U.S. v. Sanchez-Garcia

Full title: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JUAN C. SANCHEZ-GARCIA, Defendant

Court: United States District Court, D. Kansas

Date published: Oct 25, 2004

Case No. 03-20170-01-CM (D. Kan. Oct. 25, 2004)

Opinion

Case No. 03-20170-01-CM.

October 25, 2004

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CARLOS MURGUIA, District Judge

On August 5, 2004, following the trial of this matter, the jury found defendant guilty of Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the Superseding Indictment: possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, using and carrying a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, felon in possession of a firearm, and alien unlawfully in the United States in possession of a firearm. This matter comes before the court on defendant's Motion for New Trial and for Judgment of Acquittal Notwithstanding the Verdict (Doc. 68).

I. Background

Defendant claims that the government's closing argument at trial shifted the burden of proof, misstated the law on reasonable doubt, and violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. Defendant also claims that because no specific limiting instructions were given to the jury, and defense objections were overruled, defendant received a manifestly unjust trial.

Defendant also briefly argues that he should be acquitted pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 29 because the evidence at trial was circumstantial with regard to the drugs, and there was no evidence of knowledge.

During the trial, the government called nine witnesses, and defendant called one witness. The trial lasted approximately four days, and the jury deliberated less than an hour before finding defendant guilty of all four Counts.

II. Legal Standards ¹

1 In reviewing both a motion for new trial and a motion for judgment of acquittal, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government. United States v. Hughes, 191 F.3d 1317, 1321 (10^th Cir. 1999).

A. New Trial

A court may grant the defendant a new trial "if required in the interest of justice." Fed.R.Crim.P. 33. Courts view motions for new trial with disfavor and grant them only with great caution. United States v. Custodio, 141 F.3d 965, 966 (10^th Cir. 1998). The decision whether to grant a motion for new trial is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. United States v. Stevens, 978 F.2d 565, 570 (10^th Cir. 1992). The defendant has the burden of proving the necessity of a new trial. United States v. Walters, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1213 (D. Kan. 2000).

B. Judgment of Acquittal

The court must uphold the jury's guilty verdict if "`any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" United States v. Haber, 251 F.3d 881, 887 (10^th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Springfield, 196 F.3d 1180, 1184 (10^th Cir. 1999)). "The evidence necessary to support a verdict need not conclusively exclude every other reasonable hypothesis and need not negate all possibilities except guilt." United States v. Wood, 207 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10^th Cir. 2000).

III. Discussion

A. Motion for New Trial

In support of his motion for a new trial, defendant claims that the government made four improper statements during closing argument: (1) "now, during the course of this case, the defense brought a single witness forward to bring forth evidence that Mirissa Cribbet had possession of that vehicle. Although there are a number of other witnesses who, according to this one witness, had seen the same thing, that single witness was called to indicate . . ."; (2) "There was no information provided by any witness, including the defendant to Agent Backer during his interview to suggest that anyone else planted those items there, to suggest that someone else might be responsible"; (3) "Well, if there had just been a drug pick-up made, the drugs were hidden and they hadn't been cut up yet for distribution"; and (4) "He doesn't get the benefit of the doubt in this case. Thank you."

Defense counsel objected to the first three statements, but did not object to the fourth statement. The court overruled all three of defendant's objections, but did verbally instruct the jury that "what the attorneys say is not evidence" and "this is what they believe the evidence shows." The court also reminded the jury that they were to follow the instructions of law, and that they were to decide the facts from the evidence presented.

Defendant argues that, taken as a whole, the government's closing argument drew attention to defendant's failure to offer his own testimony, as well as the testimony of other witnesses, and stated that defendant was not entitled to reasonable doubt or the presumption of innocence. Accordingly, defendant claims that, because the court did not sustain any of defense counsel's objections, gave no curative instructions, and the trial and the closings were short (including the alleged inappropriate remarks by the government), defendant did not receive a fair trial.

"Improper statements by a prosecutor warrant a new trial only where they influenced the jury's verdict." United States v. Lester, 42 Fed. Appx. 257, 262 (10^th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Broomfield, 201 F.3d 1270, 1276-77; United States v. Oles, 994 F.2d 1519, 1524 (10^th Cir. 1993)). "The offending remark or action must be placed in the context of the whole trial, and not viewed in isolation." Torres v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1145, 1159 (10^th Cir. 2003). Moreover, "prosecutors have considerable latitude to respond to an argument made by opposing counsel." United States v. Hernandez-Muniz, 170 F.3d 1007, 1012 (10^th Cir. 1999).

With regard to the first two objectionable statements, the government argues that it was commenting not on defendant's failure to testify; rather, it was pointing out that there were other witnesses who could have corroborated the testimony of the one witness defendant chose to have testify, as well as highlighting defendant's inconsistent theories of who may have been responsible for the drugs and guns found in the car he was driving. Moreover, the government claims it was responding to arguments made by defense counsel during closing regarding the evidence.

With regard to the third and fourth statements, the government contends that they were made in direct response to arguments made by defense counsel during closing about the lack of corroborating evidence, and that the government simply commented on the evidence and asked the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence that was presented. The government points out that it did not comment on the presumption of innocence, but instead made a fair assessment of the evidence and told the jury that defendant should be found guilty of the charges.

The court finds that the government's comments during closing arguments were not improper, and were made mainly in response to defendant's arguments and theories regarding the evidence, as well as regarding the evidence presented by defendant. The government may comment on inconsistent stories and theories asserted by defendant. See United States v. May, 52 F.3d 885, 890 (10^th Cir. 1995). The government may also comment on the evidence presented to the jury during the trial. See United States v. Barela, 96 Fed. Appx. 610, 614 (10^th Cir. 2004) (finding that prosecutor's remarks during closing argument about defendant's failure to call certain witnesses were prompted by defense counsel's argument and did not constitute plain error that would warrant a new trial). The government is given reasonable latitude in drawing inferences from the record. See Duvall v. Reynolds, 139 F.3d 768, 795 (10^th Cir. 1998). Moreover, a prosecutor's argument, even if improper, if invited by defense counsel's arguments, is not grounds for a new trial. See United States v. Morris, 57 Fed. Appx. 797, 799 (10^th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1985)).

The court finds that the government's closing argument, taken in the context of the entire trial and in light of the arguments regarding the evidence that defense counsel made during closing, was fair comment on the evidence and asked the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the record. Moreover, as the court noted above, the court, multiple times during closing arguments, reminded the jury that arguments of counsel were not evidence, and that it was to follow the instructions of law and decide the facts from the evidence presented. Taken in the context of the entire trial, the court does not believe the government's comments improperly influenced the jury or prevented defendant from receiving a fair trial. Accordingly, the court denies defendant's motion for new trial.

B. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Notwithstanding the Verdict

In his motion, defendant, in two sentences, briefly mentions that he should be acquitted because the evidence at trial was circumstantial with regard to the drugs, and there was no evidence of knowledge. Defendant supplies no additional argument and cites no law in support of his request. The court cannot make a party's arguments for him. United States v. Kravchuk, 335 F.3d 1147, 1153 (10^th Cir. 2003) (citing Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1546 (10^th Cir. 1995)). The court therefore denies defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant's Motion for New Trial and for Judgment of Acquittal Notwithstanding the Verdict (Doc. 68) is denied.