Opinion
Case No. 97 C 4197
October 18, 2000
Attorney for Peitioner, Curtis Vaughn, N-21174 [NTC] [PRO SE] Hill-HIL, Hill Correctional Center, Galesburg, IL.
Attorney for Defendant(s), Darryl Belmonte Simko, William Lloyd Browers, Illinois Attorney General's Office, 100 West Randolph Street 12th Floor, Chicago, IL.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Curtis Vaughn's motion for an issuance of a certificate of appealability (the "COA") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. On July 10, 2000, the Court denied Vaughn's petition for a writ of habeas corpus on grounds that (1) most of his claims had been procedurally defaulted, and (2) that his only surviving claim — that his 65-year term sentence violated Due Process and Equal Protection — lacked merit. Vaughn seeks a COA with respect to all of the Court's finding.
DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, the Court notes that Vaughn's request for a COA is technically untimely. Vaughn filed the motion on August 14, 2000, more than thirty days after the entry of this Court's order on July 10, 2000. However, Vaughn also filed a motion for extension of time, explaining that his prison facility had been on lock-down, and, therefore, he did not have the ability to file the motion in time. It is within the discretion of the district court to grant an extension of time in which to file an appeal. United States v. Griffin, 88 F. Supp.2d 891, 892 (N.D. Ill. 2000). Accordingly, in light of the circumstances and the fact that petitioner is proceeding pro se, the Court grants Vaughn the extension of time and will consider his motion for a COA.
However, a COA under § 2253(c) will issue only when the petitioner makes a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, a demonstration that includes. showing that reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Slack v. McDaniel, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 1603-04 (2000) (internal quotes omitted, citation omitted). Nothing in Vaughn's motion suggests that such is the case. First, the Court found most of Vaughn's claims to have been procedurally defaulted because they were either (1) never pursued to the Supreme Court of Illinois for discretionary review; (2) were not cognizable as a federal habeas claim as a matter of law; or (3) had been dismissed on independent and adequate state law grounds. These are "plain procedural bars which the Court was correct to invoke given the record, and Vaughn adds nothing to demonstrate that a reasonable jurist could conclude otherwise. Slack, 120 S.Ct. at 1604. Vaughn is especially adamant that the Court erred in finding that his claims relating to his fitness to stand trial were procedurally defaulted, citing to a transcript of a hearing before the Illinois trial court regarding the first of two post-conviction petitions. The transcript indeed contains evidence that the issue of Vaughn's fitness was raised during the first stage of his post-conviction petition. However, this evidence was never presented to this Court during its initial consideration of Vaughn's habeas petition. Moreover, the Court found that none of Vaughn's post-conviction petitions were properly pursued to the Supreme Court of Illinois for discretionary review. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (holding that failure to present an issue for discretionary review to the state's highest court constitutes waiver). Therefore, even if Vaughn's fitness was questioned at some point during his post-conviction proceedings, the issue was waived by Vaughn's failure to complete a full round of review in accordance with the state procedural rules.
Second, the Court found that Vaughn's only remaining claim — that his 65-year term of sentence was disproportionate — was without merit because the sentence fell within the ambit of state law and was not "fundamentally unfair." Vaughn is concerned that this Court misconstrued his claim by interpreting it as an Eighth Amendment claim as opposed to a claim under the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses as he intended. But the Seventh Circuit has explicitly declined to open new avenues for attacking sentences under the Due Process or Equal Protection clauses given that the Eighth Amendment already explicitly addresses the constitutionality of punishments. Holman v. Page, 95 F.3d 481, 485-86 (7th Cir. 1996). Furthermore, it is well-settled law that as long as a defendant's sentence falls within state law and is appropriate to his crime, federal courts will not overturn state sentencing determinations. Gleason v. Welborn, 42 F.3d 1107, 1112 (7th Cir. 1994).
CONCLUSION
The Court grants Vaughn's motion for an extension of time to file, instanter, his motion for a certificate of appealability. However, since Vaughn cannot demons e that jurists could reasonably disagree with this of his writ of habeas corpus, Vaughn's motion for a certificate of appealability is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.