Handwriting experts often give their opinions in terms of probabilities rather than certainties. See, e.g., United States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 160, 163 (3d Cir. 1997) (considering a handwriting expert's testimony that the defendant "probably" authored a forged check in affirming a forgery conviction); United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 346 (3d Cir. 1992) (handwriting testimony is admissible "even if the handwriting expert is not absolutely certain that the handwriting is that of the defendant."); United States v. Galvin, 394 F.2d 228, 229 n. 1 (3d Cir. 1968) (handwriting testimony is not rendered inadmissible merely "because it expresses a probability").
We exercise deference to the jury's verdict in reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 160, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1997). "We must determine whether, viewing the evidence most favorably to the government, there is substantial evidence to support the jury's guilty verdict."
Moreover, because Shreffler is appealing from a jury verdict against him, "[w]e must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and must sustain [the] jury's verdict if `a reasonable jury believing the government's evidence could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the government proved all the elements of the offense.'" United States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 160, 163 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1113 (3d Cir. 1991)). The elements of a charge of conspiracy are: (1) "a unity of purpose between the alleged conspirators;" (2) "an intent to achieve a common goal;" and (3) "an agreement to work together toward that goal."
The intent to defraud may be shown from the surrounding facts and circumstances, including knowledge of the forgery, exclusive possession of or exclusive access to a forged check, and evidence the defendant executed an unauthorized endorsement or passed an instrument he knew to be false. See White, 611 F.2d 531, 539 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 160, 163-64 and n. 7 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting jury could infer intent to defraud and knowing and wilful conduct from evidence the defendant forged the instrument). The sole evidence at trial was that, when Ibrahim showed up at the Avila's home offering to sell furniture to them, he was invited inside and spent less than one-half hour talking with the Avilas and looking at their bar area to determine the type of bar stools Mrs. Avila needed.
" Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 43 (1984); see also United States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 160, 162 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997).
Our review is, however, "guided by strict principles of deference to a jury's verdict." United States v. Rosario , 118 F.3d 160, 162–63 (3d Cir. 1997). We must view the evidence "in the light most favorable to the prosecution," and will affirm the conviction if a "rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
Janqdhari did not testify, and therefore waived his claim regarding the District Court's ruling under Rule 609. See United States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 160, 162 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Fonseca, 274 F.3d 760, 764-65 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Luce for the principle that claims of harm stemming from a decision not to testify are "wholly speculative" and therefore waived on appeal). C.
Because Lee challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, we "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government[.]" United States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 160, 163 (3d Cir. 1997). Lee operated the Boal Mansion Museum, and, as noted, he invited young people to work there as docents.
"Probably" is typically treated as the equivalent of "more likely than not." See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 705 (2011); Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 366 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring); United States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 160, 162 (3d Cir. 1997). [W]e believe that a defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case.
Uttering a false treasury check requires the government to prove (1) that Jirak passed a United States Treasury check; (2) that the check bore a forged or falsely made endorsement; (3) that Jirak passed the check with the intent to defraud; and (4) that Jirak acted knowingly and willfully. United States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 160, 163 (3d Cir.1997). Likewise, the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find Jirak guilty of count four, mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341.