U.S. v. Rundle

13 Citing cases

  1. United States ex Rel. Johnson v. Rundle

    349 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1965)   Cited 4 times
    In Johnson, the court pointed out that the trial court, in its opinion denying a new trial, had stated that there were perhaps only three known train wreckers in the United States. United States ex rel. Johnson v. Rundle, 243 F. Supp. 695, 699 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd on opinion below, 349 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1965).

    The court below made an exhaustive review of the operative facts in this case and carefully examined the pertinent authorities. We perceive no error in the proceedings and we will therefore affirm the judgment on the able opinion of Judge Higginbotham, 243 F. Supp. 695 (E.D.Pa. 1964).

  2. Com. ex Rel. Marino v. Myers

    214 A.2d 491 (Pa. 1965)   Cited 12 times

    Upon examination of the record, we conclude that the court below did not err in dismissing appellant's petition. However, in light of the recent decision in United States ex rel. Johnson v. Rundle, 243 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd on the opinion below, 349 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1965) (per curiam), we deem it appropriate to add a few observations in support of our conclusion. The Johnson decision was rendered subsequent to that of the court below.

  3. United States ex Rel. Bolish v. Maroney

    409 F.2d 1404 (3d Cir. 1969)   Cited 7 times

    In Johnson, supra, where the prosecutor's only evidence of guilt was a confession and re-enactment of the crime by a defendant with a 7th grade education when in custody and without counsel and the jury was informed, prior to returning its guilty verdict and sentence of life imprisonment, of a prior conviction for an offense involving facts with "a striking similarity to the methods used in the present case" (p. 698 of 243 F. Supp.), the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the grant of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, relying on Spencer, supra. See United States ex rel. Johnson v. Rundle, 243 F. Supp. 695 (E.D.Pa. 1964), aff'd 349 F.2d 416 (3rd Cir. 1965). Here the prior convictions were introduced at relator's trial, over his objections, by means of testimony of the Chief Deputy Clerk of Courts of Lackawanna County and of the police officers who prosecuted the charges (N.T. 684-692 of Court of Oyer Terminer, Lackawanna County, Oct. Term 1953, No. 17, Trial of November-December 1955). They testified to the following prior criminal proceedings: (1) a plea of guilty to burglary in 1929 and sentence not to exceed 10 years in the Pennsylvania Industrial Reformatory (#31, Jan. Term 1929, Court of Oyer Terminer, Lackawanna County); (2) a plea of guilty to breaking and entering with intent to steal in 1932 and sentence of three to six years in the State Penitentiary (#2, Dec. Term 1932, Court of Oyer Terminer, Lackawanna County); and (3) a trial and conviction for robbery in 1939, with sentence of five to ten years in the State Penitentiary (#10, Oct. Term 1938, Court of Oyer Terminer, Lackawanna Count

  4. Commonwealth v. Chapasco

    436 Pa. 143 (Pa. 1969)   Cited 9 times

    See Spencer, supra, at p. 559, n. 5. This comment is puzzling, since the Third Circuit in three cases decided after Scoleri but before Spencer had held that Scoleri had not found the Parker rule procedure unconstitutional per se but had mandated a case-by-case analysis of Parker rule appeals to determine whether the record revealed prejudice amounting to a denial of due process. See United States ex rel. Rucker v. Myers, 311 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 844 (1963); United States ex rel. Lowry v. Myers, 364 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1966); and United States ex rel. Johnson v. Rundle, 243 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd. per curiam, 349 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1965), rev'd., 386 U.S. 14 (1967).

  5. Rundle, v. Johnson

    386 U.S. 14 (1967)   Cited 9 times
    In Johnson, supra, where the prosecutor's only evidence of guilt was a confession and re-enactment of the crime by a defendant with a 7th grade education when in custody and without counsel and the jury was informed, prior to returning its guilty verdict and sentence of life imprisonment, of a prior conviction for an offense involving facts with "a striking similarity to the methods used in the present case" (p. 698 of 243 F. Supp.), the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the grant of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, relying on Spencer, supra.

    The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is reversed, Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, and the case is remanded to that court for consideration of the unresolved issues. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS dissents from the reversal of the Court of Appeals in United States v. Rundle, 349 F.2d 416, which affirmed United States v. Rundle, 243 F. Supp. 695, 700, where the District Court granted the petition for habeas corpus since the introduction of the accused's "prior criminal record for obstructing a railroad was so fundamentally unfair as to deny him due process of law."

  6. United States v. Rundle

    387 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1967)   Cited 1 times

    PER CURIAM: Following the original argument of this case this court affirmed, 349 F.2d 416, the order of the district court, 243 F. Supp. 695, granting the relator's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The action of the district court was based upon its conclusion that the introduction of the relator's prior criminal record into evidence in his criminal trial in a Pennsylvania state court, as then permitted under Commonwealth v. Parker, 1928, 294 Pa. 144, 143 A. 904, was so fundamentally unfair as to deny him due process of law.

  7. United States v. Myers

    364 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1966)   Cited 10 times
    In Lowry, the relator's prior criminal record concerned mostly larceny of motor vehicles, as distinguished from armed robbery, but the court lumped these crimes together as efforts by the accused to obtain property without working for it legitimately.

    This question must be dealt with realistically and consideration must be given to all those elements which are relevant to a fair appraisal of the circumstances, such as the existence of a substantial issue of guilt and the nature as well as the number of the prior convictions. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Johnson v. Rundle, 243 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd, 349 F.2d 416 (3 Cir. 1965), cert. pending, S.Ct. Oct. Term 1966, No. 14. See also Commonwealth ex rel. Marino v. Myers, 419 Pa. 448, 214 A.2d 491 (1965); Commonwealth ex rel. Gist v. Rundle, 419 Pa. 458, 214 A.2d 496 (1965). It is unnecessary, in view of the conclusion we have reached, to consider the effect under this test of the district attorney's about face after his assurance to the court that he was pressing for the death penalty in order to obtain the admission of the criminal record.

  8. United States ex rel. Richardson v. Rundle

    317 F. Supp. 772 (E.D. Pa. 1970)

    In the later case of United States ex rel. Scoleri v. Banmiller, 310 F.2d 720 (3rd Cir. 1962) the Court limited its decision in Thompson, supra, to its particular facts and held that under the pre-Split Verdict Act procedure the introduction of twenty-five unrelated convictions in a capital case during the case-in-chief for the purpose of determining penalty violates due process of law. See also United States ex rel. Johnson v. Rundle, 243 F.Supp. 695 (E.D.PA. 1964) affd. per curiam 349 F.2d 416 (3rd Cir. 1965) revd. per curiam Rundle v. Johnson, 386 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 847, 17 L.Ed.2d 695 (1967).          The Spencer and Johnson decisions make it clear that no matter how many prior convictions are involved, their recitation to the jury is immaterial where a proper limiting instruction is given.

  9. United States v. Myers

    261 F. Supp. 151 (E.D. Pa. 1966)   Cited 1 times

    Two of the convictions (aggravated assault and battery and assault and battery with intent to kill) are equivocal on the issue of premeditation, being at least as consistent with Marino's defense of hot blood or provocation as with the Commonwealth's claim of premeditation. United States ex rel. Scoleri v. Banmiller, 310 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1962), rehearing denied, 310 F.2d 736, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 828, 83 S.Ct. 1866, 10 L.Ed.2d 1051 (1963); United States ex rel. Rucker v. Myers, 311 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1962); United States ex rel. Johnson v. Rundle, 243 F. Supp. 695 (E.D.Pa. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 349 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1965), petition for cert. filed, 35 U.S.L.Week 3001 (No. 423, 1965 Term; renumbered No. 14, 1966 Term); and United States ex rel. Lowry v. Myers, supra. The petition for writ of habeas corpus will be denied.

  10. United States ex rel. Cannon v. Maroney

    255 F. Supp. 235 (W.D. Pa. 1966)

    He does not raise the broader issue of the constitutionality of admitting a prior conviction in and of itself before the jury has determined the guilt of the defendant-- the Parker Rule. Compare United States ex rel. Scoleri v. Banmiller, 310 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1962) with United States ex rel. Rucker v. Myers, 311 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1962); and see, United States ex rel. Lowry v. Myers, 242 F.Supp. 477 (E.D.Pa.1965); United States ex rel. Johnson v. Rundle, 243 F.Supp. 695 (E.D.Pa.1964).         State remedies having been exhausted, we issued a rule to show cause and, when counsel for the respondent failed to appear at oral argument on the rule, we ordered that a hearing be held.