U.S. v. Roth

Full title: UNITED STATES ex rel. EARL HAMPTON, Plaintiff, v. THOMAS ROTH, Defendant

Court: United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

Date published: Sep 20, 2000

No. 97 C 7994 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 20, 2000)

Opinion

No. 97 C 7994

September 20, 2000

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SUZANNE B. CONLON, United States District Judge.

Earl Hampton ("Hampton") seeks a writ of habeas corpus against Dixon Correctional Center Warden Thomas Roth pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

BACKGROUND

Following a bench trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Hampton was convicted of shooting and killing Carol Thomas ("Thomas"). He was sentenced to a 24-year prison term. Prior to trial, the parties disputed the admissibility of testimony from Constance Catchings ("Catchings"). Catchings claimed that two days after the shooting Mel Thompson ("Thompson") told her that he had killed Thomas and that Hampton was taking the blame. The State moved to suppress Catchings' testimony and argued that it was unreliable hearsay. The trial court granted the motion, noting that Catchings' statement lacked corroboration. Hampton's counsel and Hampton pro se filed timely motions for a new trial. These motions were denied. Hampton's counsel then discovered another witness, Johnnie Smith ("Smith"), who stated in an affidavit that Thompson confessed to killing Thomas and knew that Hampton was taking the blame. Smith and Thompson had been friends for 20 years. Based on this evidence, Hampton's counsel moved for reconsideration of the new trial request. However, he filed the motion five days past the deadline. Consequently, the trial court denied the untimely motion. An Illinois appellate court affirmed the conviction. See Illinois v. Hampton, 249 Ill. App.3d 329 (June 30, 1993). On October 7, 1992, the Illinois Supreme Court denied Hampton's petition for leave to appeal. On November 14, 1997, Hampton filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus requesting relief on eight grounds. On April 20, 1998, this court denied the petition, but issued a certificate of appealability on July 30, 1998 for Hampton's claim that his counsel was ineffective in failing to file the motion to reconsider before the deadline. On July 11, 2000, the Seventh Circuit vacated the denial of Hampton's habeas corpus petition and remanded for further consideration of Hampton's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Hampton v. Roth, 221 F.3d 1338 (7^th Cir. 2000).

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of review

A federal court will not grant habeas corpus relief on any claim adjudicated on the merits by a state court unless (1) the state court applied a Supreme Court doctrine unreasonably to the facts of the case, or (2) the state court's decision relied on an unreasonable reading of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d). For relief based on an unreasonable application of Supreme Court doctrine, the state court's decision must be both incorrect and unreasonable.Washington v. Smith, 219 F.3d 620, 628 (7^th Cir. 2000).

II. Ineffective assistance of counsel

In order to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Hampton must establish that (1) his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) a reasonable probability exists that, but for his lawyer's alleged errors, the outcome of his case would have been different. Washington v. Smith, 219 F.3d 620, 627 (7^th Cir. 2000) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984)).

A. Objective standard of reasonableness

Hampton's counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation when he failed to file the motion for reconsideration on time. When evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims, courts give lawyers a great deal of discretion in making strategic decisions for their cases. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Failing to file a critical motion on time, however, clearly was not a strategic decision in this case. Hampton's counsel acknowledged that the motion to reconsider was not filed until 35 days after sentencing and explained that his confusion as to the 30-day time limit was caused by representing the defendant on another matter in front of the same judge. Transcript of trial record ("Tr.") at 681. He stated that he did not pay close enough attention to the sentencing date. Id. at 682. Hampton's counsel obviously did not dispute that he made an error. Therefore, filing the untimely motion cannot be considered reasonable or strategic.

B. Prejudice

Unreasonable behavior by a lawyer is not sufficient to justify relief on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Hampton must also establish prejudice from his counsel's performance. Consequently, Hampton must show that if his lawyer had filed the motion for reconsideration on time, the trial court would have probably granted the motion.

The state appellate court found that there was nothing in the trial court record to support Hampton's contention that he was prejudiced by his lawyer's failure to file the motion for reconsideration on time. In considering prejudice under the Strickland standard, the state appellate court's inquiry was not merely whether Catchings' statement was sufficiently reliable with the new corroborating statement from Smith, but rather whether the trial court would have considered it sufficiently reliable had the motion to reconsider been timely filed. Hampton, 221 F.3d at 1338.¹ When determining whether a hearsay statement is sufficiently reliable, the following factors are considered: (1) whether the statement was spontaneously made to a close acquaintance; (2) whether the statement is corroborated by some other evidence; (3) whether the statement was against the declarant's interest; and (4) whether the declarant was available at the time of trial. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 300-01 (1973).

1 The Seventh Circuit noted that the record did not include documents essential to make this assessment: (1) the State's motion to suppress Catchings' statement; (2) the transcript of the suppression hearing; (3) a copy of the state trial court's order granting the State's suppression motion, (4) Hampton's late motion for reconsideration; and (5) the trial court's denial of the motion for reconsideration. Hampton, 221 F.3d at 1338. Those documents have been submitted by the state and reviewed by this court.

The state appellate court relied on an unreasonable interpretation of the facts to reach its conclusion that the trial court would not have found Catchings' statement reliable at the time of the motion to reconsider, even with Smith's corroborating statements. A careful review of the full trial record shows that the appellate court misconstrued some of the trial court's findings. The appellate court wrote that the trial court ruled (1) Catchings could not be considered a close acquaintance of Thompson's, and (2) Thompson's statement was not spontaneous. Hampton, 249 Ill.App.3d at 339. However, as the Seventh Circuit pointed out, the trial court simply said that it did not know whether the statements were spontaneous or whether Thompson and Catchings were close acquaintances.Hampton 22 F.3d at 1338. The trial court never made findings on these issues. Tr. at 216.

Nor does the trial record support the state appellate court's conclusion that the trial court would not have granted the motion for reconsideration, even if it were timely. In fact, the record appears to contradict this conclusion. In the original hearing on the admissibility of Catchings' testimony, the trial court stated:

There appears to me to be in the statement sufficient information if it were, in fact, somehow corroborated, would make the testimony of Ms. Catchings certainly admissible . . . Unless there is something else we can use with her statement other than the naked statement, I'm going to deny the use of this statement during the course of the trial.

Tr. at 214-15. The trial judge further stated that he would reconsider the ruling if Hampton could produce "some nature of cooperation [sic corroboration]." Id. at 218.

It is clear from the record that the trial court considered Smith's statement to be corroboration for Catchings' claims. In discussing the actual motion for reconsideration, the trial court stated that Smith's statement had "some probative value in terms of being corroborative of the other statement [by Ms. Catchings] . . ." Id at 682.² The trial judge then stated that he might need additional information to determine whether Smith's statement was sufficient corroboration. Id. at 682-83. However, the trial judge never made a final ruling on this issue, and Hampton was never given an opportunity to provide additional information. The trial judge then denied the motion because it was not filed by the deadline. Id. at 683. Due to the fact that corroboration was the only element the trial court expressly needed to find Catchings' statement reliable, there is a reasonable probability that the trial court would have granted a new trial based on the additional evidence if Hampton's lawyer had not been tardy.

2 The state appellate court also acknowledged that Smith's statement may have corroborated Catchings' statement. Hampton, 249 Ill.App.3d at 339.

The state appellate court also applied federal law incorrectly. In reaching its decision that Hampton was not prejudiced by his counsel's representation, the appellate court reasoned that the trial court would not have likely found Catchings' statement reliable, even with additional corroboration from Smith, because other prongs of the Chambers analysis were not satisfied. This application of the Chambers test itself was inaccurate. Even if the trial court had found that none of the otherChambers factors were satisfied, it could still find that Catchings' statement was reliable under Chambers. As the Seventh Circuit pointed out in its decision in this case,

The Chambers factors are just that, factors; they are not necessarily elements. Thus the circumstances that some of the factors are not present does not preclude a finding that the hearsay testimony is nonetheless reliable.

Hampton, 22 F.3d at 1338 (citing Cunningham v. Peters, 941 F.2d 535, 540 (7^th Cir. 1991)). The appellate court acknowledged that the four prongs of the Chambers test only set out factors to consider rather than requirements for admissibility. However, in reaching its conclusion that Hampton was not prejudiced by his counsel's error, the appellate court treated each of the Chambers prongs as establishing independent grounds for a finding of unreliability.

For these reasons, it is clear that the appellate court incorrectly and unreasonably applied federal law and relied upon an unreasonable interpretation of the facts in finding that Hampton was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to file a timely motion for reconsideration. Hampton has met both requirements for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland.

CONCLUSION

The petition for habeas corpus is granted. Execution of the writ is stayed on the condition that the State of Illinois grants Hampton a new trial within a reasonable time, not to exceed 120 days.

ENTER.