We note at the outset that several post-Lopez cases and dicta in the decision of the court of appeals in Lopez reject the appellants' contention. United States v. Rogers, Nos. 94-2368, 94-3836, 1996 WL 399850, at *11-12 (7th Cir. July 17, 1996); United States v. Clark, 67 F.3d 1154, 1165-66 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1432 (1996) (No. 95-7511), petition for cert. filed, No. 95-8936 (U.S. May 9, 1996); United States v. Salmiento, 898 F. Supp. 45, 46-48 (D.P.R. 1995); United States v. Garcia-Salazar, 891 F. Supp. 568, 569-572 (D.Kan. 1995); United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1366 n. 50 (5th Cir. 1993), aff'd, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995). In Lopez, the Supreme Court recognized that under the Commerce Clause Congress may regulate three broad categories of activity, including "those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce."
n the chain of federal regulation of firearms dealing. See United States v. Genao, 79 F.3d 1333 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding 21 U.S.C. §(s) 841, 846); United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1995) ( 21 U.S.C. §(s) 841(a)(1)); United States v. Clark, 67 F.3d 1154 (5th Cir. 1995) (upholding 21 U.S.C. §(s) 860), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1432, 134 L.Ed.2d 554 (1996); United States v. Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135 (6th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Bell, 90 F.3d 318 (8th Cir. 1996) (upholding 21 U.S.C. §(s) 841(a)(1)); United States v. Brown, 72 F.3d 96 (8th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Yoon, No. 95-16698, 1996 WL 367621 (9th Cir. June 28, 1996) (unpublished per curiam) (upholding 21 U.S.C. §(s) 841(a)(1)); United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding 21 U.S.C. §(s) 841(a)(1), 846); United States v. Kremetis, 903 F. Supp. 250 (D.N.H. 1995) (same); United States v. Smith, 920 F. Supp. 245 (D.Me. 1996) (upholding 21 U.S.C. §(s) 841(a)(1)-(2), 846); United States v. Salmiento, 898 F. Supp. 45 (D.P.R. 1995) (upholding 21 U.S.C. §(s) 860); United States v. Gonzalez, 893 F. Supp. 935 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (upholding 21 U.S.C. §(s) 841(a)(1)); United States v. Garcia-Salazar, 891 F. Supp. 568 (D. Kan. 1995) (upholding 21 U.S.C. §(s) 860); United States v. Murillo, No. CR 93-20131 JW, 1995 WL 621797 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (upholding 21 U.S.C. §(s) 841(a), 843(b), 846); United States v. Grafton, 1995 WL 506001 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (upholding 21 U.S.C. §(s) 841, 846); United States v. Walker, 910 F. Supp. 837 (N.D.N Y 1995) (upholding 21 U.S.C. §(s) 841, 846, 848); United States v. Bramble, 894 F. Supp. 1384 (D. Haw. 1995) (upholding 21 U.S.C. §(s) 841(a)(1), 844(a)). Kenney also asserts that because Congress has historically regulated firearms and has evinced particular interest in regulating machine guns, its "accumulated institutional expertise" justifies Section(s) 922(o).
They challenged the constitutionality of section 860(a), but the district court ruled against them. See United States v. Salmiento, 898 F. Supp. 45, 46-48 (D.P.R. 1996). They then pled guilty to the charge, reserving the right to revisit the constitutional question on appeal.
al. See United States v. Yerebours, No. 95-2317, 1996 WL 339185, (1st Cir. June 26, 1996) (upholding 21 U.S.C. §(s) 841(a)(1), 846); United States v. Genao, 79 F.3d 1333 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding 21 U.S.C. § 841, 846); United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1995) ( 21 U.S.C. §(s) 841(a)(1)); United States v. Clark, 67 F.3d 1154 (5th Cir. 1995) (upholding 21 U.S.C. §(s) 860), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3690 (Apr. 15, 1996); United States v. Tucker, No. 95-1160, 1996 WL 413411 (6th Cir. July 25, 1996) (same); Bell, 1996 WL 411886 (upholding 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)); Brown, 72 F.3d 96 (same); United States v. Yoon, No. 95-16698, 1996 WL 367621 (9th Cir. June 28, 1996) (unpublished per curiam) (upholding 21 U.S.C. §(s) 841(a)(1)); United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding 21 U.S.C. §(s) 841(a)(1), 846); United States v. Kremetis, 903 F. Supp. 250 (D.N.H. 1995) (same); United States v. Smith, 920 F. Supp. 245 (D. Me. 1996) (upholding 21 U.S.C. §(s) 841(a)(1)); United States v. Salmiento, 898 F. Supp. 45 (D.P.R. 1995) (upholding 21 U.S.C. §(s) 860); United States v. Gonzalez, 893 F. Supp. 935 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (upholding 21 U.S.C. §(s) 841(a)(1)); United States v. Garcia-Salazar, 891 F. Supp. 568 (D. Kan. 1995) (upholding 21 U.S.C. §(s) 860); United States v. Murillo, No. CR 93-20131 JW., 1995 WL 621797 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (upholding 21 U.S.C. Section(s) 841(a), 843(b), 846); Smith, 920 F. Supp. 245 (upholding 21 U.S.C. §(s) 841(a)(1)-(2), 846), Lynch, 908 F. Supp. 284 (upholding 21 U.S.C. §(s) 841(a)(1), 846, 952(a)); Grafton, 1995 WL 506001 (upholding 21 U.S.C. §(s) 841, 846); Walker, 910 F. Supp. 837 (upholding 21 U.S.C. Section(s) 841, 846, 848); Bramble, 894 F. Supp. 1384 (upholding 21 U.S.C. §(s) 841(a)(1), 844(a)). No courts have struck down the federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), as facially unconstitutional after Lopez.
U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-559, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1629, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995) (citations omitted). See also:U.S. v. Henson, 123 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1997); U.S. v. Knutson, 113 F.3d 27, 29 (5th Cir. 1997); U.S. v. Kim, 94 F.3d 1247, 1249 (9th Cir. 1996); U.S. v. Lerebours, 87 F.3d 582, 584-85 (1st Cir. 1996); U.S. v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 685 (7th Cir. 1995); U.S. v. Salmiento, 898 F.Supp. 45, 46 (D.P.R.1995), affirmed at U.S. v. Zorrilla, 93 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 1996). Like in Lopez, the first two of the above categories are irrelevant to the case at bar, since the VAWA "is not a regulation of the use of the channels or interstate commerce, nor is it an attempt to prohibit the interstate transportation of a commodity through the channels of commerce; nor can [the VAWA] be justified as a regulation [protecting] an instrumentality of interstate commerce or a thing in interstate commerce."
Both District and Circuit Courts found that, notwithstanding United States v. Lopez, Id., Congress had power under the Commerce Clause to regulate the selling of drugs within school zones. United States v. Zorrilla, 93 F.3d at 8, affirmed the District Court Opinion at 898 F. Supp. 45, 46-48 (P.R. 1995). "It is not surprising to find that every court which has confronted the appellant's argument in the post-López era has upheld Section 860(a) against a Commerce Clause challenge. (Citations omitted.)
4 (2d Cir. 1995); U.S. v. Bell, 70 F.3d 495 (7th Cir. 1995); U.S. v. Hinton, 69 F.3d 534, 1995 WL 623876 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1026, 134 L.Ed.2d 104 (1996); U.S. v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396 (10th Cir. 1995); U.S. v. Shelton, 66 F.3d 991 (8th Cir. 1995); U.S. v. Rankin, 64 F.3d 338 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 577, 133 L.Ed.2d 500 (1995); U.S. v. Collins, 61 F.3d 1379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 543, 133 L.Ed.2d 446 (1995); U.S. v. Mosby, 60 F.3d 454 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 938, 133 L.Ed.2d 864 (1996); U.S. v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456 (9th Cir. 1995); U.S. v. Cardoza, 914 F. Supp. 683 (D.Mass. 1996); U.S. v. Taylor, 897 F. Supp. 1500 (D.Conn. 1995).See, e.g., U.S. v. Genao, 79 F.3d 1333 (2d Cir. 1996); U.S. v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1995); U.S. v. Smith, 920 F. Supp. 245 (D.Me. 1996); U.S. v. Walker, 910 F. Supp. 837 (N.D.N.Y. 1995); U.S. v. Kremetis, 903 F. Supp. 250 (D.N.H. 1995); U.S. v. Salmiento, 898 F. Supp. 45 (D.P.R. 1995); U.S. v. Gonzalez, 893 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.Cal. 1995); U.S. v. Garcia-Salazar, 891 F. Supp. 568 (D.Kan 1995).See U.S. v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518 (10th Cir. 1995).