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rejecting the defendant's "claims that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over him because he is not a citizen of the United States but rather 'lives within his own skin'"
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CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 03-379
February 4, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Now before the Court are Defendant's pro se Motions to Dismiss Indictment (docket nos. 13, 15, and 19) and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (docket no. 24). On June 6, 2003, Defendant was indicted for possession with the intent to distribute more than 500 grams of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(a), and possession of firearms and ammunition in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Defendant was appointed counsel and, at his request, the Court appointed different counsel for him. Despite having counsel, Defendant has persisted in his pro se attempts to get his indictment dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and for alleged violations of the Uniform Commercial Code and associated regulations. Even when Defendant's Motions are evaluated under the more lenient standard accorded pro se submissions, they are without merit.
See the Court's Order of November 25, 2003 (docket no. 16).
Defendant's first ground for dismissal is lack of subject matter jurisdiction. He claims that this Court has no subject matter jurisdiction because neither the place of his arrest nor his home are on federal lands or within federal territories. However, 21 U.S.C. § 841 and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) do not rest on federal territorial jurisdiction, but rather on the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 ("Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states . . ."); United States v. Orozco, 98 F.3d 105, 106-07 (3d Cir. 1996);Kuromiya v. U.S., 37 F. Supp.2d 717, 723-24 (E.D. Pa. 1999), citing United States v. Jackson. 111 F.3d 101, 102 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 878 (1997). As the Commerce Clause grants federal legislative jurisdiction over the trade in illegal narcotics, no federal territorial jurisdiction is required in this case. As both Bucks County and Philadelphia are within the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, this is the appropriate federal court to handle violations of federal law in those locations. Accordingly, subject matter jurisdiction is proper.
The Government does not dispute that this case does not involve federal lands or territories. Defendant was arrested on October 24, 2002 in Milford Township, Bucks County, which is within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. His residence, 852 Carver St., Philadelphia, is also within Pennsylvania's jurisdiction.
The Commerce Clause also provides for federal criminal jurisdiction over firearms that traveled in interstate commerce. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971); U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-560 (1995).
Defendant also claims that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over him because he is not a citizen of the United States but rather "lives within his own skin." Affidavit of the Living Breathing Gensman by Special Visitation, Plain Statement of Facts, ¶ 3-4. However, a Defendant is not required to be a United States citizen in order for there to be personal jurisdiction over him. Instead, the relevant question is whether his criminal behavior took place in the United States or directed his illegal acts at the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 3231-32; see, e.g., U.S. v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 96 (2d Cir. 2003); U.S. v. Hill, 279 F.3d 731, 739-740 (9th Cir. 2002). Indeed, the docket of this Court contains numerous cases of criminal actions brought against non-citizens who violated federal law while in this country. Accordingly, the Court finds that it has personal jurisdiction over Defendant in this matter.
The Court makes no finding at this time as to Defendant's citizenship.
Finally, Defendant makes several more claims, purportedly under the Uniform Commercial Code and other commercial statutes. Suffice it to say that nothing in this case involves or is governed by the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code or any other commercial statute or agreement, that surety is not required in a federal criminal case, and that the remainder of Defendant's allegations are equally meritless.
In Defendant's Motions and Petition, the Court has found, inter alia, a request for surety, the allegation that the United States is bankrupt, the assertion that the fringe color of the United States flag is improper, several "notices" that the government's "dishonor" is being "accepted for value" by Defendant, repeated demands that the United States "settle" his indictment by paying him millions of dollars, and claims under the United States Bankruptcy Code, "Regulation Z," diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, and the rules governing commercial paper issued by the United States. The majority of these claims were purportedly written by Defendant as an appointed representative for an entity named Mario G. Ramos(c)1982, a distinction also alleged to have legal significance. Defendant also alleges that his appointed attorney is a "spy for the accusers" uninterested in protecting his rights before this "illegal, sham and kangaroo court."
Accordingly, Defendant's Motions and Petition will be denied.
ORDER
AND NOW, this ___ day of February, 2004, upon consideration of Defendant's pro se Motions to Dismiss Indictment (docket nos. 13, 15, and 19), Defendant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (docket no. 24), and the Government's Response thereto (docket no. 22), it is ORDERED that the Motions and Petition are DENIED for the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum.