We therefore conclude that the location of the interview cuts against Edrington. See, e.g., Vreeland, 684 F.3d at 660 (interview at probation office not custodial); Cranley, 350 F.3d at 619-20 (same); United States v. Nieblas, 115 F.3d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1997) (same); United States v. Howard, 115 F.3d 1151, 1154-55 (4th Cir. 1997) (same); United States v. Rainey, 404 F. App'x 46, 56 (7th Cir. 2010) (same). Length and Manner of Questioning.
The Seventh Circuit held, even where a probation officer accompanies law enforcement, “fear of [probation] revocation alone is not a sufficient ground” for finding a defendant’s statements involuntary, given the lack of other coercive conditions of the interview. United States v. Rainey, 404 F. App’x 46, 55-56 (7th Cir. 2010). Even supposing a sufficiently articulate threat of consequences to a probationer might render subsequent statements involuntary, the references to Walton’s probation status are, at best, vague.
The Court does find that mitigating factors exist in the characteristics of Defendant that support a downward variance from the Guideline range. Defendant has taken steps to address his alcohol addiction through his attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous. Since Defendant attributes his conduct in this case, at least in part, to his alcohol addiction, his ongoing treatment not only demonstrates remorse but also shows that he is taking affirmative steps to lessen his recidivism risk. United States v. Rainey, 404 Fed. Appx. 46, 53 (7th Cir. 2010). Defendant has a long history of employment and has financially supported his wife and child.
Taking Johnson's narrative at face value, he says that officers tricked him into coming to the parking lot at the federal courthouse in East Saint Louis, asked him if he would talk with them, advised him that he was not under arrest and that he did not have to speak with them, and then questioned him for two-and-one-half hours in an eight-foot-by-ten-foot waiting room in the courthouse, during which Johnson made some inculpatory statements about his involvement in the housing scheme. A few parts of Johnson's narrative suggest that the questioning was custodial, but a closer look reveals that these points aren't as problematic as Johnson makes them out to be. Johnson focuses first on the fact that police tricked him into coming to the parking lot prior to the interview, but police trickery doesn't always mean that an interview was non-consensual, United States v. Martinez, 602 F. App'x 658, 659 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Rainey, 404 F. App'x 46, 56 (7th Cir. 2010), and the police's ruse here—quite different from the tricks where courts have suggested a lack of consent to speak with police—ended at the parking lot of the courthouse, after which Johnson was told that he could leave and was under no obligation to talk with police. Johnson also protests the authorities' decision to transport him to another location for the interview, but the police could hardly question him in his city office, especially given that their investigation concerned public corruption in that office.
Although Mohammadi was taken to the ICE office in the agents' vehicle, he did not ask to drive himself and this was done, in part, for logistical reasons and does not on its own point toward custody. Compare United States v. Fazio, 914 F.2d 950, 956 (7th Cir. 1990) (defendant drove separately in own vehicle to municipal building to give statement to police, suggesting he was not in custody), with United States v. Rainey, 404 F. App'x 46, 56 (7th Cir. 2010) (defendant not in custody where brought to probation office in non-coercive way in government vehicle and was told that she was free to leave and would receive a ride home). The interview also was not necessarily rendered a custodial one by the fact that Svendson accompanied Mohammadi to the restroom where part of the reason for the escort was that Mohammadi needed to be let back into the secured ICE office, a security requirement applicable to all individuals visiting that office.
); United States v. Wilson, 2010 WL 4561381, *2 (4th Cir. Nov. 12, 2010) (unpub.); United States v. Doggins, 2011 WL 438935 (5th Cir. Feb. 9, 2011); United States v. Carradine, 621 F.3d 575, 580 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Bell, 624 F.3d 803, 814 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Taylor, ___ F.3d ___, 2010 WL 5019904, *3 (7th Cir. Dec. 10, 2010); United States. v. Rainey, 2010 WL 5018527, *4 (7th Cir. Dec. 8, 2010) (unpub.); United States v. Brewer, 624 F.3d 900, 909 n. 7 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Brown, 2010 WL 3958760, *1 (8th Cir. Oct. 12, 2010) (unpub.
probation office, where defendant was interrogated for fifteen to twenty minutes by federal agents); United States v. Ingino , supra, 845 Fed. Appx. at 137–38 (defendant was not in custody during thirty minute interrogation in probation office by two state troopers, following mandatory meeting with probation officer, when defendant was told he was not under arrest and troopers did not use overt coercion); United States v. Guerrier , supra, 669 F.3d at 4–6 (defendant was not in custody when he was interrogated by two law enforcement officers for twenty to twenty-five minutes in unmarked police car, in presence of parole officer, following regularly scheduled meeting with parole officer); United States v. Aldridge , 664 F.3d 705, 709, 711–12 (8th Cir. 2011) (defendant was not in custody when ordered by probation officer to report to courthouse, where he agreed to be questioned by federal agents, and trial court did not clearly err in finding that defendant acquiesced to questioning); United States v. Rainey , 404 Fed. Appx. 46, 55–56 (7th Cir. 2010) (defendant was not in custody when probation officer and detective brought defendant to probation office, then detectives interrogated her for sixty to ninety minutes), cert. denied sub nom. Cobb v. United States , 562 U.S. 1236, 131 S. Ct. 1512, 179 L. Ed. 2d 335 (2011), and cert. denied, 563 U.S. 950, 131 S. Ct. 2127, 179 L. Ed. 2d 917 (2011) ; United States v. Cranley , 350 F.3d 617, 618–19 (7th Cir. 2003) (interrogation by federal agent in probation office was not custodial); United States v. Howard , 115 F.3d 1151, 1154–55 (4th Cir. 1997) (defendant was not in custody when federal agents met him at airport, and he agreed to accompany them to probation office for questioning, insofar as, although there was no indication that defendant was told he was free to leave or not under arrest, agents did not handcuff or otherwise restrain defendant or restrict his use of phone); United States v. Ruggles , supra, 70 F.3d at 264 (defendant was not in custody when probation officer scheduled