order to invoke the procedures under § 4243 is slight as these provisions would essentially be inapplicable as the FMC has already concluded that Defendant's release would not present a substantial risk of bodily injury to another or serious property damage to another. Lastly, involuntary medicating Defendant will not significantly further the Government's interests which have been seriously undermined due to the unique circumstances of this case; as Defendant would likely be found not guilty by reason of insanity and the substantive provisions of § 4243 would be totally inapplicable, the interests in question would not be furthered whatsoever, let alone significantly furthered. Therefore, the Court finds that the first two requirements of the Sell case have not been satisfied, and the Government's request for involuntary medication must be denied.
In light of this ruling, the Government may seek to voluntarily dismiss this case. The Government's options are quite limited as the following is currently undisputed:(1) Defendant was insane at the time of the offenses in question, (2) Defendant is incompetent to stand trial, (3) Defendant can only be restored to competency through forced medication, (4) Defendant can not be forcibly medicated pursuant to the Sell case; (5) Defendant therefore can not be restored to competency for trial and (6) 18 U.S.C. § 4243 and § 4246 are inapplicable as Defendant does not present a substantial risk of causing bodily injury to another or serious damage to another's property. While Defendant has informally requested dismissal of this case, the Court is unaware of an official motion filed with the Court specifically requesting an involuntary dismissal supported by relevant authority. As such, if the Government is unwilling to voluntarily dismiss the case, the Defendant shall inform the Court and file an appropriate written motion to dismiss supported by authority no later than May 29, 2006.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
(1) The Government's request to involuntarily medicate Defendant is denied.