U.S. v. Sandifer

13 Citing cases

  1. U.S. v. Jiminez-Perez

    238 F.3d 970 (8th Cir. 2001)   Cited 36 times

    I. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, as we must when considering the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict, United States v. Sandifer, 188 F.3d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 1999), a reasonable juror could have found the following. From approximately 1998 through 1999, Jose Girmaldo, Eduardo Morones, and Arturo Quintero-Jiminez, were major actors in a conspiracy to bring methamphetamine from California to Iowa for distribution. Another coconspirator, Jacqueline Cockerham Jass, cooperated as an undercover informant after her arrest in June of 1998. Jass testified that she began purchasing methamphetamine from Jose Girmaldo in Marshalltown, Iowa. Girmaldo told Jass that the methamphetamine he and "his friends" distribute comes to Iowa from California and is transported inside hidden compartments of cars. He later introduced Jass to "his friends," Eduardo Morones and three others, who began to supply Jass's methamphetamine needs because they lived closer to her.

  2. U.S. v. Mayo

    642 F.3d 628 (8th Cir. 2011)   Cited 22 times
    Affirming restrictions on computer access where the defendant used his computer to communicate with a minor and transmit graphic videos of himself

    Such findings may be based on any information other than materially false information. Boston, 494 F.3d at 668 (citing United States v. Sandifer, 188 F.3d 992, 994 (8th Cir. 1999)). Mayo contends that special condition 4, which bars him from possessing pornography in any form, was not reasonably related to the statutory requirements of § 3583(d) and was greater than reasonably necessary.

  3. U.S. v. Allebach

    526 F.3d 385 (8th Cir. 2008)   Cited 39 times
    Holding that "two plastic bags with cocaine residue, two corners torn from plastic bags, Brillo pads, a film canister with white residue . . . were sufficient to establish probable cause that cocaine was being possessed and consumed in [defendant's] residence" (footnotes omitted)

    "Plastic sandwich bags with the corners torn . . . are commonly used to distribute crack." United States v. Sandifer, 188 F.3d 992, 993 (8th Cir. 1999). Brillo pads can be used as filters for crack pipes.

  4. U.S.A. v. Boston

    494 F.3d 660 (8th Cir. 2007)   Cited 64 times
    Holding that “the condition in prohibiting his access to sexually explicit material involving adults is not overly broad” for defendant convicted of producing child pornography in light of his “history of sexual offenses”

    Such findings may be based on any information other than materially false information. See United States v. Sandifer, 188 F.3d 992, 994 (8th Cir.1999). The special condition here, prohibiting Boston from accessing or possessing a computer without written approval of his probation officer, did not constitute an abuse of discretion because it was not absolute and because evidence was presented at the suppression hearing that Boston had used a computer to print out images of child pornography which could easily have been done for the purpose of transferring them to others.

  5. U.S. v. Peters

    462 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 2006)   Cited 80 times
    Noting that because direct evidence of a defendant's mental state is often unavailable, the jury is permitted to scrutinize and make reasonable inferences from a defendant's conduct as well as the facts and circumstances pertaining to the incident

    We will reverse the jury's verdict only if the jury "must have had a reasonable doubt concerning one of the essential elements of the crime." United States v. Sandifer, 188 F.3d 992, 995 (8th Cir.1999). We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion.

  6. U.S. v. Pizano

    421 F.3d 707 (8th Cir. 2005)   Cited 74 times
    Holding that "the jury could infer that [the defendant] knew" that certain funds "were criminally derived" in part because the defendant attempted to conceal the funds' source

    "[We] will reverse only if the jury must have had a reasonable doubt concerning one of the essential elements of the crime." United States v. Sandifer, 188 F.3d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 1999). i. Bank Fraud

  7. U.S. v. Patten

    397 F.3d 1100 (8th Cir. 2005)   Cited 43 times
    Holding that inquiring into minor's sexual preferences and whether she would like to "hook up" constitutes sufficient evidence under § 2422(b)

    We "will reverse only if the jury must have had a reasonable doubt concerning one of the essential elements of the crime." United States v. Sandifer, 188 F.3d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 1999). The element of intent "need not be proved directly and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding a defendant's actions."

  8. U.S. v. Thropay

    394 F.3d 1004 (8th Cir. 2005)   Cited 12 times

    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution includes drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict. United States v. Sandifer, 188 F.3d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 1999). To prove that Mr. Thropay violated § 841(a)(1), the government had to show beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Thropay "knowingly possessed and intended to distribute" the cocaine hidden in the Saturn's dashboard. United States v. Sanchez, 252 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 2001).

  9. U.S. v. Blue

    255 F.3d 609 (8th Cir. 2001)   Cited 19 times
    Holding that a defendant who assaulted a child in the bathroom while his mother was present in the home had not been entrusted with the child, even though the child and his mother had been living with the defendant for six months

    We must uphold the verdict if there is substantial evidence that would allow any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Glasser, 315 U.S. at 80, 62 S.Ct. 457; United States v. Sandifer, 188 F.3d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 1999). A close reading of the record, which includes Blue's confession in which he admitted placing his penis in the child's mouth, convinces us that the district court did not err in finding that the government's evidence was sufficient to prove Blue's guilt and in denying Blue's motion for a judgment of acquittal.

  10. U.S. v. Jones

    275 F.3d 673 (8th Cir. 2001)   Cited 72 times
    Upholding the admissibility of a videotape of a drug transaction as direct evidence that defendant was involved in a drug conspiracy

    "We view the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, giving the verdict the benefit of all reasonable inferences, and [we] will reverse only if the jury must have had a reasonable doubt concerning one of the essential elements of the crime." United States v. Sandifer, 188 F.3d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 1999). In order to be convicted of conspiracy, a defendant must be shown to have knowingly entered into an agreement with at least one other person to violate the law.