U.S. v. Santos-Vanegas

28 Citing cases

  1. U.S. v. Rodriguez

    420 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 2005)   Cited 23 times
    Holding deportation proceedings did not deprive alien of right to judicial review because he failed to appeal deportation order "to the BIA and, if unsuccessful there, to a court of appeals"

    "Actual prejudice exists where defects in the deportation proceedings `may well have resulted in a deportation that would not otherwise have occurred.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Santos-Vanegas, 878 F.2d 247, 251 (8th Cir. 1989)). Rodriguez argues that he was deprived of judicial review.

  2. U.S. v. Fernandez-Antonia

    278 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2002)   Cited 156 times
    Holding that prejudice requires defendant to show that "absent the procedural errors, he would not have been removed"

    The courts of appeals that have addressed this question have unanimously required a similar showing of prejudice. See United States v. Lopez-Vasquez, 227 F.3d 476, 483 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that an alien must show fundamental unfairness, denial of direct review and actual prejudice); United States v. Wittgenstein, 163 F.3d 1164, 1170-71 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that a showing of fundamental unfairness requires a showing of prejudice); United States v. Loaisiga, 104 F.3d 484, 488-89 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that a collateral attack could not succeed because there was no prejudicial error); United States v. Espinoza-Farlo, 34 F.3d 469, 471 (7th Cir. 1994) (agreeing with other circuits that require a showing of prejudice in addition to a showing of no direct review); United States v. Proa-Tovar, 975 F.2d 592, 595 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming prior case law requiring prejudice); United States v. Santos-Vanegas, 878 F.2d 247, 251 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that a "successful collateral attack on a deportation order requires a showing of actual prejudice"); United States v. Holland, 876 F.2d 1533, 1536 (11th Cir. 1989) (noting that "[c]aselaw . . . indicates that fundamental unfairness requires a showing that specific errors prejudiced the defendant"). Fernandez-Antonia concedes that a showing of prejudice is required but contends that our decision in United States v. Paredes-Batista allows him to show prejudice merely by demonstrating procedural flaws in the removal proceeding.

  3. U.S. v. Martinez-Amaya

    67 F.3d 678 (8th Cir. 1995)   Cited 29 times

    The law in this circuit, however, places the burden of proof on an alien seeking to collaterally attack the prior deportation to prove both (1) a due process defect in the prior deportation proceeding and (2) actual prejudice. See United States v. Santos-Vanegas, 878 F.2d 247, 250-51 (8th Cir. 1989) (Santos-Vanegas); United States v. Polanco-Gomez, 841 F.2d 235, 236-37 (8th Cir. 1988) (Polanco-Gomez). Martinez-Amaya cites United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 781 F.3d 111, 112-13 (8th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 481 U.S. 828, 107 S.Ct. 2148, 95 L.Ed.2d 772 (1987) (Mendoza-Lopez), for the proposition that "when prosecuting a section 1326 proceeding, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant illegally entered the United States after being deported according to law."

  4. U.S. v. Proa-Tovar

    975 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1992)   Cited 100 times
    Holding that a due process error in a deportation proceeding must cause actual prejudice for the proceeding to be declared invalid

    We are confirmed in our view by the decisions of other circuits which have addressed this issue and have reached the conclusion that we reach today. See United States v. Encarnacion-Galvez, 964 F.2d 402 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Santos-Vanegas, 878 F.2d 247, 251-52 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Holland, 876 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1989). We recognize, as did the Court, that there may well be times when the administrative proceedings were so flawed that effective judicial review will be foreclosed. No doubt there will be instances when the very lack of an appeal from the IJ to the Board of Immigration Appeals and thence to the courts will preclude the exercise of discretionary authority that might have prevented the deportation itself.

  5. U.S. v. Proa-Tovar

    945 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1991)   Cited 16 times
    Rejecting a requirement that the defendant show prejudice

    Other circuits have interpreted Mendoza-Lopez to require a showing of prejudice in the collateral challenge. See, e.g., United States v. Santos-Vanegas, 878 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Holland, 876 F.2d 1533, 1536 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Palacios-Martinez, 845 F.2d 89, 91 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 844, 109 S.Ct. 119, 102 L.Ed.2d 92 (1988). We believe it to be a better reading of Mendoza-Lopez to read it as a bright-line rule and to encourage the INS to make certain that every person deported as the result of an administrative hearing was adequately apprised, on the record, of his right to appeal.

  6. United States v. Lopez-Rodriguez

    Crim. Case No. 17-0022 (DRD) (D.P.R. Sep. 13, 2017)   Cited 1 times

    Prejudice in a deportation proceeding is present when it "may well have resulted in a deportation that would not have otherwise occurred." United States v. Santos-Vanegas, 878 F.2d 247, 251 (8th Cir. 1989). III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

  7. United States v. Sanchez

    CASE NO. 14-CR-51 (MJD/TNL) (D. Minn. Jul. 21, 2014)

    Id. (citing United States v. Santos-Vanegas, 878 F.2d 247, 250-51 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Polanco-Gomez, 841 F.2d 235, 236-37 (8th Cir. 1988)).

  8. U.S. v. Arango-Chairez

    875 F. Supp. 609 (D. Neb. 1994)   Cited 7 times
    In United States v. Arango-Chairez, 875 F.Supp. 609 (D. Neb. 1994), the telephone interrogation took place while the defendant was incarcerated.

    Due process requires that defendant be allowed to collaterally attack the use of a deportation proceeding as an element of a criminal offense where that proceeding "effectively eliminates [his] right to obtain judicial review." United States v. Santos-Vanegas, 878 F.2d 247, 250 (8th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 839, 107 S.Ct. 2148, 2156, 95 L.Ed.2d 772 (1987)). To successfully challenge his 1987 deportation hearing, defendant must show that the alleged failure to notify him of his right to contact the consulate: (1) was a fundamental procedural error functionally depriving defendant of his right to judicial review; and (2) defendant was actually prejudiced as a result.

  9. United States v. Yan Naing

    820 F.3d 1006 (8th Cir. 2016)   Cited 9 times
    Characterizing the separate motion to be filed under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) as "a motion in limine in the district court," not a motion to dismiss the indictment

    But in the context these statements are best understood as referring to an appeal to the BIA, not a federal court, not least because there is no right to direct judicial review of an IJ's order. Nonetheless, we reject Naing's contention. It is true that we have held that a mere failure to advise an alien in a deportation proceeding of his right to judicial review ordinarily precludes the government from later using that deportation proceeding as a predicate for a criminal offense against him. See United States v. Santos–Vanegas, 878 F.2d 247, 251 (8th Cir.1989). But in this case Naing can show no resulting prejudice.

  10. U.S. v. Varela-Cias

    425 F. App'x 756 (10th Cir. 2011)   Cited 3 times
    Holding that even though the immigration judge incorrectly informed the defendant of his eligibility for relief, the defendant was not deprived of his opportunity for judicial review because the judge informed him of his right to appeal

    In so arguing, Varela-Cias asks us to follow the precedent set forth in United States v. Santos-Vanegas, in which the Eighth Circuit held that the IJ has an obligation to inform the alien of "his opportunity to pursue further challenge in federal court." 878 F.2d 247, 251 (8th Cir. 1989). We decline to address this argument because Varela-Cias never argued in the district court that the IJ should have informed him of his right to file an appeal in federal court.