Opinion
CASE NO. 07-cr-00129-DME.
June 14, 2007
ORDER
Defendant Jose Luis Porras-Astorga moves to continue his trial pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(iv). Based on Porras-Astorga's assertions in his written motion and those made by the parties during the June 13, 2007, hearing, this court finds that the ends of justice served by granting a continuance in this matter outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
Although the court concludes that this case is neither unusual nor overly complex, the court finds that defense counsel, exercising due diligence, requires an additional thirty days to investigate the Government's case, including interviewing witnesses and reviewing discovery, before explaining the options available to Defendant Porras-Astorga. In particular, defense counsel needs this additional time to confer with Defendant Porras-Astorga to consider the Government's offer of a plea deal.
These facts convince this court that the ends of justice served by the granting of a continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial, as required by § 3161(h)(8)(A). The defendant's motion to continue is therefore GRANTED pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(iv), and the period of continuance shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must occur under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1), and in computing the time limitation upon detention of the defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 3164(b).
Trial in this matter remains a four-day jury trial on the docket of Judge David M. Ebel in the U.S. District Courthouse Courtroom C201, 2d Floor (Byron G. Rogers Courthouse), 1961 Stout Street, Denver, Colorado, and is continued until Monday, July 16, 2007, to begin at 9:00 a.m. The Final Trial Preparation Conference will take place on July 9, 2007, at 10:00 a.m. Pursuant to Local Rule D.C.Colo.LCrR 11.1, any Notice of Disposition shall be filed no later than fourteen days before the revised trial date. Jury instructions must be filed and served at least one week prior to the Final Trial Preparation Conference.
Further, the court now clarifies its order of April 20, 2007, granting a previous continuance of trial on Defendant Porras-Astorga's motion. Although not specified in the text of the prior order, the basis for the earlier continuance was the withdrawal of the Defendant's previous counsel and the substitution of his present counsel. Because the substitution of counsel occurred only one month prior to the previously scheduled trial date of May 21, 2007, proceeding would have unreasonably denied the Defendant continuity of counsel. These facts convinced this court that the ends of justice served by the granting of the earlier continuance outweighed the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial, as required by § 3161(h)(8)(A). Accordingly, the Defendant's first motion to continue was therefore granted pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(iv), and the period of that earlier continuance shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must occur under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1), and in computing the time limitation upon detention of the defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 3164(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.