Convicting a legally incompetent person violates due process,and competency requirements have been applied to various parts of the adversarial process. In United States v. Ruston, 565 F.3d 892, 901 (5th Cir.2009), this court found that the initial § 4243(c) hearing required competency. Although we have never imposed a competency requirement on a § 4243(g) hearing, Mitchell asks that we extend Ruston to impose such a requirement here.

In addition, under § 4241(b), the court “may order” that a mental competency examination be conducted on the defendant prior to the competency hearing. An abuse of discretion standard applies to the district court's failure to sua sponte conduct a mental competency hearing and its denial of the defense's motion for a mental competency evaluation.United States v. Ruston, 565 F.3d 892, 901 (5th Cir.2009) (“Whether the district court erred in not sua sponte holding a competency hearing is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”); United States v. Messervey, 317 F.3d 457, 463 (5th Cir.2002) (citing United States v. Davis, 61 F.3d 291, 304 (5th Cir.1995) ( “Whether ‘reasonable cause’ exists to put the court on notice that the defendant might be mentally incompetent is left to the sound discretion of the district court.” (citation omitted))); United States v. Williams, 998 F.2d 258, 263 (5th Cir.1993).

The district court's failure to sua sponte conduct a mental competency hearing is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Ruston, 565 F.3d 892, 901 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Messervey, 317 F.3d 457, 463 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Davis, 61 F.3d 291, 304 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Whether 'reasonable cause' exists to put the court on notice that the defendant might be mentally incompetent is left to the sound discretion of the district court." (citation omitted))); United States v. Williams, 998 F.2d 258, 263 (5th Cir. 1993).

To determine whether bona fide doubt or reasonable cause to conduct a competency hearing existed, this court considers "(1) the existence of a history of irrational behavior, (2) the defendant's demeanor at trial, and (3) [any] prior medical opinion on competency." United States v. Ruston, 565 F.3d 892, 902 (5th Cir. 2009) (reasonable cause); Mata v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 324, 329 (5th Cir. 2000) (bona fide doubt). "Even when a defendant is competent at the commencement of his trial, a trial court must always be alert to circumstances suggesting a change that would render the accused unable to meet the standards of competence to stand trial."

Indeed, this holds true even assuming that everything in Risovi's affidavit is true. On appeal, Risovi cites Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 181, 95 S. Ct. 896, 908 (1975), as well as United States v. Ruston, 565 F.3d 892 (5th Cir. 2009), in maintaining that "assuming Risovi was competent at some point in time prior to the day she entered her guilty plea does not establish she was competent at the time she entered her plea." In those cases, though, the defendant was either absent from the hearing in question, 420 U.S. at 181, 95 S. Ct. at 908, or experienced "delusions [that] were readily apparent throughout the . . . hearing," Ruston, 565 F.3d at 903.

The record contains evidence that would have given the district court reasonable cause to believe that Blake might be unable to meet the standard of competence to proceed with the revocation proceeding. See United States v. Ruston, 565 F.3d 892, 904 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Williams, 819 F.2d 605, 607 (5th Cir. 1988); 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). There were medical opinions that supported the possibility that Blake, who was previously found incompetent in the criminal proceeding, suffered from a mental defect or illness that might render him incompetent.

Similarly, our review of the record and parties' arguments does not show that Lang exhibited irrational behavior or a demeanor indicative of incompetency, and she did not produce a prior expert opinion addressing her competence vel non. See United States v. Ruston, 565 F.3d 892, 902 (5th Cir. 2009). Consequently, Lang has not shown that the district court had reasonable cause to believe that a competency hearing was needed or that it abused its discretion by not sua sponte ordering such a hearing.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (“Section 4241”), court must order a competency hearing “if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). Courts in the Fifth Circuit consider three factors when determining whether a competency hearing is required: “(1) the existence of a history of irrational behavior, (2) the defendant's demeanor at trial, and (3) prior medical opinion on competency.” United States v. Ruston, 565 F.3d 892, 902 (5th Cir. 2009). “There is no specific threshold or quantum of evidence that requires the district court to order a competency hearing

See United States v. Fields, 761 F.3d 443, 468 (5th Cir. 2014), as revised (Sept. 2, 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2803, 192 L. Ed. 2d 847 (2015) (quoting United States v. Flores-Martinez, 677 F.3d 699, 706-07 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Ruston, 565 F.3d 892, 902 (5th Cir. 2009)). Accord Moghaddam, 299 F. App'x at 419-20; Enriquez v. Procunier, 752 F.2d 111, 113-14 (5th Cir. 1984).

Ruston is a prisoner currently confined at the United States Medical Center for Federal prisoners in Springfield Missouri, having been found not guilty by reason of insanity for threatening to assault and murder a federal magistrate judge. See United States v. Ruston, 565 F.3d 892, 894 (5th Cir. 2009). This complaint appears to arise from "factual contentions [that] are clearly baseless" and that "describ[e] fantastic or delusional scenarios."