Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12, a "'theory for suppression not advanced in district court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal' absent a showing of good cause." United States v. Guerrero, 921 F.3d 895, 897-98 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Keesee, 358 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 2004)); see also United States v. Restrepo-Rua, 815 F.2d 1327, 1329 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). Contrary to Acevedo-Lemus's contention, the suppression motion's passing reference to the local warrant in a section of the motion entitled "The NIT Warrant Violated the Warrant Clause's Particularity Requirement" did not adequately raise the issue.
United States v. Robertson, 52 F.3d 789, 791 (9th Cir.1994) (citation omitted). See alsoUnited States v. Restrepo-Rua, 815 F.2d 1327, 1329 (9th Cir.1987) (per curiam) ("Just as a failure to file a timely motion to suppress evidence constitutes a waiver, so too does a failure to raise a particular ground in support of a motion to suppress." (emphasis added)).
Despite the Supreme Court's pronouncement that "[o]nce a federal claim is properly presented, a party can make any argument in support of that claim; parties are not limited to the precise arguments they made below," Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. , 513 U.S. 374, 379, 115 S.Ct. 961, 130 L.Ed.2d 902 (1995) (alteration in original) (quoting Yee v. Escondido , 503 U.S. 519, 534, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 118 L.Ed.2d 153 (1992) ), our precedents are in apparent conflict over whether a particular argument supporting a claim can be waived.Compare Guerrero , 921 F.3d at 898 ("Rule 12(c)(3) ’s good-cause standard continues to apply when ... the defendant attempts to raise new theories on appeal in support of a motion to suppress."), and United States v. Restrepo-Rua , 815 F.2d 1327, 1329 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) ("Just as a failure to file a timely motion to suppress evidence constitutes a waiver, so too does a failure to raise a particular ground in support of a motion to suppress."), with United States v. Walton , 881 F.3d 768, 771 (9th Cir. 2018) (reviewing de novo a sentencing claim for which the defendant presented a different argument on appeal from the one made in the district court); United States v. Studhorse , 883 F.3d 1198, 1203 n.3 (9th Cir. 2018) (same), and United States v. Pallares-Galan , 359 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2004) (reviewing de novo denial of motion to dismiss indictment despite defendant's new argument on appeal).
Second, to the extent that Tejeda's motion for a new trial was in fact a delayed suppression motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(C), the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the motion was not timely under Rule 12(b)(3) because it was not raised until after trial. See United States v. Restrepo-Rua, 815 F.2d 1327, 1329 (9th Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Guerrero, 921 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2019). 6. The district court plainly erred in imposing three special conditions of supervised release in its written judgment without providing notice or including them in its oral sentencing, in contravention of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i) and Tejeda's right to be present at his sentencing.
We interpreted this provision to mean that "[a] theory for suppression not advanced in district court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal" absent a showing of good cause. United States v. Keesee , 358 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 2004) ; see also United States v. Restrepo-Rua , 815 F.2d 1327, 1329 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). We thus construed Rule 12 ’s good-cause standard as displacing the plain-error standard under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), which ordinarily applies when a party presents an issue for the first time on appeal. See United States v. Wright , 215 F.3d 1020, 1026–27 (9th Cir. 2000).
Accordingly, Ms. LittleDog has waived her challenge to the legality of the first search. See United States v. Restrepo-Rua, 815 F.2d 1327, 1329 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). The district court did not clearly err in finding that Ms. LittleDog consented to the second warrantless search of her home where the undisputed suppression hearing testimony was that, after the officers knocked, Ms. LittleDog opened her front door, "invited [them] in," and then told them to "go look" for Mr. Gallardo in the house.
United States v. Murillo, 288 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir. 2002). Although we may in our discretion address the Miranda issue for "cause shown," id.; United States v. Restrepo-Rua, 815 F.2d 1327, 1329 (9th Cir. 1987), Jim has provided no explanation for her failure to bring the motion prior to trial. See United States v. Wright, 215 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2000).
We likewise do not address the government's argument that under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(C), new grounds for suppression are waived if not raised in a suppression motion "before trial." See United States v. Murillo, 288 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that ground for suppression not included in pre-trial motion to suppress was waived); United States v. Wright, 215 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2000) ("failure to bring a timely suppression motion constitutes a waiver of the issue"); United States v. Restrepo-Rua, 815 F.2d 1327, 1329 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) ("Just as a failure to file a timely motion to suppress evidence constitutes a waiver, so too does a failure to raise a particular ground in support of a motion to suppress."). III.
He thereby waived the argument and placed it beyond this court's ability to review for plain error. See FED. R.CRIM. P. 12(b)(3) (2002) (now Rule 12(b)(3)(C)), 12(f) (2002) (now Rule 12(e)); see, e.g.,United States v. Murillo, 288 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir.2002); United States v. Hawkins, 249 F.3d 867, 872 (9th Cir.2001); United States v. Wright, 215 F.3d 1020, 1026-27 (9th Cir.2000); United States v. Restrepo-Rua, 815 F.2d 1327, 1329 (9th Cir.1987). Here, waiver is especially appropriate because whether the police had reasonable suspicion to extend the questioning depends on factual questions the district court might have explored had Wiley presented the issue.
A court may, "in its discretion, grant relief from waiver for 'cause shown.' " United States v. Restrepo-Rua, 815 F.2d 1327, 1329 (9th Cir.1987). The district court apparently did find cause shown (namely, that the timing of the Miranda warning only became clear upon Inspector Hill's testimony), and denied the motion on the merits.