U.S. v. Ramsey

Full title: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MORRIS RAMSEY

Court: United States District Court, M.D. Alabama

Date published: Jul 24, 2007

CRIM. ACTION NO. 3:94cr25-MHT (WO) (M.D. Ala. Jul. 24, 2007)

Opinion

CRIM. ACTION NO. 3:94cr25-MHT (WO).

July 24, 2007

OPINION AND ORDER

MYRON THOMPSON, District Judge

In February 1994, defendant Morris Ramsey was named in two counts of a multi-count superseding indictment alleging a variety of crimes related to a cocaine distribution conspiracy. In April 1994, he was found guilty on both counts. Before the court now are several motions filed by Ramsey challenging the legality of his conviction. The court will deny Ramsey's motions.

I. BACKGROUND

On February 24, 1994, the grand jury returned a 28-count indictment charging 15 defendants with a variety of crimes related to cocaine distribution. Ramsey was named in two counts of the indictment and was found guilty on both counts on April 15, 1994. He was sentenced to a total term of 169 months, and his conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. United States v. Trammell, 107 F.3d 23 (11th Cir. 1997).

On August 15, 1997, Ramsey filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255.¹ Ramsey's one claim was that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his lawyer did not appeal the district court's failure to make an individualized finding about the quantity of drugs attributable to Ramsey. On August 12, 1999, this court granted Ramsey's motion, vacated his sentence, and ordered that he be resentenced.² Ramsey was resentenced to a total sentence of 300 months on March 23, 2000.³

1 Motion, etc., filed Aug. 15, 1997 (Doc. No. 585).

2 Order, filed Aug. 12, 1999 (Doc. No. 765).

3 Amended Judgment, filed Mar. 27, 2000 (Doc. No. 818).

Ramsey's second sentence was vacated by the Eleventh Circuit on appeal, and his case was remanded for a third sentencing in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000). At his third sentencing, this court sentenced Ramsey to a total term of 292 months.⁴ The Eleventh Circuit subsequently affirmed this sentence, United States v. Davis, 329 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2003).

4 Amended Judgment, filed Jan. 11, 2002 (Doc. No. 900)

The court now has before it two motions filed by Ramsey. First, in February 2004, Ramsey moved that the court allow him to inspect the records, maintained pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(c), regarding the grand jury that indicted him or, in the alternative, that the court dismiss the indictment against him based on the government's failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governing the conduct of the grand jury.⁵ Second, in March 2004, Ramsey filed a reply brief, which discusses further the grand jury claim raised in his first motion and incorporates a new claim for his immediate release.⁶

5 Motion for the Validation of the Criminal Indictment, etc., filed Feb. 3, 2004 (Doc. No. 955) (February Motion).

6 Traverse Answer to Government's Response, filed Mar. 12, 2004 (Doc. No. 958) (March Motion).

II. DISCUSSION

The court cannot the reach the merits of Ramsey's motions because it lacks jurisdiction to hear his claims. It is undisputed that Ramsey previously filed a § 2255 habeas petition in 1997.⁷ Before the court can consider a second or successive § 2255 motion, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit must certify that it contains "(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255. "Without authorization, the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a second or successive petition." Farris v. United States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003). It is also undisputed that Ramsey did not seek authorization from the Eleventh Circuit.

This presumptive bar applies equally to motions that are the functional equivalents of habeas petitions. See Farris, 333 F.3d at 1216; Gilreath v. State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 273 F.3d 932, 933 (11th Cir. 2001). A motion or petition is the functional equivalent of a habeas petition when "a judgment in favor of the [petitioner] would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence." Bradley v. Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287, 1290 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2372 (1994)). To make the "functional equivalent" determination, the court looks at the relief the petitioner seeks. Gilreath, 273 F.3d at 933.

Ramsey's February motion alleges grand jury error. He challenges whether the required 12 grand jurors concurred in the indictment and whether the indictment was returned in open court. Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(f). Ramsey's ultimate argument is that because the grand jury rules were not followed, this court never had jurisdiction over him. There is, by no means, agreement on Ramsey's assumption that a failure to follow Rule 6(f) would deprive this court of jurisdiction, see, e.g., United States v. Engiwe, 17 F. Supp. 2d 390, 393 (E.D. Pa. 1998), however it is clear that Ramsey seeks to have his conviction and sentence invalidated. He writes that his "SENTENCE IS VOID AND SUBSEQUENTLY ILLEGAL AS A RESULT OF THIS ERROR," and in his prayer for relief, he seeks the "immediate dismissal of the indictment" and his "immediate release . . . from his illegal confinement and custody."⁸ Accordingly, the court finds that Ramsey's February motion is the functional equivalent of a habeas petition and thus must be dismissed.

8 February Motion at 10, 11.

Ramsey's March motion raises several issues. He reiterates the above argument, he raises a new grand jury argument, he argues prosecutorial misconduct and fraud on the court premised on the purported grand jury errors, and he raises a commerce clause challenge. Again, Ramsey asks that the court "[i]mmediately dismiss the indictment" against him and "issue an Order of Release to the Bureau of Prisons, ordering [his] immediate release from his illegal confinement."⁹ Based on the nature of Ramsey's claims and the relief he seeks, the court finds that his motion is the equivalent of a habeas petition and thus must be dismissed.

9 March Motion at 19.

III. CONCLUSION

The court concludes that Ramsey's two motions are the functional equivalents of habeas corpus petitions, and, therefore, the court does no have jurisdiction to hear them because Ramsey did not obtain certification from the Eleventh Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255.

Accordingly it is ORDERED that:

(1) Petitioner Morris Ramsey's motion for the validation of the criminal indictment, etc. (Doc. No. 955) is denied;

(2) Petitioner Ramsey's motion for immediate release incorporated within the traverse answer to government's response (Doc. No. 958) is denied.