Opinion
00 Cr. 1251 (RWS)
January 20, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendant Ramiro Rodriguez ("Rodriguez") moves to dismiss the indictment because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over him.
On November 27, 2001, Rodriguez was found guilty of one count of conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), 846, a Class A felony. Rodriguez is currently scheduled to be sentenced on February 11, 2004. Rodriguez moved to dismiss the indictment on December 5, 2003. The Government responded by letter dated December 23, 2003, and the motion was deemed fully submitted on December 31, 2003.
Rodriguez argues that the indictment against him should be dismissed because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over him. While Rodriguez brings his motion under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, it is Rule 12(b)(3)(B) that permits the Court to hear "at any time while the case is pending . . . a claim that the indictment or information fails to invoke the court's jurisdiction or to state an offense." Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(3)(B).
Rodriguez argues that 21 U.S.C. § 841 and 846 are applicable only to "regulated persons," and that because he is not a regulated person, nor is he in contract or partnership with a regulated person, the law is inapplicable to him. The term "regulated person" means
a person who manufactures, distributes, imports, or exports a listed chemical, a tableting machine, or an encapsulating machine or who acts as a broker or trader for an international transaction involving a listed chemical, a tableting machine, or an encapsulating machine.21 U.S.C. § 802(38). Nothing in the language of § 841 or § 846, however, indicates that the statutes under which Rodriguez was convicted apply only to regulated persons. Section 841(a)(1) provides that "[e]xcept as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful forany person knowingly or intentionally to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance." (emphasis added). Section 846 similarly provides that "[a]ny person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy." (emphasis added).
Rodriguez's argument that he is exempt from §§ 841 and 846 is drawn from the "except as authorized by this subchapter" language in § 841(a). Rather than restricting the application of the law to all but regulated persons, however, the phrase makes clear that a subset of persons whose activities are monitored by the government may distribute certain controlled substances under limited circumstances. Anyone who is not a registered or regulated person within the meaning of the statute is subject to the blanket prohibition in § 841 and the conspiracy provision of § 846. Registered persons may also be convicted under § 841 as well. See United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 96 S.Ct. 335, 46 L.Ed.2d 333 (1975) (holding that registered physicians may be prosecuted for violation of § 841 when their activities fall outside the usual course of professional practice).
Rodriguez's arguments with regard to § 841(a)(2) are to no avail. That section prohibits the distribution of counterfeit substances, not controlled substance, and Rodriguez has shown no connection between the two subsections that is relevant to his conviction. Further, nothing inMoore can be interpreted as holding that non-registrants are not subject to § 841. The Supreme Court there described the conduct prohibited by § 841 colloquially as "the offense of acting as a `drug pusher,'"id. at 138, which clearly encompasses the distribution of controlled substances by a non-registrant.
Rodriguez's motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is accordingly denied.
It is so ordered.