U.S. v. Rosario

44 Citing cases

  1. U.S. v. Mornan

    413 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2005)   Cited 67 times
    Holding that, "[W]here, as here, a defendant does not preserve the issue of sufficiency of the evidence by making a timely motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the evidence, this Court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence for plain error."

    Handwriting experts often give their opinions in terms of probabilities rather than certainties. See, e.g., United States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 160, 163 (3d Cir. 1997) (considering a handwriting expert's testimony that the defendant "probably" authored a forged check in affirming a forgery conviction); United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 346 (3d Cir. 1992) (handwriting testimony is admissible "even if the handwriting expert is not absolutely certain that the handwriting is that of the defendant."); United States v. Galvin, 394 F.2d 228, 229 n. 1 (3d Cir. 1968) (handwriting testimony is not rendered inadmissible merely "because it expresses a probability").

  2. U.S. v. Daniel

    518 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2008)   Cited 8 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding an older version of 14 V.I.C. § 2256, which made it unlawful to possess ammunition “unless authorized by law” unconstitutional because Virgin Islands law d[id] not establish a licensing requirement for ammunition. Nor does it provide any specific procedure by which possession of ammunition may be licensed or otherwise is authorized.”

    We exercise deference to the jury's verdict in reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 160, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1997). "We must determine whether, viewing the evidence most favorably to the government, there is substantial evidence to support the jury's guilty verdict."

  3. U.S. v. Pressler

    256 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2001)   Cited 108 times
    Holding the evidence was insufficient to establish a conspiracy when it did not show an agreement between conspirators to work together

    Moreover, because Shreffler is appealing from a jury verdict against him, "[w]e must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and must sustain [the] jury's verdict if `a reasonable jury believing the government's evidence could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the government proved all the elements of the offense.'" United States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 160, 163 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1113 (3d Cir. 1991)). The elements of a charge of conspiracy are: (1) "a unity of purpose between the alleged conspirators;" (2) "an intent to achieve a common goal;" and (3) "an agreement to work together toward that goal."

  4. Ibrahim v. Government of Virgin Islands

    D.C. Crim. App. No. 2004/101, Re: Sup.Ct.Crim. 373/2003 (D.V.I. Nov. 3, 2005)   Cited 1 times

    The intent to defraud may be shown from the surrounding facts and circumstances, including knowledge of the forgery, exclusive possession of or exclusive access to a forged check, and evidence the defendant executed an unauthorized endorsement or passed an instrument he knew to be false. See White, 611 F.2d 531, 539 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 160, 163-64 and n. 7 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting jury could infer intent to defraud and knowing and wilful conduct from evidence the defendant forged the instrument). The sole evidence at trial was that, when Ibrahim showed up at the Avila's home offering to sell furniture to them, he was invited inside and spent less than one-half hour talking with the Avilas and looking at their bar area to determine the type of bar stools Mrs. Avila needed.

  5. United States v. Petway

    No. 23-2033 (3d Cir. Apr. 12, 2024)

    " Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 43 (1984); see also United States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 160, 162 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997).

  6. United States v. Pawlowski

    27 F.4th 897 (3d Cir. 2022)   Cited 25 times
    Concluding "the extent of [the defendant]'s opportunity to cross-examine [a witness] and the overall strength of the Government's case support the conclusion that any error [in limiting recross] was harmless"

    Our review is, however, "guided by strict principles of deference to a jury's verdict." United States v. Rosario , 118 F.3d 160, 162–63 (3d Cir. 1997). We must view the evidence "in the light most favorable to the prosecution," and will affirm the conviction if a "rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."

  7. United States v. Janqdhari

    No. 16-4311 (3d Cir. Nov. 16, 2018)   Cited 1 times

    Janqdhari did not testify, and therefore waived his claim regarding the District Court's ruling under Rule 609. See United States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 160, 162 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Fonseca, 274 F.3d 760, 764-65 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Luce for the principle that claims of harm stemming from a decision not to testify are "wholly speculative" and therefore waived on appeal). C.

  8. United States v. Lee

    No. 16-3941 (3d Cir. Jul. 12, 2017)   Cited 2 times

    Because Lee challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, we "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government[.]" United States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 160, 163 (3d Cir. 1997). Lee operated the Boal Mansion Museum, and, as noted, he invited young people to work there as docents.

  9. United States v. Kelly

    663 F. App'x 222 (3d Cir. 2016)

    "Probably" is typically treated as the equivalent of "more likely than not." See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 705 (2011); Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 366 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring); United States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 160, 162 (3d Cir. 1997). [W]e believe that a defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case.

  10. United States v. Jirak

    728 F.3d 806 (8th Cir. 2013)   Cited 20 times
    Noting distinction between violations of the tax code, which require a finding of willfulness, and a violation of Section 287, which does not

    Uttering a false treasury check requires the government to prove (1) that Jirak passed a United States Treasury check; (2) that the check bore a forged or falsely made endorsement; (3) that Jirak passed the check with the intent to defraud; and (4) that Jirak acted knowingly and willfully. United States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 160, 163 (3d Cir.1997). Likewise, the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find Jirak guilty of count four, mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341.